

**TROOPS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND THE
DIFFERENCE OF CULTURES. Part II
(Variants and Lessons of Russian, Soviet and Other Models for Us)**

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Abstract

Due to the absence of domestic military science as a separate branch of science, the topic touched on by the USSR's GS and management culture, the largest bearer of the German model after the FWW, remains an open topic. The Russian and especially the Soviet model was based on the Prussian model and even more today continues to bear the influence of the latter, but in a more refined form. The Russian army was one of the first in the world to follow Prussian innovations. The British model was and still is unacceptable to the Russian mentality and value system. The problem is that liberalism has always been punished in this country, serfdom is still very deep in public perception. It should also be noted that the influence of the Soviet model among the post-Soviet countries was quite large and is still large. But in the second decade of the 20th century, a number of post-Soviet countries began to abandon this model one after another. Although the Soviet model seems to be the main one among the CSTO countries, nevertheless, as a result of the reforms taking place in the Armenian Army after the 44-Day War of 2020, there are tendencies to abandon that model. We hope that they will have a fundamental nature.

Keywords: army, troops, General Staff, Military school, war, Russia, USSR, Armenia, Artsakh

Russian and Soviet models

Even Peter the Great approved the service of general-quartermasters¹, which, however, had a very symbolic meaning. For the first time, this institution was more or

¹ General Staff 1892.

less applied by Catherine II, who, unlike her husband, followed the military innovations of her relative more quietly. However, this Russian body did not have the freedom and powers that existed in the German and French armies. Catherine II placed this structure under the subordination of the vice-president of the military collegium². In 1815 following Bonaparte's example, Alexander I greatly enlarged this body and assigned it extensive preparatory functions, but only preparatory and not planning and governing. In the same year, the post of naval minister was also created on the example of Britain. At this time, the Russian GS was more of an educational institution. There was more education, mapping and memoir writing than planning.

In 1832, the position of Chief of the General Staff was eliminated and the Academy of the General Staff was created instead. Emperor Nicholas I did not like that structure. Until the Crimean War in the Russian Empire, the structure was called the Military Scientific Committee instead of the General Staff³. Like European countries, Russia also understood that military training and military education are interrelated phenomena, and it is necessary to have academies where officers of all ranks will receive professional education. However, in this case too, the Russian army was significantly inferior to its competitors. In 1856, there were only 23 military educational institutions in Russia, while almost twice as many were needed. But that wasn't all the trouble. Head of Military General Staff Academy I. O. Sukhozanet, who was the brother of the Minister of Defense, liked to point out⁴: "It is possible to win without science, but never without discipline." And this was not his best idea, there was also a stronger one: "Science in military work is nothing more than a button for a uniform. A uniform cannot be worn without a button, but a button is not the whole uniform." Here was the situation.

The defeat in the Crimean War was a great impetus to reorganize this structure and in 1866 it became the General Staff of the Russian Imperial Army, receiving specific functions in planning, mobilization and other matters⁵. The role of General N. N. Obruchev in this case was extremely large, who, having served in the General Staff for a long time, tried to turn it into a real planner and a structure that prepares the troops for war. However, as usual, emperors and military ministers were obstructing the process. An attempt to create a completely independent GS was made especially in 1881, when the military minister D. A. Milutin, who, being a reforming minister, still remained a supporter of centralized government, left office. After his departure, the followers of Field Marshal A.I. Baryatinsky, a staunch supporter of the independent GS, tried to bring the case to life. General P. E. Kotzebue's commission was created, but after long discussions, nothing changed⁶.

² General Staff of the Russian Army 2006: 20-26, 480.

³ Ayrapetov 1998: 88.

⁴ Glinoetsky 1882: 106.

⁵ General Staff of the Russian Army 2006: 480; 20-26.

⁶ Zayonchkovsky 1973: 100-102.

In 1905, the head of this structure received the right to personally report to the emperor, following the example of the German GS, but it did not last long. Three years later, the head of the General Staff was again deprived of that right. The Russian military system was becoming over-centralized because absolute power was so deeply entrenched in the culture of Russian government, and such conclusions were drawn from the Russo-Japanese War. In such a situation, in essence, the Russian General Staff entered the FWW, during which it was reorganized into the Staff of the Supreme Commander.

After the establishment of Soviet rule, the new Russian General Staff was formed almost on the same principle, undergoing certain changes over time. In general, as we have already mentioned, this was a body that, on the one hand, performed planning functions, and on the other hand, it did not have much influence on the troops and military commanders, because the leaders of the country, who were the commanders-in-chief, were very influential and autocratic in Russia. Political leaders continued to be such in the Soviet country, and military ministers received greater powers than in Tsarist Russia, which had a greater impact on the significance of the General Staff itself. In this system, almost everything at the operational level in the army was decided by the minister of defense, who sometimes listened to the advice of the General Staff and gave instructions so that the General Staff could take the steps he decided to the troops. In other words, the General Staff planned and implemented the minister's decisions as much as possible. All this made the role of the military minister and the leaders of the party's central committee even more absolute, removing all kinds of competition and dissent in the army in the already over-centralized government and rather poor educational environment.

There was only one opinion in the USSR - it was the opinion of Stalin, who without restraint presented himself as a "genius" military theoretician and figure. Stalin did not express dissatisfaction at all among the seven chiefs of the General Staff of the Red Army, or almost did not express dissatisfaction with only one, Marshal Shaposhnikov, who was, to put it mildly, a modest figure who never opposed the Supreme Commander on any issue. Others were labeled in one way or another, some with very harsh words.

In such an atmosphere, where officers, regardless of their background, had no value and could be shot in a day, there could be no effective administration.

The Soviet state completely destroyed the officer's initiative. Only a few military proverbs are enough to understand it: "The commander is always right, if you don't think it's right, then look at the first thought", "Do I need any intellect when the commander decides in the military unit, and my wife at home?", "As many "stupid people" there are in our army, the stronger our defense is", "Initiative is punishable". Such sayings can be continued for a long time. It is surprising that famous Soviet military commanders often

write about the importance of proactive commanders⁷, while they themselves were often punished for it, and they themselves punished their subordinates. Having already not a brilliant situation in this case, the leadership of the USSR applied another factor that kills initiative and paralyzes the management system: the institution of commissars in the troops⁸. As L. Mekhlis openly said - "The commissars were the ears and eyes of the party in the army"⁹.

These officials caused indescribable damage to the Red Army's command system, these officials had the right to cancel the commanders' orders and viewed everything with suspicion. By implementing the party's instructions, they were the main implementers of the destruction of the quality squad of the troops.

In 1940, after great protests and discussions, the sole command system was restored in the Soviet army¹⁰. It was not so easily achieved in the troops, especially since the commanders, who had barely strengthened their positions, lost that right again after the first battles of the Great Patriotic War¹¹. Stalin did not understand that the defeats in the Finnish war and in the first two years of the Great Patriotic War were not due to the lack of commissars, but the result of their destructive activities. Sole leadership was re-established only in October 1942¹². Of course, this changed the situation significantly, but there were many other reasons why the inflexible Soviet system of governance could not compete with the German and even more so the British system. The first is, of course, personnel education and the resulting mindset.

The basis of the management system is the education of personnel, in which the German military school was ahead of all countries. However, even in the classical Prussian school, the officer had to be educated, and the administration did not allow self-deception, which was due to the atmosphere of fear in the USSR. This was already a more surrogate and impoverished system.

As an example, let us recall that German officers were the most educated specialists in the world before the World War Two. Most of the senior officers were of noble origin. Education is rather important in a military professionalism. For example, a good specialist cannot be well educated; a good specialist cannot be guided by stereotypes. Therefore, a good commander should have the freedom to make decisions. In that sense, the approaches of the representatives of the quantitative and

⁷ The Great Patriotic War 2014; Russian Archive. The Great Patriotic War 1993: 145.

⁸ Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR at a meeting on January 31, 1957 found that the criminal case against M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. P. Uborevich, I. E. Yakir and others was falsified and decided to overturn the verdict, See: Russian Archive. The Great Patriotic War 1994: 310.

⁹ XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party 1939: 274.

¹⁰ Russian Archive. The Great Patriotic War 1993: 97.

¹¹ Order on combat and political training of troops for the 1941 academic year, N 30, January 21, 1941, Russian Archive. The Great Patriotic War 1994: 207.

¹² Russian State Military Archive, fund 4, inv. 15, list 30, sheet 739.

qualitative schools of military management are in a classic struggle. The Soviet model was based on quantitative approaches and the German model on qualitative.

The distorted Prussian system in the USSR can be explained by the following formula: show-allow-control.

And the modernized German system and the British system operate according to this formula: teach-trust-monitor.

Examples of other models

A more extreme version of the Soviet model is the Arab model, which was referred to by the American researcher, Colonel Norwell Atkin. He explains very clearly that the rank in the Arab armies has no value; it is almost a disenfranchised body. Commanders of all echelons try to keep the information they have available secret and under no circumstances inform subordinates, whom they consider ignorant as a rule, and this is in all echelons. The state of education is very bad. It is monotonous, based on making by heart¹³. As a result, subordinates hate officers, officers do not trust subordinates, commanders do not make decisions independently, etc. The Arab system of governance has worse manifestations that have a more destructive effect on the cause. An American colonel who worked for many years in the Arab armies clearly mentions several traditions that are destructive to any army.

1. Distrust of strangers. Only tribesmen, relatives, friends are trustworthy, for example, various authors consider this to be one of the reasons for the defeat of the Egyptian army¹⁴.
2. Mistrust and lack of cooperation even between states, for example, according to the American colonel Abdel Nasser clearly lied to King Hussein in 1967 about air superiority¹⁵. In 1973 Sadat similarly lied to the Allies about his war tactics¹⁶. No country had sent an officer to the Allied army. A Saudi commander, during the Gulf War, after an attack by the Iraqi army, reports in writing to the US commander in chief that he cannot hold the city, but then blames the US military for failing to hold the city.
3. Leaders of Arab countries like to create bodies of duplication of functions, more reliable control systems, armies within armies, etc.¹⁷ It seems to them that two bodies doing the same work will achieve a better quality by competing, but this is a great hindrance.

¹³ De Atkine 1999.

¹⁴ Harkabi 1967: 678-679.

¹⁵ Lunt 1989: 99.

¹⁶ Seale 1988: 97-99; Shazly 1980: 21, 37.

¹⁷ Bill, Springborg 1990: 262.

4. Exercise is of more formality than substantive benefit. Harmonization and mutual cooperation during military exercises above the battalion are not real, they are of a formal nature, and the military units do not work together. Everything is dramatized.

In an inflexible management system, where dissent is not accepted, where orders are not discussed, where the idea that the commander is always right is reinforced since the cadet years, no idea can be born; no creative thought can be born. The author has interacted several times with different Arab armies in different countries, and I can confirm that they clearly have this rule: every subordinate is a slave of his superior¹⁸.

These are the Russian and Arab institutional similarities, which may be slightly different in degree, but they are basically the same. It should be noted here that the Russian (Soviet) army is traditionally a Ground Forces, with the navy and air force playing the role of auxiliary forces. Therefore, everything is decided by the warlords, who as a rule became ministers and heads of the General Staff. It is noteworthy that no admiral or aviation general in the Russian (Soviet) army has ever held the position of Minister of Defense or Chief of Staff. And in the USSR years, even in the case of the greatest growth of these military forces in the Soviet army, out of the air force and the navy, it was allowed to have one chief marshal and one admiral of the USSR, which was equal to the title of marshal of the GF of the Soviet Union. Two aviators, A. A. Novikov and A. E. Golovanov, who received that title during the World War Two, but they were never in active positions at the same time. No matter how strange it is, even in the army that declared artillery “god of war”, two chief marshals of artillery did not serve at the same time. The only exception were two admirals, N. Kuznetsov and H. Isakov, who simultaneously held that title for several months, until the first was finally demobilized. In general, the post of the Soviet Navy Minister is a separate topic of discussion, which was established in 1938, but it could not compete with the Soviet Union in any way, because first of all it had very small forces, a very small budget and very few personnel, of which, as we mentioned, only one had the highest military rank. This ministry was abolished in 1946, and the head of the Navy Forces became the deputy minister of defense of the USSR¹⁹. However, in 1950, the Ministry of the Navy was created again. Stalin tried to justify this step by the appearance of nuclear weapons in the navy, but under the pressure of the ground marshals, whose number and

¹⁸ As in the ancient Roman proverb, the commander of any echelon of the Arab army does not think of his freedoms, but dreams of having a subordinate, that is, a slave. The words of an unknown arms dealer about the armies of Arab countries were also interesting. While talking to the author, the arms dealer, who had been engaged in arms trade in many countries of the world for several dozen years, expressed such an idea: “In Arab countries, newly acquired weapons are treated like camels, horses and women. They admire them, they use them at the moment they get them, but the next day they forget about them because they have too much of it and get a newer one.”

¹⁹ Kuzin 1996.

influence reached a “godlike” level after 1945, this ministry survived until Stalin’s death²⁰.

Moreover, the famous marshal G. Zhukov, who first abolished the ministry, then retaliated with Admiral Kuznetsov. By the way, at the same time, the same all-powerful marshals also “successfully buried” the projects of Soviet aircraft carriers.

All this means that any collegial decision was simply not possible in the Soviet army, that no military unit had the opportunity to compete with the Ground Forces.

Here we think it is appropriate to mention that even in Germany during the interwar years and especially after 1945, the defense ministers were mostly civilians. One of the most interesting episodes is also the fact that under Hitler, the longest-serving head of the General Staff was Artillery General Keitel, and after Hitler’s death, despite being in a very difficult situation, Admiral Karl Dönitz, whose flexibility of mind amazed everyone, was appointed the de facto leader and supreme commander of Germany. And it is pointless to even mention Great Britain and the USA, because the ministers of defense in these countries are sometimes also admirals, and more often civilians.

The situation in Russia has not changed much in this respect. After the collapse of the USSR, several unsuccessful attempts were made to improve the command system and the army in general, after which they returned to the “good old” Soviet model. As strange as it is, in a country where there is no freedom of speech in the press, where the national intelligentsia does not have free mindset, there cannot be a healthy and conscious officer corps, and therefore good governance. In the Russian army, the highest level of troop management is still maintained through the General Staff, as well as the institution of the military minister, which has not justified itself for a long time, especially in large countries. It is important to note here that there can be no competition in terms of resource allocation and doctrinal development among the military forces, as the Russian Air Force and especially the Navy remain as auxiliary military forces. Moreover, in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the navy and the air force proved that they are not capable of carrying out any significant strategic operation. Their share and influence in the armed forces remains low compared to other countries. The first to suffer from military budget cuts is the Navy, then the Air Force, and finally only the Army.

Here we also consider some examples from other countries. First let us look at Japan, which was one of the first and best carriers of the Prussian model. The General Staff of the Japanese Army was created on the model of the Prussian Army in 1871, after the future founders of the Japanese Army, Generals Iwao Oyama and Yamagata Aritomo, were trained in the Prussian Army²¹. They were the first and second Heads of the General Staff and were then re-appointed to that position at least twice. Like the Prussian 1878, the Japanese GS had great powers, and unlike the Russian GS, the

²⁰ Achkasov et al. 1988: 522-533.

²¹ Kitaoka 1994: 67-83.

head of the GS had the right to access and report to the emperor²². In 1889, the General Staff of the Japanese Navy was created, which became a separate structure and could plan separate military operations²³. An interesting thing here is that when the Kaiser HQ was formed in Japan during the war, the HQ of the British-style Navy had the same rights and rank as the Army. This was understandable in that the political weight of the Japanese fleet was too great.

After Japan's defeat in the World War Two, this model ceased to exist, and the modern self-defense forces of Japan are very similar to the American model in their structure and organization, but they are still weak and do not yet have a clear strategy.

The model of the Israeli army's GS is interesting, which is a mixture of the Prussian and American models, as well as the entire IDF. Here, the GS consists directly of departments, and the head is the head of the GS, who has only one deputy, whose rank is equal to the ranks of the heads of departments. Only the head of the General Staff has the rank of lieutenant general, the others have the rank of major general. The Head of the General Staff is appointed for three years, with the right to stay for one more year. The Minister of Defense is a political position and does not participate in the management of the troops.

In the 1955 reorganized German army after the World War Two, the GS, as such, in the classical sense, was not created. The structure, called the Army Command, also includes the command of the Navy and the Air Force, and appoints admirals and air force generals to the highest post. The highest military officer was called the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, who in 1957 received essentially the same functions as the Chief of the General Staff. However, the German model underwent the biggest significant change, all military units received equal rights in the leadership of the military. At least two admirals and two air force generals have held the position, with the longest, more than eight years, held by Artillery General Volker Weicker. Thus, the classic Prussian model took on British overtones even in Germany.

Recently, the Chinese army has become unprecedentedly powerful. It has made great strides ahead of the communist, Mao Zedong army and has come closer to the American army in terms of military technique and structure. Of course, it is still far from the American military model, but every day it is moving more and more away from the Soviet and Communist Chinese model. We will further write about the structure and armament of the Chinese army. However, having created quite mobile and self-sufficient units and troops, the Chinese army, unfortunately, still maintains an inflexible system of the communist rule. The highest actual governing body of the military in China is the Central Military Council (CMC), where the Minister of Defense and his deputies are members of that council, and the chief is the de facto head of the country and party. The CMC consists of five departments, three commissions, six departments

²² *Edgerton 1999.*

²³ *Sadao 2005; Schencking 2006.*

and headquarters²⁴. The General Staff of the Chinese Army has already been transformed into a unified body, which is more similar in structure to the American system. For the first time, the Chinese Army's GF received its own headquarters. At first glance, this is very good, that the military has its own headquarters, but since it is directly subordinated to this party-oriented body, its effectiveness is under a big question. Here the party decides and manages everything, the army is highly party-oriented, and most of the officers are communists. The Chinese army still retains the right to participate in internal political processes; moreover, the troops of the entire central command have such problems. Such a system cannot be flexible and efficient under modern conditions. In addition, very recently, high-ranking military members of this body were arrested for corruption. It is true that the structural reforms of the Chinese army began in 2016, but as it turns out that the political management has become stricter, which worsens the situation²⁵. On October 22, 2022, the new composition of the CMC was elected, where a military personnel loyal to Xi Jinping was gathered²⁶. In the last two years, the management of the Chinese army has become more rigid and subordinated to the political leadership.

Thus, we can summarize that those armies that give great importance to literate and open-minded officers, emphasize preparation, knowledge and quality in general, always make innovations with a creative mindset and develop the military work. Armies, that constantly emphasize numbers, inert reactions, have rigid control and do not develop.

Here is the difference between the Prussian and British models.

We believe that if the British model has a certain disadvantage, it also has some major advantage that the opposite model does not have. It is the ability to quickly correct mistakes and omissions by free and independent commanders. That is, the balance of freedom and equality quickly corrects the situation. Imagine if, for example, there was a situation in the Soviet army when the commander of a military unit had to argue with the head of the General Staff or a minister about some issue, even if a high-ranking aviator or sailor dared to do so, still the number of those high-ranking officers was inferior to those on the ground in purely quantitative terms, so there would never be a compromise. We should mention here that in fact, in all armies and headquarters, there has always been and will be competition between military units. Moreover, this competition exists even in intra-jurisdictional issues. Parallel to that, there can never be unified and absolute management in large armies, even in the same military unit. During large-scale wars, individual commanders, depending on their position, always receive separate rights from the main command to develop and conduct their operations, for example, the plans developed separately in the powerful German GS by Rommel, Manstein, Paulus and others, which were often awarded by colleagues and even to

²⁴ Khramchikhin 2017.

²⁵ Scobell 2023.

²⁶ Morris 2022.

criticism from higher ups. Let us not forget that the plan for the attack on France was criticized by some of the German field marshals, and there was no unified agreement in Galder's headquarters about the plan, and in the case of the Citadel it almost came to a duel between generals. Even in a country like USSR, there were individual situations when the commanders of the military fronts developed their plans separately and, due to various influences, contrasted it with the plans developed by the General Staff or insisted on their own options²⁷.

So, the question that non-unified and rigid management can cause problems, mentioned as a defect in the model of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, is not very valid. Such problems can occur in all cases, in all models, for various reasons. More important is the introduction of flexible mechanisms for solving these problems, which is much more difficult in a rigid and vertical system than in a freer and more competitive system. The best proof of the more prospective of the CCS model is also the fact that the country that created the CCS model and one of the most powerful countries that supports it today has moved more towards the British model.

There have also been opposite examples in the world, when a transition was made from the CCS model to the GS model. The best-known example is Kazakhstan, which created the CCS in 2003 and transitioned from the CCS to the GS in 2012. The Kazakh CCS was created with certain circumstances in mind, for example, a rather large air force ratio for the total number of troops. At the same time, instead of military districts, territorial commands were created. However, the problem is that at that moment all the circumstances of Kazakh reality were not taken into consideration. The leadership system for the CCS is quite rigid, starting with the Commander-in-Chief. At this time and for a long time, the Minister of Defense of Kazakhstan was a military man, moreover, most of the Deputy Ministers of Defense were military men, and the Deputy Chiefs of the GS were mostly generals of the GF.

The commander of the rather large and American-style combined air force-air defense has the rank of major general. In other words, there are not all the necessary basic requirements for CCS.

Lessons for us

Here we would like to refer to the system of Defense and Security in our army. After the establishment of the Armenian Army, the General Staff was created on the Soviet model, that is, a distorted version of the Prussian model, with only one significant Armenian difference, that our General Staff always reported directly to the Supreme Commanders-in-Chief. It should also be noted that the institution of the GS was established in the Armenian Army from the very beginning, and civilian ministers were appointed. Until now, most ministers have been professionals with civilian, non-military education. All this created a pretty good situation for us in the sense that the

²⁷ Rokossovsky 1997: 313.

commanders-in-chief often heard different opinions of both the minister and the head of the General Staff, that is, there was a discussion. However, due to the lack of leadership traditions of the Armenian army, many things are inherited from the USSR. Unfortunately, the loss of Armenian statehood, the loss of traditional national aristocracy, and the loss of officers have caused great problems.

At the same time, it is quite difficult to establish the institute of the General Staff and Heads of General Staff. In this regard, the problems are:

- in the Armenian armed forces, for obvious reasons, the GF, whose representatives make up a significant number, occupies a primary place,
- for that reason, unfortunately, the chiefs and deputies of the GS were, as a rule, mainly from the GF, more so from the infantry, besides, the heads of the GS, bearing the traces of the Soviet school, often blindly agreed with the ministers, without trying to counter in any way, even if they had other opinions, for example, Defense Ministers Vazgen Sargsyan and Serzh Sargsyan were almost never countered by the Heads of the General Staff.

There was also another problem. Heads of the General Staff have remained in the same position for a long time - Colonel-General M. Harutyunyan for more than 12 years, Colonel-General Y. Khachaturov for more than 8 years. The latter was an artilleryman, and as a result, for the first time, he was also the first deputy of the head of the GS, and for a long time, lieutenant general E. Apriamov. However, unfortunately, both of them did not lead the artillery after the artillery regiments, and continued their service as commanders of joint military units. In the case of Y. Khachaturov, Seyran Ohanyan also encouraged a relatively more liberal management approaches, but all the same, ex-military Seyran Ohanyan was able to influence the head of the General Staff, especially since the General Staff structure had almost no internal debate. There were also other problems here, which are also characteristic of the Russian army. Since most of the generals also had educational and other problems, they unwittingly became silent consenters.

GS for many years, until 2007, had a clear structure of the model of the Soviet GS, and after that small changes took place, which did not have a positive effect on the work of the GS. It refers to the creation of the position of the deputy head of the GS for Air Force and Air Defense, the creation of the strategic planning department, etc. They were distorted and unclear steps of "westernization". As a result, no significant reforms were made in this direction.

Taking into consideration the main tendencies and requirements of the development of martial arts, as well as certain features of our reality, we believe that certain structural changes of the Military Academy should be made. Those changes should be based on the principle that first the factors affecting the decisions of the head of the General Staff should be more and more profound by his subordinates, the term of office of the Chief of General Staff should be a shorter and fixed period, like Israel and the USA, this period should not exceed 3-4 years, other military units of the RA Armed

Forces and their commanders should be given wider rights in decision-making, in particular, Air force, EW, intelligence and artillery. There are serious deep reasons for all this.

They are:

- The presence of generals with basic non-military education in the RA Armed Forces. We believe that the presence of such generals in the RA Armed Forces always has a positive effect.

- the Armenian libertarian way of thinking, as a strategic consequence of the 2018 revolution,

- the importance of new and mixed types of troops with new military scientific concepts.

Today, in a sense, a strange situation has arisen. Artillery represents the main means of fire and striking potential of the RA Armed Forces, moreover, among the military units under the central command of the GS, there are more rocket artillery military units left today, but there is no artilleryman among the deputy chiefs of the GS. In our opinion, the deputy chiefs of the General Staff of the RA Armed Forces should first be from the artillery, special purpose command, as well as from the air force, which will be strengthened in the future.

In general, we think it is appropriate to address the issue of commands regarding the model of our GS. Factually, we need to solve the issue of unification of Air Force-Air Defense by turning it into a command, the issue of special purpose command, the issue of the EW command, etc. We believe that the management of Special Forces through commands is more effective and is based on more liberal decision-making and decentralized management. Also important are the strengthening of the headquarters of military units and the reduction of the function of planning combat operations from the General Staff to military units and units, as we mentioned above, following the example of the German and American armies. Modern warfare requires decentralized governance that allows for the avoidance of leadership breakdowns. However, for this, first of all, one thing is necessary: creation of management bodies in all senses, positions, structures, training, education, equipment and programs, their testing, etc.

And for such a level, first of all, an established military education system and political decisions are needed. We should mention here that in this regard we also have great potential, which the opponent does not have. Armenia and Armenians love a free and educated person, and the current political line is liberal and democratic. In contrast, Azerbaijan has a centralized, rigid form of governance and an undemocratic political system. Strategically, we need to take advantage of all this.

Conclusion

After the Artsakh War (1988-1994) and the April War (2016), the Armenian Army transitioned from a de facto victorious but semi-regular liberation militia to a regular army. However, due to the created vacuum, during that time there was an automatic

elevation of the often-heroized figures of the tactical circles to the operational and strategic level. This process was accompanied by the almost eliminated Soviet military science, almost zero level of military scientific analysis and innovation. Those personnel did not exist due to both the increase in demand and the impasse of the Soviet military science, the source of development of the existing personnel, the Russian military scientific thought, was dried up. That is why we were defeated. Now there is a new situation. In the future war, the side that will create its own military scientific school, elite and as a result science at the level of world advancement will win. Creating and implementing that science is the greatest imperative.

The 2020 44-Day War, the Russian-Ukrainian war, the special operation for the final disarmament of Artsakh proved that our arguments were true, the Russian strategic management system is a dead end. The rigid rule vertical does not work, sometimes simply because of the basic lack of time, and the political systems of authoritarian rule are a guarantee of defeat in modern wars. An authoritarian system implies rigid management, has minimal trust in subordinates, relies only on loyalists, decision-making takes longer, and is not ready for flexible scenarios in case of dynamic development of situations. The superior command interferes in the affairs of the subordinates in every matter, and with all this, the processes are quickly paralyzed.

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