

TROOPS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND THE DIFFERENCE OF CULTURES

Part I

Prussia, United Kingdom and United States of America

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Abstract

In the ancient world, it was accepted that a talented general can do everything. He must be able to train the troops, teach the commanders how to behave in every situation, he should personally plan the actions and finally implement and follow this complex mechanism. Military historians were inspired by such generals who crushed the enemy, and as a rule they were kings and emperors. However, the more military science developed and became more complicated, the less space was left for such commanders to operate. Back in 1640, the English general Oliver Cromwell created a planning organ for his troops, which was the prototype of modern headquarters. During the reign of the Prussian king Frederick II the Great (1740-1786), the office of the General-Quartermeister, the planning body for the operations of the troops, was created. In 1763 Friedrich II established a military academy in Berlin. In 1800-1803 in Prussia, Colonel Christian von Massenbach and General Karl von Le Coq founded the idea of the Main Staff (General Stab / Staff). Basically, in the Prussian army, that institute was formed little by little starting from 1785, which included only officers who graduated from the Potsdam Military Academy. It is accepted that even, in 1766-1771 and 1783, France also had a Main Staff. Moreover, according to some researchers, the French Headquarters were more suitable for their role. At the same time, the theoretical foundations of military science were being laid in Europe.

Keywords: *Army, Troop, Main Staff, Military school, Prussia, United Kingdom, United States of America*

The Prussian school as a synthesis

The Prussian school of military science was the first to sum up the theoretical knowledge and lay the scientific foundations of military work, passing from the theoretical to the practical.

The birth of military science and the educated officer that is its result can be considered August 6, 1808, when the military school of Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August von Gneisenau gave its first results.¹ This can be considered the basis of officer professional education throughout the world. In France, Marshal Laurent de Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, who fought after Napoleon Bonaparte (1804-1815), fought to prevent the nobles from returning their exclusive right to become officers. In Great Britain, it is true that as early as 1802 at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, an opportunity was created to become an officer, without the system of purchasing positions, which was the exclusive right of the nobility, but old customs were still preserved, which hindered the development of the army. Those manners were not purely military or barracks, the way of life of a person was changing, therefore the way of thinking, which caused a change in military work.

In 1810 Gerhard Scharnhorst founded the world's first military academy in Berlin, which was an educational institution equal to current military educational level academies. For a long time, there was no such structure in any country, where military affairs were studied at the level of science, where officers received a broad education in political science, history, economics, and other fields. In 1818, the command staff school was founded in France, but its quality was far inferior to the Prussian school. The real military academy was established in France only in 1878.² The Academy of the General Staff was founded in the Russian Empire in 1832, and its quality was very similar to the French command school.

The Prussian military academy had such a high quality that as of 1859, exactly half of the military literature published in Europe was published in Germany,³ and most of the publications of the rest of the countries either repeated what was published in Germany or were responses to the German military literature. The Prussian military education system with its Main Staff model was accepted throughout Europe and the advanced world in about a hundred years. First, they were repeated by the French, then by the British, and then only by other countries.

The German Main Staff had two distinct divisions: the Grand MS and a separate operational division, which was more responsible for the specific operations of troops and sometimes troop groups. New quality operations and wars were planned and born here. It must be said that this Prussian institution was blindly repeated in many armies. In 1813 in the Ground Forces of the United States, the Main Staff was established, in which there were several services.⁴ In many countries, even if formal, MSs were created, but it did not happen in the main rival country of the already unified German state, Great Britain. As early as 1821, the German MS was removed from the Ministry of

¹ Jany 1929: 426ff.; Jany 1933: 14ff.; Lehmann 1886: ch. 1; Seeley 1879: 397-423; Delbrück 1882: 117-145; Ritter 1954: 97ff.

² Irvine 1940: 149-153.

³ Vagts 1937: 242.

⁴ Huntington 2020: 210.

War and directly subordinated to the king. The king thus concentrated three governing bodies in his hands: the Main Staff, to which he gave priority, the Ministry of War, and the War Cabinet, which can be considered the prototype of the Security Council. In late 1883 the body became purely advisory and dependent on the other two bodies, with the MS becoming the main body. In Germany, MS officers were considered the most influential elite: they were called demigods in the troops.⁵

Here it is important to compare the German management model with other armies. That system and its value base were greatly developed under Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, who always insisted that an officer should be educated and proactive, prepared and independent.⁶ He often repeated: "The most unfortunate of commanders is the person who is harshly ruled from above. Every day, every hour, he has to explain to his superiors, justify his ideas, plans, every second he is disturbed by tele-connection. In that situation, the commander loses confidence in himself, decision-making ability and courage. He can no longer wage war. Bold decisions are made alone."⁷ Moltke clearly insisted that young and intelligent officers should serve in the German Main Staff, as described by German historians themselves, such officers whose heart belongs to the army and whose head belongs to science.⁸

In 1864, Moltke the Elder tried to plan everything ideally in the war for Schleswig and Holstein, so that the actions were quick, so that the enemy would not have time to understand what happened.⁹ The Main Staff contemplated blitzkrieg operations, also concerned with the problems of waging war on two fronts. First of all, Moltke the Elder solved the most important political problem: the army is the perfect vehicle for the realization of the national desire of a united Germany, but the army does not interfere in political affairs. The statesmen did not interfere in every detail either; the Main Staff was free in the military strategy and operational affairs of the army. No matter how much the military disagreed with the political leadership, they would rather resign than show any kind of rebellion. This was the result of traditions, established institutions and schools. This was the highest manifestation of gentlemanliness and honor. A unique system of civil control was formed in Germany, which, although it did not have the British-American level, was quite high and unique.¹⁰ Although German officers were sometimes belligerent, sometimes the opposite, they had absolute respect in society.¹¹ However, over time, militancy began to take precedence over common sense. The result was the WWI and its bitter consequences. During the WWI and especially after it, due to Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff and several other officers, the accepted norms of political institutions and military relations began to be violated.

⁵ Roediger 1900: 276.

⁶ Vlasov 2011: 135.

⁷ Kokoshin 1968: 3-29.

⁸ Gorlitz 1953: 493.

⁹ Vlasov 2011: 45.

¹⁰ Huntington 2020: 108-111.

¹¹ Rosinski 1939: 96ff.

The German model of military rule became more upgraded after the First World War, and rigid rule became more relaxed. The German model came closer to the Anglo-Saxon culture of governance, although it was far from being a direct copy of it. In any case, in the 1930s, in the newly formed German army, military headquarters were created, and the Main Staff lost its strategic-political decision-making capabilities, focusing more on operational art. The German Main Staff clearly worked like clockwork, as there was careful planning and the commanders of army groups were given adequate leeway.

German general Burkhard Müller-Hillebrand writes about the situation before the WWII: "The command of the new German army demands initiative and quick decisions from its officers in new, rapidly developing situations."¹² Genius of military art, field marshal E. von Manstein/ Fritz Erich Georg Eduard von Manstein/ in his post-war memoirs states that the successes of the Wehrmacht were hidden in the traditions of independence of the German army, down to the junior officers and soldiers, such traditions that they did not have in any army in the world.¹³

Thus, the German MS, which was initially a more absolute institution, and then a more planning and operational-level body, became the benchmark, and to this day, many countries around the world implement their armed forces through this body.

Hitler's distortions

At the strategic level, the accepted norms of army-state relations were increasingly undermined under Adolf Hitler. He first found ideological support among the military, generals who had many things in common: the revival of Greater Germany, anti-Semitism, order and discipline, diligence, rejection of materialism, etc. It was not difficult to find such people in the German army. And when he slowly began to rely on more stubborn and politicized officers, he began to get rid of the first group, because the first always expressed their opinion and did not like to remain silent. A clear resistance of the generals, led by Chief of the Main Staff Ludwig Beck, who later became one of the symbols of the internal struggle against Hitler, matured.¹⁴ Hitler forced him to resign, but his replacement, Franz Halder, over time also became one of the opponents of Hitler's policies. Part of the army was no longer with Hitler.¹⁵ The generals were against Hitler's aggressive and adventurous foreign policy, with which he actually started a world war, and also the material issues of army building.¹⁶ The arbitrary change in the composition of the German tank divisions, the issue of production of types of tanks, the issue of

¹² Müller-Hillebrand 2002: 277.

¹³ Manstein 1999.

¹⁴ Görnitz 1953: 324-339.

¹⁵ Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Washington, 8 vols. and 2 supplements, 1946, I, pp. 377-387; Rothfels 1948: 58-63.

¹⁶ Wheeler-Bennett 1953: 395-424.

heavy bombers, the formation of SS troops as an alternative to the army, etc. These were questions that Hitler decided personally, without consulting the generals. Hitler began to destroy the Wehrmacht Supreme Command "OKW" and the Ground Forces Command "OKH" with his will. He mixed them together, appointed himself the commander of all of them, then divided the functions, giving each of them the status of a specific command, but the situation did not change much. At the tactical and operational level in the German army, commanders mostly made independent decisions. Artillery General Wilhelm Keitel was in charge of his Staff during virtually the entire war.¹⁷ The more German armies were defeated the more intolerant Hitler became and the more he violated the institution of free will. Even at the end of the war, to move some divisions, the commanders of armies and army groups had to get permission from Hitler himself. All this weakened the backbone of the German army.¹⁸ When the Wehrmacht entered the USSR, Hitler specially appointed three oppositional, but not radical, decent and noble generals as army group commanders. He thought that he would bribe the latter with victories, success and glory. In a way, it worked for about half a year. However, when failures began, including because of his wrong decisions, Field Marshals Wilhelm von Leeb, Karl Gerd von Rundstedt and von Bock openly criticized Hitler. Of course, the latter were dismissed, but being oppositionists, they did not actively participate in Ludwig Beck's underground group. This internal struggle continued, but eventually Hitler was able to destroy the army and the country as a result of his wrong strategic decisions, the weakening of the German officer corps and the destruction of traditional schools.

The British School

A new world-class powerful army was coming to the scene, the American army, which at that time was distinguished by powerful headquarters. And talking about the level of American supply in general is unnecessary, especially since the American army did not have a man problem like the German one, except for a short time.

Here, let's try to understand what alternatives there are to this management system and how this case developed in general. Created by the unified German Empire, the MS evolved from war to war as the main body, but it worked particularly well for one big reason: the German army was primarily ground troops. In other words, this body planned, directed and coordinated only land forces, as a rule, at the time of its creation, it could not coordinate the rather weak German navy. And in those countries where naval power was of great importance from the beginning, it was more difficult to create such a unified military force. Great Britain was a prime example of this. The issue of a unified command in this country has been raised many times, but the Marines have never let the Army take over that unified command. During the war the work of

¹⁷ Megargee_1997: 60–80; Stone 2011.

¹⁸ Rothfels 1948: 60-63.

coordinating the affairs of the two great armies was really important, and the defects of their not working together were often seen; military types used different terms and concepts for the same phenomenon. In other words, the gulf of difference was really dangerous, and joint military operations were out of the question. It should also be noted that the level of military science reached by the German school was still unattainable to any country, that is, each military unit in these countries had almost always conducted its own separate war and had little cooperation with other military units. And wherever they cooperated, it was purely due to the good connections and cooperation of the commanders in the places. Such was Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, who created a clearly operating headquarters for his army in Europe, but it did not receive institutional development.

The problem became especially urgent for the British troops after the Crimean War (1853-1856), but as a result the Harrington Commission did not achieve anything in this matter.¹⁹ In 1904, the Army Council was created only in Britain.²⁰

In 1903, during the Spanish War, the American Armed Forces, which carried the British model, or as some specialists would later say, the Anglo-Saxon model, also faced the problem of cooperation between the two military types. The history of the development of relations between the American military administration culture and political institutions is a separate topic. It is in no way similar to European states. In this country, there was a cult of liberal ideas, republicanism, in which the concept of armed forces in peacetime did not fit at all. More than once, the question of not having an army at all was raised at the highest level.²¹ However, due to circumstances, that dead-end approach gave way over time. In the end, due to the geographical location, a powerful navy was first created, which could compete with the army in everything. Moreover, many argued that it was the American fleet that drove Spain out of the oceans, and that the army did not perform very well in the War of 1898, which was quite normal in a society where everyone was armed, armaments were rapidly developing,²² but everyone hated the service. The highest American military and political leadership understood that the army is a necessity and there is a need to coordinate the activities of these two types of troops.²³ A Joint Army and Marine Corps Council was created.

¹⁹ Pechurov, Sudakov 2004: 17-23.

²⁰ Hittle 1949: 127-145.

²¹ Palmer, Baker 1931: 40f.; Hartz 1955; Boorstin 1953; Rossiter 1955.

²² After the Civil War, American armaments developed rapidly and many of the samples created were sold to leading European and Asian countries, Russia, Japan, China, etc. Many of the American soldiers served as mercenaries in the armies of other countries due to the lack of an army in their country. In the United States, military science was quite backward, but any direction related to the navy was developing.

²³ In the history of the USA, this seemingly incomprehensible, but actually deep-rooted liberal extremism is well studied, but little has been written and spoken about it in our country. After the Civil War, American society got another reason to hate the war and the army. However, the ever-growing economy of the USA brought political realism and before the WW I, the American political elite realized that freedom and political neutrality cannot be unlimited either.

This body initially functioned as an advisory body, but it was the first such attempt. In fact, the first such attempt was made in the United States, followed by Great Britain, where in 1904 the Committee for the Defense of the Empire, a collegial body, was created apart from the Army Council. There, the military jointly decided strategic issues.²⁴ In the same year, the position of the head of the Main Staff was created in Great Britain, which in 1909 became the head of the Main Staff of the Empire.²⁵ This body was again largely a coordinating, planning and resource-calculating body,²⁶ and it had no great advantage over the First Lord of the Admiralty. Moreover, this system showed that collegial decision-making works better in this culture. The experience of WWI showed that this model works in power structures that support this value system.

The problem was also from the beginning that the British school was based on the mindset and ideology of the free man. The British navy was equal in size to the army. It was difficult to gather the leaders of each of the free and powerful military types under one leader. A general of one military type cannot well understand the characteristics of all military types.

As a result, in 1923, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) was established in Great Britain, where the First Admiral and the Chief of the Main Staff are alternately elected as the chairman of the committee. A third military unit, the Air Force, also joined the case. In other words, the British system returned to the institution of full collegial decision. Only the head of the committee had the right to report directly to the country's prime minister, that is, he received powers equal to the minister of war, and in some ways even greater powers.

This British model had its advantages and disadvantages. Opponents of the system explain the disadvantages as follows: duplication of resources and even steps, poor coordination of actions between troops.

The architects of the British system also had this fear.²⁷ The birth of the third major military force, the Air Force, confused all accounts. This type of military first caused problems for the rather well-established German military system. German land generals found it difficult to accept the idea that they could not control the activities of German submarines. The latter, operating on strategic infrastructures, were subject only to the supreme command, and from the middle of the war, the air force, which, bombing London, also sought such independence. The German ground generals wanted to use the big airships, the zeppelins, when planning major military operations, but they often heard the Kaiser's view that they should specifically bomb British industrial and strategic facilities.

This problem remained in virtually all countries, both the Prussian model and the British model. The experience of the WWI and intermediate wars showed that the

²⁴ Franklyn 1960.

²⁵ Oakeley 1906: 481.

²⁶ Campbell 1997.

²⁷ Hall 2002.

problem of planning and cooperation of joint actions of all military types is very complex and difficult.

American model

When the top US military was making plans as part of their duties during WWI, how to intervene in the European war, President Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) almost had all the generals arrested.²⁸ American newspapers wrote about the death of the American liberal mentality and the era of tyranny. The American Congress has presented many proposals regarding the coordination of military activities in this area. When Wilson had to send American troops to Europe due to geopolitical circumstances, he changed his views and tried to give different explanations for it.²⁹ During the WWI, many discussions were born in the American society already on this occasion. The American society and political elite put up with a standing army, but put forward unique preconditions that coincided with the values of liberalism.

In 1915, the American political elite put forward several important provisions, the author of which was the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels:

“You cannot have any institution in America that is not Americanized.

- Military defense, like the right to vote, is the duty of every citizen. It cannot be delegated to small select groups.
- A democratic country must have a democratic armed forces. This also comes from colonial times and its most extreme manifestation is the practice of electing officers. In milder ways, it emphasizes the desire to eliminate differences between officers and enlisted men, infusing the armed forces with a democratic-liberal ideology and relying more on individual initiative than on discipline and guidance.
- If armed forces are to be maintained, they must be used to achieve other socially desirable goals. Throughout American history, from the public activities of the Corps of Engineers to the present day, this is a mandatory element. It distinguishes Ruth Colquhoun from the view that the only purpose of armed forces is war”.³⁰

As a result of these provisions, the National Guard, which has the image of a militia, received an exclusive status in the United States, which still plays a major role in the American public life and security system. It is not just a military type, it has a strong perception of a savior, a guardian of social order and an institution associated with the symbols of freedom³¹. Here are the liberal, independent, right-to-choice foundations that

²⁸ Journals of Continental Congress 1774-1789, XXVII (June 2, 1784), p. 518, p. 524.

²⁹ Public Papers. New York, 6 vols., ed. By Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd 1925-1927, V, 83, 86.

³⁰ Huntington 2020. 164.

³¹ Official Proceedings of the Natl. Guard Assoc., 66th Annual Convention, 1944, pp. 28-29, 44; 1948, pp. 111, 242-244, 254-255; 1949, pp. 202-210. Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security (Washington, 1948), pp. 9-24.

explain the "Mission Command" traditions of initiative, free thinking and decision-making in the American military culture.

This establishment of the American force system, the creation of new types of troops, the establishment of the officer corps required many organizational complications that did not contradict the liberal constitution and thinking.

Military figures, of course, were looking for ways to coordinate the complicated phenomenon of war, the harmonious operation of military units, etc. The Germans were the first to succeed in this.

The level of symphonic harmony of at least two types of troops was reached by the German military machine during the blitzkrieg. However, it was possible to achieve this not by maintaining the rigid Prussian management system, but by creating a headquarters for the air force and the joint work of the headquarters. It was brilliantly executed, everyone admired it, but it must be admitted that it was done mainly at the tactical and operational-tactical level. The German air force did not have a strategic toolkit, but on the other hand, the commander of the air force had an important role in the hierarchy of the military and political leadership of the country.

In any case, it must be admitted that the German air force in its model was more of a support type for the Ground Forces; it worked more for the interests of the Ground Forces and almost did not carry out separate large military operations. It is no coincidence that the German Air Force never had a strategic bomber wing. And in Operative art, the need for separate management of strategic troop groups and operational troop groups grew. In other words, the management of large military groups caused new problems. In the 1920s in the USA, the generals of individual military units had problems with their ministers. The situation in the navy was especially difficult. The Secretary of Defense Henry Lewis Stimson has aptly observed: "The admirals came to a unique psychology in which Neptune was a god, Meheue was a prophet, and the United States Navy was the only true church."³² In other words, the crisis in the management of headquarters and ministries was obvious.

Following the British example, the same decision was reached in the USA, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was established in 1942. In the USA, after the First World War, the dead-end mentality of political neutrality was partially overcome, but not completely. The US was actually fighting two separate wars here: one in the Pacific area, sometimes reaching as far as the Indian Ocean, and in the European area, starting from North Africa and Britain. And here was a great feature. If Germany, fighting on two fronts, was often able to carry out strategic regroupings with forces and means, it was a problem for the USA, because it was almost impossible to transfer even one ground or air division from the Pacific area to the Atlantic one.

This top American body was the joint decision-making and management body at the strategic level for the entire Armed Forces.³³

³² Stimson 1947: 506.

³³ Leighton, Coakley 1995: 144.

In actual warfare, the next model after the Main Staff was the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The formation of this institute also has a long and interesting history, but one thing is clear: it is the only established competitor of the German Institute of the MS to date.

At first glance, it is surprising that Admiral William Lah was appointed the first head of this American body. At this time, the committee was still called the Joint Headquarters of the Army and Navy or the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, that is, the headquarters of the US President, where the headquarters of all military branches were united with the same rights. The de facto Army, Navy, and Air Force common chief was an admiral. However, on the other hand, General George Marshall, who was actually just an advisor to the president, had a similar role.

At this time, headquarters for coordinating operations at the level of strategic areas showed their great vitality. Experience has shown that, for example, the headquarters of the American Supreme Commander clearly performed its task, carrying out planning and allocation of resources at the strategic level, the rest was left to the headquarters, where General Dwight David Eisenhower and Admiral Chester William Nimitz fully found solutions. These were the powerful headquarters of the multinational forces, whose troops numbered in the millions, the equipment hundreds of thousands, and the supply routes in the size of half the planet. Of course, there were many disputes and problems between these commanders and subordinates, in particular with the commanders of other types of troops, the commanders of military groups of other countries, but they were settled on the spot, and the headquarters carried out the plans with great efficiency as of 1943. One pattern was clearly at work: as American troops grew, headquarters, that is, planning bodies were created on the ground, and only the troops were gathered under one flag, and the commanders of the operational chain themselves established the number of their headquarters and often personally selected the operational officers - detectives, supply service officers, etc. The American and British governance models also had certain characteristics. As one of the American army's management architects, General Omar Bradley, recalls: "Unlike the American Armed Forces, where the order is mandatory, the British consider the order as a basis for discussion. If there are differences, they are taken into account and the order may be changed as a result. In the U.S. Army, we work to understand all judgments from the beginning and then only give the order. After giving the order, no one can change it except the commander who gave the order."³⁴ As we can see, this is a significant difference, but it has some similarity. In any case, it is fundamental to listen to subordinates, in the USA they did it before the decision was made, and the British could do it even after the order. The American army learned a lot from the British army in this war.

Changes were needed to manage the US military, which had grown considerably during WWII. On the one hand, the army had grown, on the other hand, the air force had also grown unprecedentedly, which, together with the navy, had also received the opportunity to carry a strategic nuclear arsenal. These growing military forces tried to

³⁴ Bradley 1957: 159.

usurp priority and importance from one another, which often worried the political leadership. Back in the war, all this was understandable. Eisenhower had as many as 2,000 officers at his headquarters by the end of the war and was able to listen to service chiefs before making decisions. After the war, all this was becoming a problem for politicians. Again, this was the question of political control and relations between the top military.

President H. Truman, who liked to repeat: "War is too important a business to be entrusted to the military," worried about this competition and began major reforms. The American political leadership was primarily concerned about the enormous and sometimes obscure differences between these three powerful military branches, such as differences in terms, differences in officer training programs and educational models. All of them led to serious and pointless disagreements. The political leadership understood that no matter how to separate these types of troops, there are phenomena that are unacceptable and must be eliminated. First, Truman passed the famous National Security Act of 1947 with great difficulty. This law governed the entire American power system. Instead of the ministries representing the three separate military branches, the institution of a unified Ministry of Defense with a civilian minister was founded.³⁵ At first this single minister, called the National Military Department, was subordinated to three separate military ministers who still remained as members of the Security Council, and then this was abolished. James Forrestal, a former naval aviator and former Secretary of the Navy, was appointed the first joint Secretary of War. This exceptional politician was constantly in great disputes with his colleagues, but he did a great deal for the development of American aircraft carriers.

This law established the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the three major military branches, as well as the Marine Corps and the National Guard. The first head of the committee was General Omar Bradley. The Committee of Chiefs of Staff had a staff of 210 officers who analyzed the situations and planned everything.³⁶ This body, as a result of President Truman's major reforms, received the main function of strategic planning and management, but unlike the German one, it was a collegial governing body, that is, based on a more liberal model of governance.

Moreover, almost at the same time, in 1948, in the American city of Key West, a corresponding agreement was signed between the military branches, which reconfirmed the model that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, with all its powers, leaves the commanders of strategic and operational units and military groups (unified commands, separate commands) free to make decisions.³⁷ These changes, by which the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff received clear functions from mere advisory functions, had great political significance. This was the time when American neutrality won a

³⁵ Cambone 1998: 228-232.

³⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff. Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1987. Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1988, Stoler 1982: 303-320.

³⁷ Trask 1985: 10.

certain victory in the great domestic struggle. This was the time of aggressive Soviet foreign policy and McCarthyism. American “neo-Hamiltonianism” was strengthening its position, albeit with difficulty and hard internal struggle.³⁸ The involuntary increase in the role of the commanders of the American occupation forces also contributed to this. In one way or another, the American generals had a huge role in the political life of West Germany, Japan and South Korea, even though they were very liberal. The USA was becoming a traditional empire and it was first of all important in terms of strengthening itself in the head of the American society. For the first time in the United States, the military was gaining great influence. The generals became president, secretary of state and were appointed to other high positions. It was definitely not accepted in the liberal society, the American society was afraid of the militarization of the state, but the situation was changing.³⁹

Chief of Ground Forces and Staff and future president D. Eisenhower was a staunch member of the “united” team. He was one of the team that insisted that the US Army should create as unified a Headquarters as possible. It was natural and understandable. He was a general of the ground forces, as well as the man who had commanded the largest headquarters and troops ever, whose joint command even with the allied forces had at least worked well.

As president, he made a big effort to make the US Joint Chiefs of Staff a more empowered body, so that military ministries and chiefs of staff would not have much power on the committee, and so on. As a result, President Eisenhower signed the Act on a stronger and more centralized Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 6, 1958.⁴⁰ All these names, Eisenhower, Bradley, Forrestal, etc. played a big role in this case. These leaders were uniquely educated, developed and open-minded people who had not only military but also good civilian education and connections; they were not guided by limited judgment. In the American military culture, this is an extremely important prerequisite for the highest military rank.

The Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, strengthened by the new law, already had 400 staff officers and could work directly with the president, without military personnel.⁴¹ The last major change that occurred in 1986 was interesting in relation to this structure. According to this amendment, the position of the first deputy head of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff was also confirmed, who is usually either an admiral or an air force general, thereby increasing the number of representatives of these military branches in the committee to a clear priority. To date, there have been four admirals, four Air Force

³⁸ A movement of moderate militants, opposed to supporters of neutrality and excessive public control over the military.

³⁹ It is true that the danger of the US becoming a militaristic state caused a powerful internal struggle by various layers of society, there was great resistance from the Congress, as a result of which only exceptionally open-minded and worthy generals got high positions in the state. The threat of becoming a new Sparta was neutralized by established state institutions. We will address this question later.

⁴⁰ Trask 1985: 22-25.

⁴¹ Barrett 1996.

generals and two Marine generals. With the 1986 amendment, the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, receiving more centralized functions of strategic planning, at the same time transferred the operational management more clearly to the commanders of operational military groups, that is, it decentralized and gave more freedom to subordinates.⁴² As they will say later, the “Mission Command” system was established. This was the need for changes born from the demands of fifth generation wars. That role made 2020 the first in the world to create a purely space force, the commander of which received the right to become a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

All this is culture, which is available only to a free environment, an educated environment, constantly evolving organisms. This is the environment that always exists in the American Armed Forces, because it is a set of civilized, social, scientific, religious and other values. The heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been the Chiefs of Staff of various branches of the military at different times, but it is highly symbolic that the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been nine times Army generals, six times admirals, twice Marine Corps generals, and four times Air Force generals. If we keep in mind that in the American Navy, starting from WWII, the flag ships are the aircraft carriers, that is, the admirals, and this position as a rule led such fleets, where the main striking means is the air force, then it will turn out that the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff led more are air-naval rather than army. This is the hallmark of American management culture. It should also be noted that General George Marshall of the American Army and Colin Powell, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, later became US Secretaries of State. As a rule, it is a consequence of the fact that the leadership of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, being a representative of the military-political body, has more broad-minded perceptions and ideas.

Here it is appropriate to remember the words of a general that we often use for our reasoning. German general, the last chief of staff of the air force K. Koller has noticed: “Any soldier usually thinks in terms of the range of action of his unit and the speed of movement of his weapon. Because of this, naval officers will not often (and army officers never) attain the scale of judgment and worldview that Air Force officers of almost all armies possess to one degree or another. What is an army corps on the ground with 50,000 men, 1,000 pieces of equipment and a bunch of artillery with a huge command system? And all of them are fighting on a front of 15-20 km. A huge monster, but he is only interested in the neighbors to the right and left. At the same time, an Air Force officer thinks considerably more deeply, and imagines it all differently. What is that corps front to a lieutenant who has to make a long-distance reconnaissance flight, a section of the map a finger’s width, if not less?”⁴³

These are apt words to understand the differences in the mindset of officers according to their military types.

⁴² Goldwater-Nicholls DOD Reorganization Act, 10 USC 162, Combatant Commands, Assigned Forces, Chain of Command, Section (b), Chain of Command.

⁴³ Elmhurst 2006: 580.

In the American Armed Forces, the meaning of all this was objectively significant, because since WWII, the most mobile, fast, powerful operational and strategic groups in the American Armed Forces became the carrier (airborne) groups. This was a group in which the assembled ships had powerful air strike means, and these means are becoming more powerful today with all data, in which there was the possibility of any kind of attack on the enemy's sea and land areas, and even the ability to capture the near-shore land areas to an operational depth. The American operational art was first concerned with the issues of military science solutions for the actions of these operational groups.⁴⁴ As experience has shown, they should be subject to the commands of various directions and can form separate operational combined-gathering groups with airborne forces. Therefore, these commands and operational unified-gathering groups should have appropriate autonomy.⁴⁵

And if the commands of the strategic areas were unchanged and due to their political importance, they could deal with different problems, then the operational unified-gathering groups subordinate to them could be very different, formed according to the situation, have different composition and different problems, even army units could have a large place in them. With all this in mind, the US Strategic Command decided to form permanent headquarters for the operational combined-gathering groups under the command of all five (currently six) units without permanent troops and resources.⁴⁶ In 2003, the number of personnel was approved for these headquarters, which is up to 64 specialists and officers, and also the number of personnel of the commanders' headquarters, which had been reduced until then, was increased.⁴⁷ We think this is an extremely important decision, taking into consideration the fact that American commands are separated by extremely large areas, and they are almost like world divisions. In such strategic areas, according to the emerging needs of different principles, there should be permanent headquarters, several of which can be under one command.

From this point of view, the network-centric war theory developed by Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the head of the American Defense Reform Service, should be considered a great revolution⁴⁸. He developed the theory with Pentagon analyst John J. Garstka and Admiral Jane Johnson before he was in that position. The theory, to put it in simple terms, basically assumed the management of all troops and troop groups by means of a joint network by superiors, which was possible to achieve thanks to the

⁴⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States. 1993. Feb. W., D/C/ 20318, Executive Summary, II-III-2,3; Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1994, March 23, JP 1-02, JMGTM-094-95.

⁴⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, 1993, Feb., W., D/C/ 20318, Executive Summary, II-III-2,3.; Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, JP 1-02, JMGTM-094-95.

⁴⁶ R. Holzer, A. Svitak, Rumsfeld May Establish Joint Response Forces//Defense News, Jun. 2001, 11-17.

⁴⁷ J. T Bennet, Rumsfeld Tells...//Inside the Pentagon, 22 Jan. 2004.

⁴⁸ Cebrowski, Garstka 1998: 28-35.

modern intelligence and management means and the network of exchange of information between them. That is, what one sees, everyone can see and the commander, who can give an order at once and everyone will receive it as needed.

Of course, network management was not an idea created completely from scratch, which was put forward by the above-mentioned specialists at once, it was actively discussed in the American military science field, and moreover, it was partially applied even at the intra-service level. Back in the Gulf War, the US military used local area network systems to coordinate their operations.

In the beginning, almost all military branches or commands had their own separate networks with which to more effectively manage combat planning, decision making, strikes, supplies, etc. But the theory of network-centric warfare was born out of the idea of connecting these local networks together. In other words, electronic control networks are familiar to the American military, who during combat operations have been able to coordinate the actions of all types of troops at least at the level of operational strategy with great success. A few combat examples are notable. The first example occurred during the second Iraq War, when a Patriot missile guided by a ground-launched MIM-104 missile successfully hit an Iraqi missile with the ship's Aegis anti-missile guidance system.⁴⁹ The second glaring example happened on October 8, 2018, when an F-35B fighter belonging to the US Marines, being in the air, directed a HIMARS missile belonging to the Russian Federation.⁵⁰ In fact, there are many such local examples, and we will look at the technical management systems. These network systems of command are the best evidence that the US military has clear, unified command at the operational joint command group levels, and it is not at all hindered, moreover, supported by having a well-functioning Joint Chiefs of Staff institution and a strong operational joint command headquarters.

The next step was to put all of that together, as well as the maritime information. Now this process is actively going on in the American army. Such systems are one of the best technical solutions for resolving military differences during combat operations.

Thus, in the culture of American military management, a clear system of values and practices was formed over the years. Although due to the complexity of the problems, it was important to carry out the management of the military units in a unified way, even if according to the situation, it was carried out only temporarily, only within the framework of the given problems, and the main governing body, the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, remained in its main role. As much as the Army aspired to a German-style Main Staff, the world's most powerful air force and navy provided powerful counterarguments.

If we summarize those arguments, they are as follows:

⁴⁹ Fontenot, Degen, Tohn 2004: 97f.

⁵⁰ «Sensor to shooter»: The Marines just pulled off a historic feat with the F-35 and the Corps' rocket artillery Shawn Snow, Military Times. Oct. 8, 2018, <https://www.businessinsider.com/marine-corps-use-f-35-to-guide-himars-rocket-artillery-for-first-time-2018-10/?IR=T>

- Such large military units cannot be managed by one body.
- Strategic spanning the entire planet cannot be managed by a single body.
- The leader of one military type cannot master the characteristics of all military types equally well.
- The equal rights of the forces in the committee create counterbalances of the scales, which do not allow making bigger mistakes.

Very recently, the command of the space forces was created in the USA, the commander of which receives rights equal to the rights of military forces of any other dimension. In other words, space is considered as an important domain like land, air and sea. In the same way, the command of the troops of the cyber domain also gets the right, thus integrating the troops of all dimensions and domains into one governing body.

All the attempts of actual unifiers were met with great resistance, and from these debates almost always, according to the situation, the right decisions and solutions were born. They are true only because of one thing, the debate. Basically, this whole struggle can be explained as follows: at the strategic level, there was mostly a compromise of joint decision-making. Even if it did not work at the level of military headquarters or commanders, the political leadership intervened.

At the operational and tactical level, great independence and freedom were allowed, even if the Peter's Committee of the Staff did not give it, then the commanders born from an independent value system achieved it.

These decisions were often characterized by a competition of arms, especially in the air between the Air Force and the Marines, on the ground between the Army and the Marines, and in terms of the nuclear arsenal, between the Air Force and the Navy.

In other words, due to healthy competition and balances, the quality of the British and American armed forces won.

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