

REVEALING THE KHAN TEKINSKY CONSPIRACY
(from the history of counterintelligence of the First Republic of Armenia)

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Abstract

In the article are revealed the efforts of Armenian counterintelligence in its struggle against the Azerbaijani secret services which were aimed at destabilizing the state structures and economy of the Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920. The Armenian counterintelligence was able to secure the internal peace of the country, neutralize the Muslim uprisings in the territory of RA and solve the most important security issues in general.

Keywords: Khan Tekinsky, counterintelligence service, T.Devoyants

Spies have always been a state's invisible and smartly disguised eyes directed at its not-underestimated enemy. Spies are a state's invisible, most loyal and trained soldiers among the enemy. Ancient Chinese martial arts expert *Xian Li* (VI-V centuries BC) knowingly noted in his book: "... *an army without reconnaissance is like a man without eyes and ears*"¹.

The geopolitical consequences of World War I brought about radical changes in the content of the political map of the Transcaucasian region and in its manifestations. The upheavals and political tides caused by the 1917 October Revolution in Russia were of a "long-lasting" nature and affected almost the whole world, including Armenia. All the possible solutions to the Armenian Question collapsed one after another, the previous treaties and agreements lost their former validity and the peoples (Armenians, Macedonians, Arabs, Slovenes, etc.) standing on a difficult path of seeking independent national statehoods faced fatal dilemmas and geopolitical insecurities. In such an unfavorable geopolitical and grave military situation, when the Turkish hordes, carrying out the massacre of Western Armenians, were knocking on the doors of Eastern Armenia, the First Republic of Armenia was proclaimed on May 28, 1918. The Armenian National Council of Tbilisi that had undertaken the mandate of the first government, not only declared itself the supreme power of the Armenian provinces and creator of state power, but also considered one of its priorities the establishment of a vital body for every state – intelligence and counterintelligence - as the most important basis of the state security system. The processes in that direction were complex, contradictory and

¹ Sun Tszi 2006: 67.

ambiguous, due to the alignment of geopolitical forces in the region and the intensity of the struggle between them.

The study of various archival documents leads to the conclusion that in 1918-1920 the Government of RA sought to have not only important structures such as the army, bank, parliament, etc. in terms of understanding and establishing the idea of statehood, but also, of course, the necessary structures guaranteeing the national security of each state, such as the special services - intelligence and counterintelligence, as well as fully-fledged security forces of internal affairs bodies, militia, i.e. a more or less complete security system which would serve the solution of various foreign and domestic policy issues in the region, the detection and prevention of hostile conspiracies and provocations against the Republic. Due to such considerations, in spite of the grave geopolitical situation that arose in the second half of 1918, the government of the Republic of Armenia undertook the task of forming state and national bodies of the security system and directing their activities. The first more or less practical steps in terms of solving organizational-and-financial and human resources issues were taken immediately after the proclamation of the Republic. On August 13, 1918 the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Armenia heard the request of the Ministry of Defense to release funds to cover the expenditures on aviation, intelligence and radiotelegraphy. After discussing the issue, the Council of Ministers decided to approve the steps taken, such as to release 6 million roubles financed from government loan: a) to allocate 20 thousand roubles for unforeseen expenses, b) 20 thousand roubles for intelligence, and c) another 20 thousand roubles for counterintelligence, for solving the organizational-and-political problems of the intelligence service.²

Considering these obvious historical facts, it can be argued that immediately after the arrival of the RA government from Tbilisi, when the RA Council or Parliament was formed and the government was appointed, one of its priority tasks was the establishment of the RA state security system and the organization of the relevant bodies, including intelligence and counterintelligence divisions, i.e. the Armenian Intelligence Service or special services, crucial from the point of view of the establishment of the Armenian statehood and its security, protection of state borders. Therefore, it can be unequivocally stated that the beginning of the establishment of the RA intelligence and counterintelligence services or special services should be considered August 13, 1918.

In this regard, it is important to clearly understand that statehood in general, its independence and more or less complete domestic policy and after all, national and state security cannot be imagined without the thorough organization of intelligence and counterintelligence, the constituent component of that system. In this regard, Tigran Devoyants³ very accurately noticed: "*The intelligence is the eyes and ears of the state.*

² See NAA, f. 201, l. 1, d. 484, l. 9, F.P -202, l. 1, d. 13, l. 12, F.P - 204, l. 1, d. 216, l. 1.

³ Devoyants Tigran Tadevos (20.08.1887, Yerevan - 02. 09. 1965, Belgium) – studied at the Faculty of Mining Engineering of Tomsk University, teacher. He is known by the nicknames Devo, Tigr, etc. See Hovakimyan 2005: 596.

The intelligence division prepares for war during a peaceful time, and constantly studies the alignment of enemy forces, the movement of troops, the types and quality of the troops, the fortifications, means of communication, food and ammunition stocks, crops, the economic and health condition of the people, their mood, the relation between the nations and their attitude towards the state, reserve military units, the character of the commanders, the depth of the rivers during the four seasons of the year, the places to cross them, the newly-built roads, the airports, etc., etc. The job of the intelligence division is also to try to disrupt the means of communication of the enemy, to blow up ammunition depots, to burn supplies, to spread illness through microbes, to stir up rebellion and unrest within the enemy country, to connect with their telephone and telegraph communications, to decipher coded telegrams. In short, a skilled spy has no boundaries in his work and activities, he must move in accordance with the requirements and conditions".⁴

It should be noted that Armenian spies had a good understanding of the essence of intelligence and its problems. Tigran Devoyants correctly noticed that circumstance: *"The intelligence, during peace or war, is the eyes and ears of every state. Intelligence studies the arrangement of troops of the enemy or neighbouring state, the alignment of forces, the weapons system, the layout of cannons, machine guns, rifles, tanks, armoured trains, air force, navy, fortifications, their type, quality, power, etc., means of communication, supply, military and supply depots, the economic and sanitary condition of the people, their mood, the relations of the powerful and their attitude towards the state, reserve forces, the description and character of commanders; in a word, everything connected with war - the construction of railway lines, highways, bridges, navy, type of air force, their speed, weaponry etc..."*

The intelligence division prepares for war during the peaceful time of every state, thoroughly examines all the things irritating the given state in order to facilitate the implementation of its own state's strategic plans in the event of future war. Thus, the knowledge of the main connections of the railway lines, the depots, the location of important factories, the exact location of bridges will make it easier to bomb those centers, to blow up the bridges and temporarily disrupt communications behind enemy lines. Thus, in peacetime every state prepares for war with the help of its intelligence division"⁵.

This situation is very well depicted by the well-known Armenian spy Tigran Devoyants, who wrote the following in his memoir "Episodes from my Life": *"And the budget was so small, with worthless Armenian roubles, that was of no significant value outside Armenia. Meanwhile, large sums of money should be allocated to those*

Other sources used - Horizon, 1914, № 230, 233, Armyanskij vestnik, 1916, № 33, p. 24, Kavkazskoe slovo, 1914, № 28-30, 3436, 1918, № 117. P.S. The date of birth has been corrected as opposed to the year 1980 circulated by us previously. See Virabyan 2018. 16.

⁴ Devoyants 1938b: 59.

⁵ Devoyants 1943a: 91.

branches for the self-preservation of the country, because those two branches were to be the eyes and ears of the small country of Armenia, the basis of its diplomacy".⁶

From the very first days of establishment the head of the intelligence division at the General Headquarters was highly-skilled Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Constantine Shneur, who had a small number of employees at his disposal. In the following years, the division was headed by a number of officers, whose names will forever remain in the pages of biography of that division. From September, 1919 to April, 1920 the head of the intelligence division was Vahagn Galust Muradyan, a rather famous, non-partisan captain. From April, 1920 to the end of June, the intelligence division was run by Tigran Tadevos Devoyants, who had political convictions and was a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation party (by his own testimony, he had been Dro's classmate⁷). From July, 1920 to the Sovietization of Armenia (December 2) the intelligence division was headed by Mikayel Nikita Dodokhyan. On the path to the establishment of the Service, of great importance was the decree of the RA Military Minister dated April 14, 1919, which mainly completed the organizational work carried out towards the formation of the intelligence service; and an intelligence and counterintelligence division of the General Headquarters was established. As T. Devoyants noticed, becoming *"the eyes and ears of every state"* *"it prepares for war in peacetime, thoroughly examines all the things irritating the given state in order to facilitate the implementation of its own state's strategic plans in the event of future war"*.⁸ "It became a more or less complete institution, the immediate tasks of which were to gather facts about the enemy and terrain, to process those data and provide timely information about them, to lead the intelligence work of the brigade headquarters, to count the money provided for intelligence, to organize the fight against espionage".⁹

And at the time of the escalation of espionage passions against Azerbaijan, when the official diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Yerevan was Khan Tekinsky, who took advantage of his position and conducted conspiracy and reconnaissance activities against the Republic of Armenia, the resident representative of Armenia in Baku was Arshak Sargsyan¹⁰ (according to a number of facts, in 1922 Tekinsky was already in Tabriz). In response to Tekinsky's expulsion from Baku, Arshak Sargsyan (Arshak Sargsisov), resident representative of RA in Baku - a member of the diplomatic mission, was deported from Baku for alleged disruptive activity when Khan Tekinsky was the

⁶ Devoyants 1945b: 84 -85.

⁷ See Devoyants 1938a: 49.

⁸ Devoyants 1943b: 91.

⁹ See NAA, f. 204, l. 1, f. 132, l. 54-55.

¹⁰ According to the investigation carried out in July, 1927 by General Political Department of the Crimean SSR (at that time he worked as an accountant) and according to the data of Grigory Khachatryan's interrogation in connection with the case, the work of intelligence in Baku went rather well. A large number of copies of very valuable correspondence of the General Staff of the Azerbaijani Army and the Military Ministry were received.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. On February 20, 1920 this was reported to Foreign Minister Mustafa Vekilov.¹¹

There is almost no fundamental work on the issues related to the Armenian army and intelligence especially in terms of the military and political relationship of the army and the RA intelligence service. In this respect, of certain interest is M. Karapetyan's work¹², where the author addresses several issues of the formation and development of the Armenian army. It is important to mention several books¹³ published in the Diaspora, where, however, the issue under discussion has caught our attention with some of its undisclosed pages. In general, they are undoubtedly of some interest, but the issues we are interested in are discussed from the standpoint of the activities of the ruling party, the ARF. They mainly focus on the analysis of the strategy of the Bolsheviks and largely blame the Bolsheviks for the slips and mistakes of the Armenian army, dimming the deeper causal findings, without delving into the errors and deviations of the internal political strategy implemented by the Government of the Republic of Armenia. The study of the main issue under discussion is particularly important from the point of view of the RA State Security System formation concept. In that respect of great interest are the issues related to the crisis and conflict situations for the Republic in 1918-1920 and the successful or failed attempts to overcome them, first of all having in mind, for example, the two-week Georgian-Armenian war in December, 1918 that ended in victory for Armenians,¹⁴ as well as the 1920 Turkish-Armenian war which was disastrous for the Republic of Armenia, particularly the inglorious fall of Kars on October 30, around which there are conflicting views today - with sound approaches, as well as views dictated by opportune selfish motives.

This gives the impression as if Kars were one of the main points of confrontation between the world military and political forces, and the solution of many problems depended on the resolute will of the Armenians, the strength of spirit, etc., viewing them in isolation from complex regional realities. The need to shed light on the issues under discussion stems from the fact that today some authors discussing the problems of the Armenian army try to find the failures and slips of the Armenian armed forces in other areas, particularly putting the lion's share of the blame on the Armenian intelligence, without thoroughly examining the matter and showing a complex approach to the problem, without any real grounds. This is done unilaterally and mainly relying on literature in the format of memoirs, without showing an investigative or critical approach to them, almost without relying on archival data, as if they do not exist or are not very useful or suitable for use, contradicting narrow personal goals. It can be said that regarding that issue, with some reservations, Colonel T. Baghdasaryan duly noted: *"Writing about the reasons for the defeat of the Armenian army is absolutely beyond my*

¹¹ See Nazim 2018a. See Nazim 2018b: 80, 99, 110, 158 etc.

¹² See Karapetyan 1996.

¹³ See Sahakyan 1937.

¹⁴ See in more detail Virabyan 2003; Virabyan 2016; Hovhannisyan 2005: 99-135. See also Gevorgyan 2007: 269-316 etc.

power. It is raw material and only strategists and skilled military men can write about it. My writings are my personal memories, very limited, a modest amount of material".¹⁵

Thus, we once again refer to the publications of authors, who relied heavily on literature in the format of memoirs which requires a somewhat critical attitude. The authors of those publications were members of the junior command personnel of the Armenian army, and were not high-ranking officials (centurion Hay Gnduni (Hambardzum Toptchean)¹⁶, commander of the 1st battalion of the 8th regiment led by Sepuh, commander of the Armenian Army; Artashes Babalyan.¹⁷ Minister of Social Affairs and had no direct contact with civilian and military departments (it goes without saying that they had to be less informed about the current events, especially that there were civilian albeit high-ranking officials in that role). Their references should be treated with reservation. They contain completely unverified, one-sided, often inaccurate and defective facts, the target of which, among other goals, is the activity of the RA Intelligence Service in 1918-1920 and therefore, Armenian spies, from the private soldiers to officers. It should be emphasized that the assertions openly denying the existence of the RA special services and certain activities carried out by them, are totally unacceptable and not convincing, inaccurate and one-sided, despite the aforementioned mistakes and slips of the RA intelligence division which must have been typical of the whole Armenian state in the process of its establishment and there is no intention to disguise or moreover, openly deny them. Thus, summarizing what has been said, we reject the "assertions" of the non-existence, indisputable dullness and absolute inaction of the Armenian intelligence service, as well as the viewpoint that "the latter were completely unaware of the plans and schemes of the enemy Turkey", the number of soldiers of the Turkish armed forces and their plans, and that the Republic of Armenia had no agents in Turkey etc. Under the irrefutable pressure of numerous undeniable facts all the above-mentioned is denied in the monographs published by us. Although there is some rationality in the points of view expressed, they are sometimes so contradictory and with vague purpose that they can confuse inexperienced readers and create a misconception about the history of the First Republic's state security system, particularly the intelligence service, leading to the erroneous conclusion of the non-existence of the Armenian statehood. It is unacceptable ignoring the existing facts on the activities of young Armenian intelligence against the republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia and other forces, and especially looking for the causes of the failures and slips in the field of army-building and defeats of the Armenian army only in the activity of the RA intelligence service, and doing so based solely on memoirs and other completely unverified sources.

Thus, by coming to random conclusions about the specific issues of the army and the activity of the intelligence, how could one ignore the circumstance and evident

¹⁵ See Sahakyan 1937: 130-131.

¹⁶ See Martkots, October 29, 1932, № 16, 1, 3, 5, 8, November 10, 1932, № 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.

¹⁷ See Babalyan 1923: 53.

historical fact that, no matter how disorganized and weak Armenian intelligence were (as some “supporters” of the non-existence of the Armenian intelligence services or merely “political deniers” claim), it was to some degree practically possible to prevent the aggression of the Republic of Azerbaijan against the Republic of Armenia in the fierce and long battles¹⁸ from September-October 1919 to April 1920 due to the efforts of the Armenian intelligence service that was living through complicated and uncertain processes of establishment, born in grave conditions of starvation and destruction and persistently aspiring to be fully established (the mentioned problem is one of the completely unresearched issues in Armenian historiography). It was due to this that the Armenian armed forces under the leadership of Garegin Nzhdeh achieved an important decisive victory and thus, secured the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia in the territories very important for Armenia from the strategic point of view. There is an episode in famous Armenian spy T. Devoyants’s memoir, which we do not take as granted, but neither can we ignore, as it clearly testifies to a very important fact of the useful activity of the Armenian intelligence, a historical episode which, in fact, directly and practically to some extent enabled the audacious Armenian armed forces under the command of G. Nzhdeh (Garegin Yeghishe Ter-Harutyunyan, January 1, 1886 - December 21, 1955) to defeat and force out of Zangezur the aggressor army of Azerbaijan, as the invincible patriotic army had once done under the command of David Bek. In this connection, T. Devoyants very clearly claims: *“Armenia’s intelligence division bribed the chief of officers of the Azerbaijani army that stood against Nzhdeh by giving him 200,000 roubles. He arranged his troops, cannons and machine guns in the way we wanted, and when the fighting broke out, Nzhdeh’s forces defeated the much stronger Azerbaijani army, captured or destroyed the enemy’s strong artillery and machine guns.*

The chief of officers of the Azerbaijani troops of that region was Georgian.

*It was after this that Garegin Nzhdeh became Sparapet...”*¹⁹

¹⁸ At the end of 1919 two Azerbaijani regiments intruded into Zangezur headed by Generals Ali Agha Ismayil Agha oghli Shikhlinskij (April 23, 1865 - August 18, 1943) and Samed Bek Sadikh Bek oghli Mehmandarov (October 16, 1855 – February, 1931). [Shikhlinskij 1984: 209; Ibragimov 1975]. G. Nzhdeh organized a counterattack under Goris, and the enemy fled in panic to Avdalar [present Lachin]. After this defeat, the Azerbaijanis did not dare to attack Zangezur until April, 1920. Azerbaijan also used Turkish forces, which in April, 1920 tried to attack Kapan under the leadership of Nuri Pasha, but they suffered a crushing defeat in the Vorotan gorge. At the end of April, Nzhdeh not only repulsed all the attacks of the enemy, but also went to Artsakh with Dro, and helped the heroic Armenians of Artsakh (See Melkonyan 1998: 217; Danielyan, Melkonyan 2008: 297-299). In connection with these events and regarding the acts of heroism demonstrated by Arsen Shahmazyan, Garegin Nzhdeh, and other national devotees and well-known military figures during the long and fierce battles in Zangezur from September-October, 1919 to April, 1920 one of the totally undiscovered and unknown pages of Armenian historiography is addressed above. It is connected with the role of the intelligence and counterintelligence division of the General Staff of the RA Military Ministry in these very important events for the Republic of Armenia, which does not cast a shadow on the military and political activity of the famous general Garegin Nzhdeh.

¹⁹ Devoyants 1944: 75.

In order not to give the impression that on the one hand we demand a critical attitude towards literature in the format of memoirs, and on the other hand we refer only to such sources let's turn to the help of archival facts to verify the above-mentioned evidence. A number of important archival documents help shed light on obviously insufficiently studied or, more exactly, completely unexplored issues, thus overcoming a number of hardened stereotypes, stereotyped conclusions and judgments. The first documents related to Major General Hovsep Artem Kishmishyan, the military attaché attached to the Armenian diplomatic mission in Tbilisi, i.e. the coordinator and head of intelligence-related issues, are of certain interest from the point of view of the above-mentioned questions despite some contradictory information contained. It should be taken into account that despite the fact that the Armenian intelligence was still quite young, inexperienced, and was taking the first steps to become a serious service, in the moral and political sense this did not hinder it from getting useful information. The document below is one of the best and indisputable proofs of that and confirms T. Devoyants's above-mentioned assertion about a really interesting historical event that testifies to the fruitful work of Armenian spies. It proves that the division's work was not so bad at all, as some eyewitnesses and contemporary authors "try to testify". Thus, H. Kishmishyan, the head of the Armenian special service in Tbilisi, in his report (N° 33) of January 17, 1920, addressed to the RA Military Minister, informed that a fully trusted person, Bogdan Davidovich Avan-Yuzbashi Khan Sagnakhsy (who was considered a loyal man among the Armenian military mission in Tbilisi), according to the assignment of the department he ran, had reached an agreement with Lieutenant Colonel prince Eristov,²⁰ chief of staff of the Azerbaijani detachment which had been given the "right" to act in Zangezur. For 200-300 thousand roubles Eristov had promised to provide them with the code (password) of the Azerbaijani Army, all the secret correspondence, deployment of Azerbaijani troops and the plan of alleged attack on Zangezur. Eristov was also obliged to make the combat order in a desirable way for them and to develop the whole plan of the operation according to the instructions of the Armenian side, at the same time keeping in touch and informing of all the military operations of Azerbaijan.

As we can see, this is very interesting information, which, of course, cannot be taken as granted. However, one should not ignore similar intentions of the Azerbaijani intelligence and the preparations being made, although in the information he gave General Kishmishyan confidently added that Khan Sagnakhsy had assured them of the reliability of the information, adding that it would be delivered through Lieutenant Colonel Eristov, and the money would be paid only after checking the above-mentioned documents. Apparently, expressing almost complete conviction that these Azeri officers could already be considered fully bribed or lured to their side, in this very interesting report General Kishmishyan expressed an opinion that it was necessary to immediately

²⁰ Eristov, Eristavi Ksansky, Alexander Nikolay (5.07.1873-10.02.1955) – prince, lieutenant general from August 23, 1917. He served in the army of Menshevik Georgia. As a member of the delegation of the Menshevik government he was sent to Turkey, where he remained until 1921, after which he was deported to France. See Zalesskij 2003: 712-713.

send Captain V. G. Muradyan to Tbilisi together with the money, so that the latter could directly contact the above-mentioned Lieutenant Colonel Eristov for a detailed clarification of all the circumstances. Kishmishyan informed that on the eve of Captain Muradyan's business trip it was necessary to ask the Chief of Staff about the questions that Lieutenant Colonel Eristov should be aware of 1) the number of troops, 2) their groupings, 3) directions of military actions, 4) auxiliary operations. At the end of this interesting report, General Kishmishyan stated that Captain Muradyan should be informed by a detailed, exhaustive instruction necessary for his work, which would include the verification of all the information. Besides, Kishmishyan informed that one of the best employees of the Tbilisi intelligence network, Lieutenant Yeghiazarov had been sent to Yerevan for an oral report. There is also a corresponding note on the document (N° 34) addressed to the Military Minister that the code, as well as the whole secret correspondence about the deployment of the Azerbaijani troops could be obtained for 200-300 thousand roubles.²¹

Ultimately, the important thing here is that although one might think that the Armenian intelligence was naive enough to believe the Azerbaijani army officers in such important matters, it should be noted that in this case the Armenian intelligence officers acted successfully and obtained very important information that could serve the issues of ensuring Armenia's security and defense capacity [such examples can be found in the practice of other countries as well]. They even turned to bribery and other means and methods of obtaining important information which in practice served the decisive victory against Azerbaijan won by military units led by Nzhdeh. Referring to T. Devoyants it should be once again stated that when Azerbaijan was concentrating large numbers of troops against Zangezur, thanks to the Armenian intelligence service the Armenian government was able to obtain information of great strategic value, which helped to achieve significant results in the military and political conflict with the enemy. In regard to this T. Devoyants simply emphasizes the following: "*The Armenian government was able to bribe the Azerbaijani army's chief of officers who was a Georgian colonel. The latter not only gave us information on the deployment of Azerbaijani troops, but also arranged the Tatar military units in such a way that our army managed to easily defeat them and seize their cannons, machine guns and ammunition*".²²

We think that additional comments are unnecessary and irrelevant here. Moreover, even Dr. *Nazim Mustafa*, the Azerbaijani researcher studying our monograph²³ on Armenian intelligence published in 2015 unwittingly and unconditionally acknowledged this fact and confessed that a significant role in the defeat of the Azerbaijani troops was played by the misinformation of Major General David Bey Yedigarov, who headed the 1st Azerbaijani division against Zangezur (he was

²¹ See NAA, f. 275, l. 5, d. 184, l. 3-4.

²² Devoyants 1945b: 83.

²³ Virabyan 2015.

disqualified directly by the order of Azerbaijani Military Minister Samed Bek Mehmandarov, and an official investigation was launched). At the same time Dr. Nazim Mustafa stated that before the famous operation, Armenian spy Tigran Devoyants had managed to bribe a Georgian officer of the Azerbaijani army with 200,000 roubles thanks to which G. Nzhdeh was able to strike with great accuracy and defeat the stronger Azerbaijani army.²⁴

Thus, the RA Intelligence Service did not stop showing interest in the events unfolding around Armenia and the people involved in them. In his secret service telegram dated May 18, 1920 (N 01322), addressed to the RA military attaché in Tbilisi, General Kishmishyan, H. Khan-Kotursky, acting Head of Intelligence Division at the time, asked to interrogate retired rotmister Khan Sagnakhsky to find out if his adjutant Timiryman, who served in the Tbilisi Cavalry Regiment, had served during his tenure and what was known about him.²⁵ And on May 21, 1920 (N 218) in a secret letter addressed to the RA Chief of the General Staff, General Kishmishyan informed that Timiryman's interrogation had already taken place and it had revealed that Timiryman had served in the 1st Machine Gun command staff of the Cavalry Regiment. He was from Shushi and as far as was known, he was from a wealthy family and his mother lived in Tbilisi at that time. He was said to be a generally negative person who had persuaded his friends to rob his own mother two years before, and it had been done. Kishmishyan reported that, according to Sagnakhsky, more thorough details about Timiryman could be provided by Timiryman's immediate staff-captain Melik-Adamov, who was in Armenia in Colonel Bek-Pirumyan's detachment.²⁶

The detailed study of a number of other documents makes it evident that the special services of the First Republic of Armenia tried to work, to do their best in the conditions of the resources and manpower available. It is another thing that they were not able to achieve a more or less tangible advantage, e.g. in the fight against the Turkish special services (especially against counterintelligence) which felt more confident and secure, and in some situations were more proactive and bold. On the one hand, there was the centuries-old experience of a powerful world empire (albeit an Asian variant, savage and insidious), the availability of manpower and resources, and on the other hand, there was the newly-forming state of Armenia, with lack of manpower, and the available staff consisted of very young, untrained people not having much experience in operative work. The establishment of these services was also negatively affected by the isolation from Russia and from its educational and military support institutes, the geopolitical isolation, as well as the pro-Western sentiments, which then boomeranged, exposing their rear. Nevertheless, in this situation, the existing Armenian special services tried to interfere with the enemy agents, to strengthen the security of the Republic in extremely tense moments for the homeland

²⁴ See Nazim 2019a.

²⁵ See NAA, f. 275, l. 5, d. 154, l. 119.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 123.

(Böyük-Vedi and Zangibasar, Armenian-Georgian war for Lori and adjacent regions, etc.).

In order to have a more or less full disclosure of the history of the intelligence service of the First Republic of Armenia it is relevant to mention an important page of the activity of the Armenian intelligence service in regard to the plots of the Azerbaijani special services in Yerevan which had the diplomatic mission of Azerbaijan in Armenia as the headquarters of their activity, and a network of agents. In this connection Al. Khatisyan meaningfully noted: *“The other side confirmed that the special messenger of the government of Azerbaijan had distributed 5 million rubles to the rebel villagers of the Sharur region. Thus, the riot fed from the outside, not only disturbed the minds of the population, but also created a belief that in the event of an uprising foreign aid would be provided to them.*

At the beginning of 1920 the other side would send them officers and soldiers...

*Through their intelligence bodies the government of the Republic of Armenia received information on the preparations made in this or that region on a daily basis”.*²⁷

All this is denied by the facts illustrated by V. Artsruni and others. According to them, the Armenian intelligence which allegedly operated during the years of the First Republic of Armenia, *“would also show its traditional weakness on the Armenian-Azerbaijani front”*. In practice it was not so: on July 31, 1919 the RA Minister of Foreign Affairs Al. Khatisyan lodged a strong complaint with the Azerbaijani government over the Böyük-Vedi incidents, in connection with its disruptive espionage and intelligence activities, emphasizing his great awareness: *“The Armenian government has evidence based on verified, undeniable documents not only about the armaments and financial aid provided to the population of Böyük-Vedi from outside, but also about the fact that all the subsequent insurgences are the work of an organization that pursues one goal - to artificially turn the Muslim population against the government of Armenia and to forcibly wrap this provocation around the neck of the Muslim population through the many agents from abroad. Without them the Muslim population would still continue to live a peaceful, cultural life in the mentioned regions of Armenia, as is the case in other parts of Armenia. After these exhaustive explanations about this issue, the Armenian government deems it necessary, based on solid data, to declare with sorrow that with his actions Mr. Tekinsky²⁸ personally contributed to the movements directed against the Republic of Armenia and against peace in the country”*²⁹.

²⁷ Khatisyan 1968: 205.

²⁸ Tekinsky Mamed (Muhammed) khan (1880-1938) –was a lawyer, worked as the official representative of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in the Republic Armenia from January 29 to October 10, 1919. From October 11, 1919 till April 28, 1920 he was Deputy Foreign Minister. In 1938 he was executed by the decision of the Council of 3 of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), later in 1955 he was acquitted. See Nazim 2018a.

Undoubtedly, Nazim Mustafa’s book published in Baku in 2018 is worth paying attention to. It is written from the Azerbaijani point of view and a number of fundamental issues related to the activities of the Azerbaijani envoy in Yerevan Khan-Tekinsky, as well as the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict became a subject of discussion. See Nazim 2018a; 2018b: 20, 80, 84, 99-105, 107, 109-110, 113, 115, 158 and etc. Safarov Rafiq (National Archive Department of the

This is very clearly stated by T. Devoyants in his famous memoir “Episodes from my Life”: “Azerbaijan had a very good spy network in Yerevan”³⁰. Then on another occasion he added the following: “The diplomatic mission of Azerbaijan in Yerevan not only reported with unusual speed about the deployment of Armenian troops and transportation of troops and ammunition to Tbilisi and Baku, but also had in its possession Armenia’s secret orders and instructions.

Armenia had given seats to Muslims in its parliament and for the election of those Members of Parliament the Azerbaijani government had allocated 40,000 roubles. Every day many of their spies freely passed Tokhmakhian Gyol behind the Tatar district of Yerevan and went from there to Sharur-Nakhichevan, Böyük-Vedi and Zangibassar, transporting ammunition, instructions, news and food from Yerevan. They had all kinds of certificates issued by the police, this or that member of Parliament or minister”³¹.

At the same time, in honor of the measures and countermeasures undertaken by the Armenian intelligence service, Tigran Devoyants emphasizes the following: “Fortunately, every day the Armenian government was kept informed of the enemy’s plans by these telegrams and accordingly, took measures. If the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan had not been robbed by “bandits” in the neutral zone, the number of the Tatar army in the Sharur-Nakhichevan region alone would have reached 10,000 with the money sent from Baku through Tbilissi. Similarly, the number of Tatars fighting in Böyük-Vedi, Zangibassar and other regions would have increased, and all Armenians of Armenia would have been in danger of extinction”³². This view is also supported by S. Vratsyan: “From the very first day of Khan-Tekinsky’s arrival in Yerevan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia was familiar with his code. All the telegrams sent by or to Khan-Tekinsky became known to the Armenian government before they reached him. In May, 1920, after the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, those telegrams were published in a separate booklet “Secret Documents” (a page of conspiratorial activities of Azerbaijan), 1920, Yerevan, publ. “Razmik”.³³ In another place S. Vratsyan added: “From the very first days of independence, Azerbaijan did not leave Armenia alone. With the support of the Turks, the Azerbaijanis tried to turn the

Republic of Azerbaijan Chief Advisor, Documentation and Usage Department), Mammad Khan Birinski (1879-1938), one of the statesmen and prominent diplomats of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic. See <http://www.milliarxiv.gov.az/az/memmed-xan-tekinski-1>; Nazim 2018a; Kelbizade 2014.

Tekinsky was one of the most experienced and promising diplomatic and intelligence employees of Azerbaijan, whose neutralization and prevention of conspiratorial steps was one of the most successful and skillful actions ever undertaken by the RA Intelligence Service, particularly Tigran Devoyants.

²⁹ See Hayastani Ashkhatavor, August 19, 1919, N123.

³⁰ Devoyants 1945a: 88.

³¹ Idem.: 81.

³² Ibid.

³³ Vratsyan 1993: 310; Ruben 1982: 193; Vratsyan 1966: 102. It should be added that famous spy T. Devoyants had a significant role in this issue. He was the first to decode their key, to declassify them and prevent the destructive actions against Armenia and its authorities (See Devoyants 1945a: 87).

Turkish-Tatar population of Armenia against the Armenian government. The Ambassador of Azerbaijan Khan Tekinsky was a key player in these affairs. He kept agents in various parts of the country, received large sums of money from Baku and provided classified information to his government. An official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Yeakulian (P. Yakulyan – V. V.) soon deciphered the code by which Khan-Tekinsky exchanged telegrams with his government.³⁴ Abr. Gyulkhandanyan also wrote about it: *“Although seemingly friendly relations were maintained and the two countries had representatives in the other country, the government of Azerbaijan made every effort to prevent the Muslim elements in Armenia from submitting to the Armenian government. And that is why Azerbaijan supported them with weapons, military leaders, especially money. The representative of Azerbaijan in the Republic of Armenia, using his position, constantly reported to his government about the work he carried out through coded telegrams and received instructions...”*

*The Armenian government, which was aware of the content of all these telegrams from day one, was finally forced to actually expose the real image of that unique state ambassador and demand that the Azerbaijani government recall him. And although that representative was replaced by another, the latter also continued the work that his predecessor had begun”.*³⁵

This is clearly confirmed by R. Hovhannisyan, who emphasizes the awareness of the Armenian intelligence: *“The Armenian intelligence service soon learned to decipher the briefs and provided declassified texts to the government and officers.”*³⁶

*Mamed Khan-Tekinsky, Azerbaijan’s representative in Yerevan, worked tirelessly in order not to let Sharur and Nakhichevan to connect to Armenia. Since his arrival, he kept his government informed of the military and political situation in southern and other regions through coded messages. And in order to achieve those goals, Khan-Tekinsky constantly demanded large sums of money from the Azerbaijani government, at the same time demanding to use force on the Armenian government to immediately resolve the issue in favor of Azerbaijan.*³⁷

Therefore, it is quite natural that during those years the Armenian special services not only had a certain interest, but also control over the activities of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission in Yerevan, the capital of the Republic of Armenia (it was opened in March, 1919 and became an espionage and intelligence center for developing and directing anti-Armenian operations; the spy forces concentrated there, gathered information about the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, deployment of forces, conducted political observations, collected data on the RA financial capabilities and

³⁴ Vracyan 1966: 102. It should be noted that in this connection Tigran Devoyants reported that he had declassified all the known 75 secret coded telegrams, which the RA Ministry of Foreign Affairs illegally attributed to themselves (Devoyants 1945a: 87-90; 1945b: 82-83).

³⁴ See NAA, f. 200, l. 1, d. 299, l. 9, number 150, f. 206, l. 1, d. 84, l. 27, Ghazakhetsyan 2000 (ed.): 110.

³⁵ Gyulkhandanyan 1967: 76.

³⁶ Hovhannisyan 2005: 213.

³⁷ Ibid.: 263-264.

gave instructions and advice to their own government on how to harm the national and state security of the Republic of Armenia). In this regard, the declassification of a number of coded telegrams sent to Baku by the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission provided an opportunity to disclose some important aspects of hostile activity. Moreover, the enemy's goals included providing financial and military support to the hostile and insurgent elements inside the country, as well as causing the implementation of various issues of state and political construction to fail. In order to have a clear understanding of the destructive and harmful espionage and intelligence work Azerbaijan carried out against the Republic of Armenia through its diplomatic representatives in Yerevan, let us bring a number of factual data, quotes from secret correspondence. This is reflected in the first secret coded telegram that Tekinsky, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Armenia, sent to Baku immediately after setting foot in Yerevan, on March 22, 1919. It said: "On March 14 Armenia received 14 million roubles from Tbilisi, but if you cause financial difficulties, Armenia will soon find itself in a difficult position. Because of lack of income, Armenia cannot lead an independent life"³⁸.

On April 10, 1919 a few days after arriving in Yerevan, Khan-Tekinsky briefed the Head of the Government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, informing: *"Armenia has 6 infantry regiments, each consisting of 3 battalions. Besides, 6 Karabakh battalions and 1 Yerevan battalion are being formed. Chieftain military units are being formed. The whole infantry does not exceed 10 thousand. Conscription has been announced to replenish the regiments. The cavalry consists of 3 divisions, each having 3 squadrons. Only one squadron is provided with horses. There are 2 field, 5 mountain and 1 cavalry batteries, 3 armored vehicles, captured from the Georgians"*.³⁹

Paying special attention to the events and incidents in the Nakhichevan region, on April 18 Khan-Tekinsky informed his government about the resistance of Muslims in the Zod-Bassargechar region and the fighting with the Armenian military units.⁴⁰ On April 29, Khan-Tekinsky wanted to find out what kind of help the government would provide to the Muslims of Nakhichevan in the event of resistance when Armenian troops entered there: *"Will they send troops, at least under the pretense of volunteers?"*.⁴¹ S. Vratsyan testifies about Khan-Tekinsky's anti-Armenian conspiracies and provocations: *"On April 30, Azerbaijani agents Nakhichevansky and Makinsky arrived in Yerevan with large sums of money in order to get to Nakhichevan... A new period of conspiracies of Azerbaijani agents began"*.⁴²

There is direct evidence of that in a telegram sent to the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan by Tekinsky, the diplomatic representative of that country in Yerevan, on May 1, 1919. It said: *"On April 30, Makinsky (Ganizade) and Nakhichevansky arrived. In*

³⁸ See Secret Documents 1920: 18.

³⁹ See NAA, f. 200, l. 1, d. 299, l. 3, number 41.

⁴⁰ Ibid., l. 4, number 60.

⁴¹ Ibid., number 72.

⁴² See Vratsyan 1993: 311-312.

*Yerevan, Thomson prohibited Makinsky from crossing into Nakhichevan on the grounds that the area was under the control of the Armenian government. Makinsky has given the money to me. I am waiting for instructions on how to use the money allocated to Nakhichevan. Nakhichevansky is forced to return. The British took Makinsky's car".*⁴³ On May 4, 1919 asking for an urgent response to his April 29 telegram, Khan-Tekinsky added: *"The people of Nakhichevan are asking me how to behave. Will Azerbaijan come to their help if the people of Nakhichevan show resistance to Armenians?"*⁴⁴ In another telegram of the same day, Khan-Tekinsky informed the government of Azerbaijan: *"The Armenian regiments moved to Nakhichevan. In order to put pressure on Armenia, I consider it necessary to immediately deploy our regiments to the borders of Armenia. The population of the Nakhichevan region is ready to show resistance. The 4th Armenian Regiment is stationed in Dilijan but not at full strength. The accumulation of Armenian troops continues in Davalu. The Muslims stand near the village of Sadarak, in the region of Gayli Durk".*⁴⁵ Khan-Tekinsky demanded that the Azerbaijani government provide a large amount of money to the diplomatic mission to organize armed forces and use them against Armenia. *"Thanks to the measures I have taken, Sharur, Nakhichevan and Ordubad have united in the Nakhichevan (Muslim) National Council, which always keeps in touch with me",*⁴⁶ - Khan-Tekinsky informed. Here is the answer of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jafarov to the last telegram No. 130: *"I approve of the measures aimed at establishing contacts with Sharur-Nakhichevan. I agree to release funds for military organizations. Inform of the ways of implementation and organization of the mentioned plan".*⁴⁷ In a telegram dated July 24, 1919 Jafarov also informed Khan-Tekinsky of the decision of the Defense Committee of the Government of Azerbaijan about refusing to supply oil to Armenia: *"I inform you about it, do not say anything to Armenians".*⁴⁸

Khan-Tekinsky, using the cover of diplomatic immunity, through evident espionage was in fact engaged in sending valuable information on many issues, including the structure and armament of the Armenian army. In his secret telegram No 94, dated May 10, 1919 sent to Baku, to the chief of ministers, Khan-Tekinsky wrote: *"Make the Bolshevik threat to Baku a pretence and ask the British to transport the cannons in Kars to Baku".*⁴⁹ This was later achieved by Azerbaijan. We learn about this from the letter dated April 14, 1920 sent to Colonel M. Zinkevich, the military representative of the General Command of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, by Al. Khatisyan, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of RA. We have covered this previously. Due to

⁴³ Secret Documents 1920: 21.

⁴⁴ See NAA, f. 200, l. 1, d. 299, l. 5, number 83.

⁴⁵ Ibid., number 82.

⁴⁶ Ibid., l. 8-9, number 129, 130, 151.

⁴⁷ Ibid., l. 9, number 1599.

⁴⁸ Ibid., l. 13, number 54.

⁴⁹ See Harutyunyan 2002: 61-62.

the efforts of the intelligence this and 75 other such secret and coded telegrams came into possession of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of RA, which published them.⁵⁰

A few more examples: thus, in response to telegram No 1599 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated June 5, 1919 Khan-Tekinsky reported that the Sharur-Nakhichevan region had a semi-regular army of up to 6,000 soldiers, cavalry, cannons, machine guns, *“they are not inferior to Armenians in combat capabilities”* and at wartime their number could increase to 10.000. *“I think we should make expenditures for 6,000 soldiers, with the old command staff, we should deploy troops in the places where they were before the arrival of the Armenians, and concentrate one military unit in the mountains of Zangezur. It is difficult to fully guarantee the right spending of money. The importance of the case makes us even reconcile with small abuses”*, - Khan-Tekinsky wrote.⁵¹ At the request of the Azerbaijani government to urgently report on the situation in Nakhichevan, Sharur, Vedibassar, Goghtn, Ordubad and Julfa, on June 26 Khan-Tekinsky reported: *“The regions of Nakhichevan, Sharur, Vedibassar, Shahtakht are occupied by Armenian troops, an Armenian administration has been established. Julfa is under the control of Armenians, the Muslim troops are scattered. There are only 300 Chetniks”*.⁵²

On June 22, 1919 the diplomatic envoy of Azerbaijan, who had arrived in Armenia to “establish good-neighborly relations”, but carried out active and provocative espionage and intelligence activities, wrote the following in a very hostile attitude: *“I think Azerbaijan has no other enemy besides Armenia. Special attention should be paid to Armenia: we need Kurdish Smko to take our side”*.⁵³ On July 16, 1919, he sent a coded telegram to the Azerbaijani military attaché in Tbilissi, Colonel Mahmed Bek Aliyev, saying: *“Armenia has 3 infantry brigades, each consisting of 2 regiments. A regiment has 3 infantry battalions, three cavalry regiments, each consisting of 6 squadrons, but the organization of all squadrons is not over yet; 12 batteries with 4 cannons each. In addition, there is one Karabakh detachment consisting of one infantry battalion, 3 squadrons and 4 cannons. There are approximately more than 500 cannons in Kars, from 8-inch to field cannons, and there are officers and soldiers on them. There are three armored trains. A strong mobilization is currently taking place. I think that only by mobilization the number of the mentioned regiments can be supplemented, because there is a lot of desertion. Please report all this to the Military Minister”*.⁵⁴

Two days later, on July 19, in another telegram sent to the same addressee, the Azerbaijani diplomat engaged in espionage activities against the Republic of Armenia hurried to make the following addition: *“Besides the six infantry regiments, there is the seventh one. There is also one border brigade and the military unit of the military*

⁵⁰ See Virabyan 2007: 82-88.

⁵¹ See NAA, f. 200, l. 1, d. 299, l. 9, number 150, f. 206, l. 1, d. 84, l. 27; Ghazakhetsyan 2000 (ed.): 110.

⁵² Ibid., f. 200, l. 1, d. 299, l. 10, number 184, 1695; f. 206, l.1, d. 84, l. 28; Ghazakhetsyan 2000 (ed.): 114.

⁵³ See NAA, f. 200, l. 1, d. 10, number 202.

⁵⁴ See Haraj, June 6, 1920, № 117.

headquarters. There are Armenian military units in Zangezur, but their number is unknown". Then he added: "The fifth Regiment is stationed in Kars. The fourth is somewhere in the Dilijan and Surmalu province. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd military units of the 7th Regiment, as well as one unit of the border brigade, the military headquarters company, a mortar unit, two armored trains, the small military units of the cavalry and mountain cavalry battery are located in the regions of Vedibassar, Sharur and Nakhichevan. The military training contingent and the separate Yerevan battalion are stationed in Yerevan. The entire Karabakh detachment, under the command of Colonel Kafiev, have probably moved to Zangezur. The cavalry was stationed in Alexandrapol, but it is difficult to determine where it is now, as there are only three squadrons on horseback, the rest are without horses. Due to the fighting, the locations of the military units are being changed. Copies of General Shelkovnikov's secret orders to the regimental commanders have been sent to the Muslims of Sharur-Nakhichevan, which the Armenian authorities probably are not aware of".⁵⁵

As it becomes clear from the materials of the correspondence on the conspiratorial activities of the Azerbaijani agents, in addition to organizing internal unrest in the Republic of Armenia, Azerbaijan spared no effort and resources to dismantle Armenia economically, using oil, fuel oil and gasoline which were in their hands. As it becomes obvious from the well-known correspondence, Azerbaijan paid special attention to the railway as the main artery for the operation of the commercial and industrial system of the Armenian state, a means of rapid transportation of goods and troops. From this point of view, the military and political regions of Azerbaijan, the intelligence bodies and the agents operating in the territory of RA always gave instructions to their government to be very prudent and careful in the transit of oil and fuel oil to Armenia and avoid excessive "generosity". Thus, in a telegram dated June 4, 1919, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tekinsky emphasized the following: *"For whatever reason, postpone sending fuel oil to the Armenian railway because events are expected to take place in the Nakhichevan region"*.⁵⁶ And in a telegram dated July 24, 1919 the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jafarov instructed Khan-Tekinsky on how to act in the current situation: *"(On – V. V.) Bekzadyan's mediation on sending 500,000 poods of oil... the Security Council has decided not to release oil until the Azerbaijani government changes two conditions of the contract"*.⁵⁷

Azerbaijani diplomatic spies were deeply convinced that by causing financial difficulties for Armenia they would be able to bring about military and political complications and unsolvable difficulties as well. Moreover, in their intrigues against Armenia the Azerbaijani agents also allocated a certain place to external forces, trying to find the most effective ways and means to influence them, giving appropriate instructions and advice to their own government. Thus, in his telegram dated April 16,

⁵⁵ See NAA, f. 200, l. 1, d. 299, part I, l. 6.

⁵⁶ Secret documents 1920: 26.

⁵⁷ Ibid.: 37.

1919 addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Khan-Tekinsky emphasized the following: *“It is necessary to protest before all the Muslims of India, Turkey, Afghanistan, the Malay Islands and the Caucasus, as well as before the Reconciliation Assembly against the desire of the British to subjugate several million Muslims to half a million Armenians”*.⁵⁸

The Azerbaijani agents believed that their government should take some precautionary measures to ensure its interests in the means of communication. In this connection they asked the government to take actions so that the British would not harm them or hinder them from taking the appropriate measures. This view is defended in the telegram dated July 28, 1919 sent by Khan-Tekinsky to the Chief of Ministers: *“I think our government should make a solid offer to the British to hand over to us the Julfa-Shahtakht railway on the Aleat-Julfa line to start trade with Persia. The line to be handed over must extend to the village of Davalu. While making that offer to the British, point out Armenia’s incompetence, the frequent interruption of train traffic. At the same time, promise to establish a new order in Sharur Nakhchivan. I think the British will agree”*.⁵⁹ Finally, when it comes to the operation of the Julfa-Yerevan railway, from the point of view of trade, without considering the sovereignty of any state, in his telegram dated February 10, 1920, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan, taking an openly anti-Armenian position, literally emphasized the following: *“Before the normalization of our relations and the establishment of the borders, I consider opening the Yerevan-Julfa road inexpedient. From the economic viewpoint, it is beneficial only to Armenia. For us the opening of the road is not of economic interest yet, and we can pursue political interests in both Nakhichevan and Persian Azerbaijan without that road”*.⁶⁰

Back on July 21, 1919 Khan-Tekinsky demanded that his government concentrate Azerbaijani troops on the borders of Armenia and raised the alarm that Armenian troops continued to move to Sharur, where major events were unfolding, battles were going on: *“Armenia is concentrating all its efforts... The presence of our troops on the borders is causing panic among Armenians, is increasing desertion and lifting the spirits of Muslims. I have already informed Aliyev, the military attaché in Tbilissi about the number of Armenian troops, asking him to inform the Military Minister about it. If you want to take advantage of the moment, take urgent and decisive action”*.⁶¹

On August 1 and 3, Khan-Tekinsky wrote to the Head of Government of Azerbaijan: *“We must immediately declare war on Armenia⁶² and put an end to Zangezur within two weeks and move troops to Ghamarlu. Now is the best time. It will be too late after the arrival of Colonel Haskel, American Commissar in Armenia.*

⁵⁸ Ibid.: 19.

⁵⁹ Ibid.: 38- 39.

⁶⁰ Ibid.: 51.

⁶¹ Ibid.: 36.

⁶² See NAA, f. 200, l. 1, d. 299, part I, l. 14, number 601; Ghazakhetsyan 2000 (ed.): 116.

*Organize the attack without declaring war. Please use the moment and do not waste time”.*⁶³

On August 3, 1919, the “diplomatic representative-spy” reported to the Azerbaijani government that artillery and projectiles had been sent to Dilijan, Nor Bayazet and Bassargechar in 8 trucks and that the 4th regiment was in those regions. He concluded that “the Armenians are preparing it against the Muslims” and demanded that the government “take the necessary measures”.⁶⁴ The anti-Armenian provocative and destructive activities of the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative, the establishment of an espionage and intelligence network and groups of agents throughout the Republic of Armenia encouraged the Muslim masses, whose leaders provoked them to run various manipulations, and pushed them to insurgent actions against the legitimate Armenian authorities and the Armenian people. Encouraged by this, Muslim bandits that had started anti-government riots in Zangibassar, Zod-Bassargechar, Kars and elsewhere, showed strong resistance to Armenian troops and local authorities under the leadership of Turkish officers and special service agents and with the participation of military men and Turkish soldiers.

In this respect, the information obtained by Armenian special services regarding the Azerbaijani aspirations towards Zangibassar is of interest. The telegrams sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Baku testify to that. Thus, in his telegram dated December 20, 1919 sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan the acting diplomatic attorney of Azerbaijan in Yerevan, Mir Babayev simply wrote the following: “... *if the people of Zangibassar surrender, we will lose a lot from the political, moral and material point of view. Please make every effort to repel the Armenian attack on the people of Zangibassar. They have taken all the possible measures*”.⁶⁵

From the point of view of revealing the conspiratorial and disruptive activities of the Azerbaijani special services against the Republic of Armenia, of interest is the telegram regarding Zangibassar and Nakhichevan, dated March 4, 1920 sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by Musayev, acting Head of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission in Yerevan: “*Failure to receive money for Nakhichevan until today makes the work of the governor general useless and causes significant damage to the Republic. Without our financial support, Zangibassar is also in a terrible situation which is beneficial for Armenia. I am defending the two regions by saying that the money is already in Tbilissi and as soon as it arrives in Yerevan it will immediately be sent as planned. Every minute of delay has a strong impact on our interests. I’m asking for your order before it is too late*”.⁶⁶

Naturally, as we have already mentioned, the Armenian intelligence was well informed about all these preparations, because it was carefully monitoring it all. After

⁶³ NAA, f. 200, l. 1, d. 299, part I, l. 14-15, number 601, 606.

⁶⁴ Ibid., l. 15, number 616.

⁶⁵ See Secret documents 1920: 47.

⁶⁶ Ibid.: 55.

the neutralization of the Azerbaijani network of agents in Armenia by the Armenian special services, it became obvious that the Azerbaijanis also had serious ambitions towards the Böyük-Vedi and Kars regions and supported the local separatists. We learn about this from a telegram dated May 6, 1919 sent to Khan-Tekinsky by Khan-Khoisky, the Chief of Ministers of Azerbaijan: *“Contact the government of Kars immediately. Show them all kinds of support, find out what they need, write to us to take the necessary measures”*.⁶⁷ And in a telegram dated July 14, 1919 addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Khan-Tekinsky referred to the issue of Böyük-Vedi: *“The situation of Böyük-Vedi is serious, Armenia is concentrating all its forces. A mobilization has been announced... The Muslims can be saved by Azerbaijani armed intervention... The conflict continues. Send large sums of money to military organizations without wasting time”*.⁶⁸

This position was supported by the government. In a telegram dated July 19, 1919 Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan informed Khan-Tekinsky about it: *“Follow the events in Böyük-Vedi and in other villages. If possible, send an official representative, otherwise appoint an undercover agent. Report about the situation”*⁶⁹. Finally, the same mentality prevailed in the telegram dated July 22, 1919 sent by Khan-Tekinsky to the Minister of Foreign Affairs: *“I have the impression that the Armenian troops will not leave Böyük-Vedi, but will stop the hostilities standing only on the positions. Take measures for the withdrawal of Armenian troops, otherwise the situation of the Muslims of Böyük-Vedi will become difficult, even dangerous”*.⁷⁰

As a “result” of his conspiracy and espionage activity in Armenia Mamed Khan-Tekinsky was declared *persona non grata*. This was emphasized in Al. Khatisyan’s note addressed to the government of Azerbaijan: *“Based on solid data, the Armenian government finds it necessary to state with sorrow that through his actions Mr. Tekinsky personally contributed to the movements against the Republic of Armenia and peace in the country”*. Al. Khatisyan advised the Azerbaijani government to make the relevant conclusions about Khan-Tekinsky’s activities after receiving that information,⁷¹ but the latter was appointed Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan for his services and “successfully” continued his anti-Armenian activities and his place was taken by “national poet”, former representative of Azerbaijan in the Mountainous Republic Abdurakhman Bek Hakhverdov (Abdul Rahim-Bek Hakhverdov).⁷² After

⁶⁷ Ibid.: 23.

⁶⁸ Ibid.: 31-32.

⁶⁹ Ibid.: 33-34.

⁷⁰ Ibid.: 36-37.

⁷¹ See Zohrabyan 2002: 179-181.

⁷² In a telegram (No 1671) dated November 8, 1918 addressed to the RA Minister of Foreign Affairs, RA diplomatic envoy in Tbilissi, A. Jamalyan reported that he had received a letter from Jafarov, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Tbilissi, asking on behalf of his government to find out which of the persons represented by him would be considered desirable for the role of the representative of Azerbaijan in Armenia by the RA government - Tbilissi Mission Financial Officer Narimanbek Narimanbekov, Assistant to Sworn Envoy Amir Bek Narimanbekov or Sworn

March, 1920 the latter was replaced by Teimur khan Makinsky⁷³ (according to the decision of Prime Minister of Azerbaijan N. [Yusufbeyli] Bek-Usubbekov dated February 25, 1920).⁷⁴ They continued Tekinsky's vicious practice which the Armenian intelligence and government were aware of. Due to the negligence of the Azerbaijani agents, the Armenian side easily obtained the code number, which the Azerbaijani side found out with some delay,⁷⁵ but it did not give them significant results, which testifies to the good work of the special services in preventing and neutralizing the intelligence and destructive activities of the Azerbaijani agents which had hostile attitude towards the RA.

In order to make it clear that Azerbaijan really provided large financial aid to Sharur-Nakhichevan and Zangibassar, due to which the uprisings in those regions were organized, it is enough to point out that in 1919 a sum of about 5 million was sent to the governor of Nakhichevan in bonds and cheques. This money was stolen by the "robbers" who attacked the train while it was crossing the "Neutral" zone. They took all the money from Hakhverdov, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan⁷⁶ and T. Devoyants wrote about it. This is also stated by K. Sassuni, R. Ter-Minasyan, A.I. Khatisyan,⁷⁷ who assured that the money was intended for intensifying the insurgent and separatist moods against the Armenian authorities in Zangibassar, Sharur and elsewhere, with the aim of cutting off the known territories from the Republic of Armenia and annexing them to Azerbaijan. "One day, a telegram was received: Hakhverdov, the new ambassador of Azerbaijan and S. Harutyunyan, the leader of the People's Party were leaving Tbilissi for Yerevan by the same train. Ruben and I immediately gave the relevant instructions, and at dawn of March 8, in the neutral zone of Lori, between the stations Sanahin and Kober a group of masked and armed young people stopped the train and seized the belongings from Hakhverdov and Harutyunyan. They took 3,400,000 roubles worth of Azerbaijani and 2 million roubles worth of Transcaucasian bonds from Hakhverdov, and 296,000 roubles worth of Transcaucasian bonds from Harutyunyan, which he was taking to their party's "Zhoghovurd" newspaper in Yerevan. This incident caused quite a stir.

Envoy Mamedkhan Tekinsky. Jamalyan informed the Foreign Minister that in Tbilissi's private circles they believed that the response of the Armenian side should be delayed just as Azerbaijan was trying to do in T. Bekzadyan's case. Thus, based on the information in his possession, Jamalyan considered Tekinsky's candidacy undesirable. - See NAA, f. 200, l. 2, d. 18, l. 5.

⁷³ Teimur Khan-Makinsky - graduated from Yerevan Gymnasium, and in 1916 from the Faculty of Law of the University of Warsaw. He was a member of the Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He worked as the plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan in Armenia until December, 1918. By the decision of the Azerbaijani Government dated January 31, 1919, sworn envoy Mamed Khan-Tekinsky (1880-1938), a Turkmen national, a graduate of the Novorossiysk Imperial University was appointed the diplomatic representative in the Republic of Armenia. Tekinsky was succeeded by Abdul Rahim Bek Hakhverdov, and finally, the last diplomatic envoy of Azerbaijan in the Republic of Armenia before the Sovietization of Azerbaijan was once again Teimur Khan-Makinsky appointed in that position on March 16, 1920.

⁷⁴ See Slovo, February 25, March 18, 1920.

⁷⁵ See NAA, f. 200, l. 1, d. 299, part II, l. 105.

⁷⁶ See Secret documents 1920: 9.

⁷⁷ See Sassuni 1968: 173; Ruben 1982: 246; Khatisyan 1968: 205.

The Azerbaijani government expressed its complaints to Yerevan. The Georgians were laughing at their Azerbaijani friends. The Armenian government expressed condolences to S. Harutyunyan, returned the money and the golden watch taken from him, in spite of the fact that the money brought by Harutyunyan to “Zhoghovurd” newspaper would be spent to fight against the government.⁷⁸

An Armenian avenger at the root of “Nemesis”, Misak Torlakyan⁷⁹ (he served in the intelligence unit of the Russian army from 1915 to 1918. Later he moved to Batumi, then Constantinople, where on July 18, 1921 he killed Behbut Khan Jivanshir, executioner of Armenians in Baku. On October 6, 1921, a British court found Misak Torlakyan insane and released him), gave an interesting reference and observation of it complementing and completing the above mentioned in regard to the conspiratorial and destructive activities of Azerbaijan in the Republic of Armenia: “...*The ARF Bureau in*

⁷⁸ Vracyan 1966: 103.

⁷⁹ Misak Torlakyan was one of the active members of the ARF Dashnaksutyun. In 1910, like many other Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, M. Torlakyan was drafted into the army. During World War I M. Torlakyan was in Erzurum as a member of the 4th regiment of the 12th army of the Ottoman Empire. Feeling that Armenian soldiers were likely to be annihilated in the army, M. Torlakyan secretly escaped and joined a group of hayduks operating in the Erzurum-Trabzon direction. In 1915 Torlakyan went to Tbilissi and from there to Yerevan. Afterwards, Misak Torlakyan first participated in a number of battles as a member of the 6th volunteer detachment, and then as a member of the newly formed Armenian Corps (commander General T. Nazarbekyan), including the battle of Bash-Aparan (May, 1918). There he joined the volunteer regiment of Ishkhan (Hovsep [Arghutyan-Long-armed] Arghutyan), took part in several important battles, after which, by the decision of the party, went over Sukhumi to Trabzon with his detachment. He soon became a member of the Trabzon region Self-Defense military body. In December, 1915 it became known that after losing the battle of Sarighamish, Enver Pasha, a fanatical Armenophob intended to go over Trabzon to Istanbul. At a secret meeting it was decided to terrorize him in Trabzon. However, at the last moment, Enver managed to avoid the punishment he deserved. During the 1915 massacres of Armenians in Trabzon M. Torlakyan and the other Hayduks organized the self-defense of the Armenians, thus saving many Armenians from death. In 1916, Russian troops liberated Trabzon. In his memoirs Torlakyan said that his first job in Trabzon was intelligence service in the Russian army in Trabzon, which gave him an opportunity to enter Turkish villages, conduct searches, look for and find Armenians hiding there, and get a good chance to avenge Turkish criminals and executioners. For his service in the Russian army M. Torlakyan was awarded the “Battle Cross” order. In January, 1918, the Turkish troops started their campaign to Transcaucasia. The Trabzon group of Hayduks joined the troops under the command of Drastamat Kanayan (Dro). Prior to that, the Trabzon detachment was located in Kars, where it controlled the retreat of Armenian troops and the peaceful Armenian population to the Araks River. At the end of May, the detachment took part in the battle of Bash-Aparan. Battle-seasoned Misak Torlakyan helped the great hero in that work. He was in the vanguard detachment that, at Dro’s command, started the attack on the positions of Turkish troops in the battle of Bash-Aparan. In 1921, M. Torlakyan came to Istanbul where together with Harutyun Harutyunyan and Yervand Fundikyan, as part of the ARF Constantinople group he became one of the participants of operation “Nemesis”.

During World War II, together with Dro and Nzhdeh, Torlakyan participated in the formation of Armenian military units within the Wehrmacht. He headed the secret agents and subversive-and-intelligence subdivisions of the Armenian Legion. He personally led the operation to seize the secret documents of the Turkish leadership concerning the spread of Pan-Turkism and the conquest of the Caucasus. The documents obtained in Turkey, which were presented to Rosenberg, became a reason for the Reich not to trust Turkey as an ally. After that, the Reich leadership refused to use the Turkish army in the Caucasus. For the brilliantly performed operation Captain Misak Torlakyan, along with many other intelligence agents, was awarded and received highest ranks. See Who is who 2005: 435; Torlakyan 2001: 357-490.

Armenia instructed the Central Committee of Georgia to rob Azerbaijani Ambassador Hakhverdov's steam train in a neutral zone and obtain the necessary documents. In late March, 1920, when Hakhverdov was returning from another visit to Baku, a group of armed young men dressed in Georgian clothes attacked the steam train at night, in a neutral zone. Harutyun Harutyunyan, armed with a weapon, ordered the train driver to stop the steam train. The boys broke into Hakhverdov's wagon, stole everything from the people there. And in order to make the robbery look just like a bandit attack, they did not spare even the Armenian public figure Samson Harutyunyan, who was in the wagon and was heading to Yerevan. The documents obtained left no doubt about the intentions of Azerbaijan and Turkey to blow up Armenia from within. Some of these documents were published in the seventh volume of Rouben's memoirs".⁸⁰

Such a bold undertaking, which brought honor to its executors, had undesirable developments, of which we learn from M. Torlakyan's memories. And M. Torlakyan simply stated the following: "A group of participants in the operation did not want to give the money to the Central Committee. That is why the Central Committee decided to terrorize their leaders.

Some of those who carried out this operation remained in the neutral zone, where one of their leaders, Gasim Ruben was intimidated by Harutyun Harutyunyan. After this intimidation, the others came to Tbilissi to take revenge on the Central Committee for their friend.

Considering this tense situation, the Central Committee of Georgia summoned me and my friends from Batumi to Tbilissi.

The friends and associates of the murdered man were outraged and would come to Tbilissi to terrorize both Harutyun and the members of the Central Committee that had been with him.

Barely a week after our arrival in Tbilissi, Ruben Safaryan, the second leader was assassinated on Yerevan Square by Yervand Fundukyan. After this terror, the others ran away and the issue was closed".⁸¹

It was not confirmed either on March 11, 1920 during the Yerevan Provincial Court hearing on Hakhverdov's case, in which Samson Harutyunyan, a member of the People's Party of Armenia, Member of Parliament and Hakhverdov himself were questioned, but with no evidence, so the court finished its job.⁸²

It is known that back on March 16, 1920, in the March 8 complaint (N 920) addressed to the Armenian representative in Tbilissi, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Georgia, Vekilov stated that between the stations Kolageran and Kober Abdul Rahim Bek Hakhverdov, the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative in Yerevan was robbed by vicious bandits who had taken money and documents from him. He asked to take measures to find the robbers, to hold them accountable and return the

⁸⁰ Torlakyan 2001: 455-456.

⁸¹ See Torlakyan 2001: 456-457.

⁸² See NAA, f. 275, l. 5, d. 207, l. 48-50, 64-70.

stolen items and state documents. By the way, it was mentioned that the crime had been committed in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.⁸³ And already on March 18, 1920 a complaint (N 1920) was filed by F. Khan-Khoisky, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, who informed the British Chief Commissioner O. Wardrop⁸⁴ about the robbery that had taken place with Hakhverdov in the Neutral Zone of Lori, during which 5 million 300 thousand roubles taken from the state treasury and 40 thousand roubles of personal money had been stolen from him and the robbery was accompanied by shooting. Stressing that the crime had been committed in the Lori Neutral Zone belonging to the two republics, Khan-Khoisky noted that the incident affected the interests of the Transcaucasian republics, and therefore, asked not to refuse and take decisive measures to immediately find the culprits, return the seized items, money and documents.⁸⁵

Further squabbles over this case continued, the RA Internal Affairs bodies became involved, and they were tasked with finding out what happened. In this connection, on March 19 (N 1066) and March 27 (N 2871) there was some exchange of correspondence. The RA Diplomatic Commissioner in Tbilissi was also informed about this, as well as about the testimony given by S. Harutyunyan, interrogated in connection with the case. It should be noted, however, that while investigating this very important case, the Internal Affairs bodies examined it from the point of view of RA interests. They completely denied the circumstance that the robbery had taken place in the part of the Lori Neutral Zone that was considered RA territory, claiming that there was no evidence to prove that. And as it turns out from the document submitted to the RA Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs bodies by the Militia Department on March 30, 1920 (N 101) and from the protocol approved by the prosecutor, the robbery had taken place between the stations Kolageran and Sanahin, not Kober, i.e. in the territory of the Republic of Georgia, therefore the Republic of Armenia could not be held accountable. They also noted that if the perpetrators had crossed the border and hidden in the territory of RA, the Internal Affairs bodies ordered the Gharakilisa provincial commissioner to take urgent measures to arrest the robbers.⁸⁶ The deep motives of such an approach are clear - to ignore the facts of the case for the sake of protection of the interests of RA.

The intelligence had revealed that in the telegrams dated September 18 (N° 736) and September 21 (N° 757), 1919 sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan by Mir Babayev, the secretary and substitute of the diplomatic mission of Azerbaijan in Armenia, there were interesting details about the financial support provided by Azerbaijan to the insurgent and anti-government movements in Armenia, as well as the

⁸³ Ibid., l. 24, 29.

⁸⁴ Wardrop John Oliver - General, specialist in Georgian Studies, former Consul General in Moscow. On July 2, 1919, the British War Department approved Wardrop's appointment as British Chief Commissioner to Transcaucasia, which was approved by Lord George Curzon as well. On July 22, the British Foreign Office approved Wardrop's candidacy, who knew Georgia and Caucasus very well. See Hovhannisyan 2014: 130.

⁸⁵ See NAA, f. 275, l. 5, d. 207, l. 33-34.

⁸⁶ See NAA, f. 275, l. 5, d. 207, l. 40-41, f. 200, l. 1, d. 520, l. 141.

disruptive espionage and intelligence activities. Thus, in the telegram dated September 18, 1919, the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative in Yerevan informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Armenian agent in Baku had informed the head of the Armenian counterintelligence that Captain Kasumbekov, an officer on special assignments attached to the mission (it is interesting to note that on November 5 about half a million roubles were stolen from Azerbaijani diplomatic mission attaché, special assignments officer Kasumbekov's apartment by Armenian mauserists. Hakhverdov also informed about this in his telegram to the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan dated November 21, 1919 (N° 1455) adding that the Armenian government was powerless against what happened and could not take any measures (it is clear that such a large sum was not personal money and it can be said with some certainty that it was just for intelligence purposes), and Cornet Ali Khan Makinsky were registered in the Azerbaijani counterintelligence, and in his opinion the Armenians were trying to get rid of them under various pretexts. Mir Babayev reported that Armenian special services had discovered their activities in Yerevan and asked the Foreign Minister to give Kasumbekov and Makinsky military uniforms and to get them into the Azerbaijani army, and thus, free them from various incidents, placing them under the auspices of the mission and therefore, getting rid of the Armenian counterintelligence.⁸⁷

And from the declassification of Mir Babayev's telegram dated September 21, 1919 it becomes clear that the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan reported that mobilization of 19-to 30-year-olds was underway in Armenia, that Yerevan mayor *A. Shahkhatuni* had left for Dilijan to personally observe the positions. Mir Babayev also mentioned that weapons and ammunition were being brought urgently.⁸⁸ Thus, Mir Babayev was engaged in espionage activities in Yerevan, and the young Armenian counterintelligence was not asleep. They were intently watching the enemy and neutralizing the latter's schemes and fraudulent deals. As a result of all this, the work of Armenian intelligence and counterintelligence services in Yerevan yielded the desired results in terms of exposing hostile agents and preventing their conspiracy against Armenia.

As a result of all this, in the middle of May (May 19-22), 1920 the Information Department of the RA Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram-message to the ARF Bureau, the RA Ministries of Justice, Interior and Military Ministries, Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Nazarbekyan, the Speaker of the Parliament, as well as the RA diplomatic envoy in Tbilissi, Consul General of Batumi, the Armenian delegation in Paris, the Ambassadors of the Republic of Armenia in Italy, London, Washington and elsewhere. It said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia had published the entire secret correspondence exchanged between the representatives of the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Yerevan and their agents. It stated that it concerned the anti-government, anti-Armenian aggressive activities of the

⁸⁷ See NAA, f. 199, l. 1, d. 73 (71), l. 155.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, l. 156.

Azerbaijani government and its representative in Armenia, which were aimed at organizing anti-government movements in the regions of Armenia and at undermining the foundations of statehood in the Armenian republic, and ultimately in practice deepening the insurgent situation in Zangibassar, undermining the authority of the Armenian officials, overthrowing them and annexing to Azerbaijan the Zangibassar region which was a legitimate and inseparable part of the territory of the Republic of Armenia.⁸⁹ Besides, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs applied to the newspapers “Haraj”,⁹⁰ “Zhoghovurd”, “Razmik”, “Socialist-Revolutionary” (only due to the closure of the “Socialist-Revolutionary” newspaper by the government order, at the last moment that important material was not published though it was planned) and others and offered them to publish the well-known correspondence about the secret anti-government activities of the Azerbaijani agents, relying on the full version of the case, also publishing it in English.

Finally, on June 3, 1920 the RA Military Court held a hearing in the case of the former staff of the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Yerevan (the so-called *kavases*, patrol staff Mashadi Mamedov, Mashadi Hussein oghli, Hussein Vali oghli, Musa Mashadi Mamed oghli, as well as Ivakhnenko, the driver of diplomatic mission who was included in that list). They were accused of various criminal and political crimes, in particular of supporting the Zangibassar insurgents and inciting riots there. This was carried out on the direct instructions of the Azerbaijani diplomatic envoy to Yerevan *Temur Bek Makinsky*, and by coordinating with him the actions taken, as well as promising to transfer more than 600,000 roubles in Azerbaijani and Caucasian bons (more precisely, 449,750 roubles in Azerbaijani bons and 117,050 roubles in Transcaucasian bons) addressed to the insurgents in Zangibassar and to hand the money over to Molla Kasum, the head of the Zangibassar “government”. However, in the village of Jafarabad (now Argavand - V. V.) they were arrested by Hambardzum Hakobyan, Jafarabad frontier post senior mounted militiaman of the Etchmiadzin provincial militia. They offered him a bribe of 100.000 roubles which he strongly refused to take. He arrested them and to make the case legal, handed them over to the law enforcement bodies together with the confiscated money. For performing his official

⁸⁹ Ibid., f. 200, l. 1, d. 427, part II, l. 284, 288, 290, d. 461, l. 24-27, 28-31, 40.

⁹⁰ See for example Haraj, June 5, 1920, № 116, June 6, 1920, № 117, June 8, 1920, № 118, June 14, 1920, № 121.

In this connection, the robbery of Abdurahman Bek Hakhverdov was referred to by Nazim Mustafa, laureate of State Prize of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Doctor of Philosophy, during his speech at the international conference held on June 26-30, 2018. The relevant materials were posted on Azerbaijani websites in February 2012. He tried to evaluate the realities of those days, assessing them as an operation carried out by the Armenian Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services against Azerbaijan, particularly the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Yerevan. Referring to Hakhverdov’s notorious robbery, M.Nazim described it as a violation of his diplomatic immunity, citing Armenian intelligence officer Tigran Devoyants, who was allegedly in Tbilissi at that time and followed the events. He said it was a calculated operation by Armenia in response to which the Azerbaijani government arrested the staff of the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Armenia in Baku, including Arshak Sargsyan, in return for which the Azerbaijani diplomats arrested in Yerevan were allegedly released. See Nazim 2018c; See also Nazim 2018b; Nazim 2019b.

duties conscientiously and honestly senior militiaman Hambardzum Hakobyan received thank-you from the Minister of Internal Affairs A. Gyulkhandanyan.⁹¹

The RA Military Court issued a verdict, according to which one of the defendants, Hussein Vali oğlu was sentenced to indefinite exile, the other two, Mashadi Mamed oğlu and Musa Mashadi Mamed oğlu [see the materials of the June 3, 1920 court case regarding the three *kavases* - guards of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission in Yerevan] to 10 years of hard labor each.⁹² The case was not over by this, as Azerbaijan took retaliatory measures by arresting several employees of the Armenian diplomatic mission in Azerbaijan. We learn about this from a telegram sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to the RA diplomatic envoy. The Azeris finally agreed to release the employees of the RA diplomatic mission in Azerbaijan in return to the release of secret agents of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission arrested and convicted in Yerevan by the Armenian government, although their complicity in anti-government and espionage and intelligence activities against RA was absolutely evident.⁹³

Based on intelligence data, it was noted that Khan-Tekinsky was actively organizing anti-Armenian operations, maintaining secret relations with the Tatars of the Sharur-Nakhichevan region, inciting them to riot, supplying money, etc. It was mentioned in the overview that in the face of anti-Armenian sentiments, the situation of a small number of Armenian patrol guards among a well-armed, rather organized Muslim population had become dangerous. The authors of the military overview also noted that in view of the resumption of Turkish-Kurdish-Tatar attacks on the region of Surmalu and province of Kars, as well as taking into account the intelligence data regarding the general offensive planned by the Muslims throughout the south and in the west of Armenia, it was decided to withdraw the Armenian troops from Vedibassar (Böyük-Vedi) as far north as possible to give them a chance to rest, also providing possible reserves.⁹⁴

One thing is quite obvious - relying on secret telegrams and letters sent to Baku by Azerbaijani diplomatic representatives in Yerevan Khan-Tekinsky, Hakhverdov, Makinsky, as well as other sources, the Armenian counterintelligence was able to declassify them. They did not believe the “news”,⁹⁵ i.e. tried to work fully and effectively and obtain valuable information from the point of view of ensuring the RA security, which was aimed at securing the internal peace of the country, neutralizing the Muslim uprisings in the territory of RA and solving the most important security issues in general, and finally, aimed at the processes of the establishment of the Republic of Armenia as a state.

⁹¹ See Ghazakhetsyan 2000 (ed.): 181.

⁹² See NAA, f. 200, l. 1, d. 249, part II, l. 415, 427, d. 461, l. 31, 40, d. 427, part II, l. 322-327. See also Secret documents 1920: 56.

⁹³ See NAA, f. 200, l. 1, d. 249, part II, l. 431.

⁹⁴ See *Ibid.*, l. 4.

⁹⁵ Zohrabyan 2002. 233.

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