ISSN 1829-4618

THE IMPACT OF MILITARY SCHOOLS ON THE IRAQI ARMY AT THE EVE OF OF THE FIRST GULF WAR

By: Arkadi Grigoryan, Deputy Head of the RA Command and Staff Institute named after V. Sargsyan of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel, applicant of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RA NAS
E-Mail: arkadigrigoryan82@gmail.com

The article examines the origins, development, and consequences of the influence of Western and Soviet military schools on the formation of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Using a historical-comparative approach, the author analyzes the reasons behind the failure of the decision-making freedoms theoretically granted to commanders through British and French military traditions.
At the same time, the problems of the officer corps operating under the rigid vertical of Soviet rule in the Iran-Iraq War are analyzed, and it is documented that in the first Gulf War, that officer corps, having the fourth most massive army in the world, suffered a crushing defeat not only in the technological field, but first of all in the culture of military management.
Through the influence of military schools on the Iraqi army, the author highlights the negative consequences of the rigid Soviet-style vertical management during the army-building phase of the RA Armed Forces during the 4-day and 44-day military operations in Artsakh.

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