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HISTORY

REGARDING THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMIGRATION PROCESSES OF ARMENIANS

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Abstract

During the Soviet years, the number of the Armenian population increased significantly, population movements were not significant. In the 1990s, population migration from Armenia began, the main destination of which is the Russian Federation and post-Soviet countries, the European Union, the USA, etc. The region's socioeconomic, military, and political instability as well as the perspective's ambiguity were the determining factors. For a variety of reasons, the trend and rate of Armenians returning to their homeland have been apparent in recent years.

Keywords: Demographic, emigration, Armenian, census, population, diaspora

During the First World War, as well as the preceding and following decades, the Ottoman and then Turkish governments planned, consistently and stage by stage carried out the Armenian Genocide, making the last remnants of Western Armenians stateless, making hundreds of thousands homeless, emigrants and orphans, Islamizing Armenian children and women.

The active participation of Eastern Armenians in the First World War as members of the Russian army and the Armenian volunteer movement resulted in huge human losses.

It is noteworthy that according to the first All-Russian census held in 1897, the Armenian population of the Russian Empire was 1,173,096 people or 0.93% of the population of the entire Empire.

Dislocation of Armenians in the Russian Empire according to the 1897 census

Column N1

| | total | urban population | rural population |
|-----------------|-----------|------------------|------------------|
| Transcaucasia | 1,079,059 | 221,192 | 857,867 |
| North Caucasus | 33,452 | 17,677 | 15,775 |
| European Russia | 49,329 | 29,211 | 20,118 |
| Middle Asia | 4,864 | 4,316 | 548 |
| Siberia | 629 | 239 | 390 |
| Baltic states | 182 | 166 | 16 |

As of 1897, Transcaucasus included the provinces of Tiflis, Kutaisi, Elizavetpol, Yerevan, Baku and Kars region, where 4,934,614 people lived, of which 1,079,059 were Armenians. Armenians were present in all provinces and districts of the region. Thus, 441,000 Armenians lived in the Yerevan province, 292,188 in Elizavetpol, 196,189 in Tiflis, 52,233 in Baku, 24,043 in Kutaisi, and 73,406 in Kars region. Thus, less than 100,000 Armenians lived outside the Transcaucasus.

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, a civil war erupted between the Bolsheviks and the White movement in various regions of the former empire, affecting particularly the Armenian population of the North Caucasus and the Don.

After the formation of the USSR, the increase in the number, dislocation and dynamics of Armenians living within the borders of the Union can be divided into two main stages:

1. Before the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War, in the 1920-1930s, the census demonstrated the dynamics of the growth of the number of Armenians.
2. The post-war period until the collapse of the USSR, when the all-Union censuses held in 1959-1989s came to show the exceptional indicators of the demographic progress of the Armenians.

After the formation of the USSR, in 1926 the first all-Union census was held, which recorded the number of Armenian population in the USSR as 1,567,568 people, of which 1,332,593 were in the TSFSR.

In 1939, according to the all-Union census, 2,152,860 Armenians lived in the USSR, of which 1,061,997 lived in the Armenian SSR, 388,025 in the Azerbaijan SSR, 415,013 in the Georgian SSR, and 218,156 in the RSFSR. Thus, before the Great Patriotic War, about half of the Armenians of the USSR already lived in the Armenian SSR.

In the post-war years, the number of the Armenian population of the USSR continued to grow steadily, and the Armenians made a great contribution to the state, economic and educational life of the Soviet republics.

Of course, mass repressions against various population layers in the Armenian SSR, the Georgian SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR, and the RSFSR (especially in the North Caucasus) as well as starvation, epidemics, and human casualties—which reached approximately 200,000 on the front lines of the war—were negative factors contributing to the decline in the Armenian population in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.

At the same time, in terms of the demographic growth of the Armenians of the USSR, the repatriation process, which took place at various stages during the Soviet years, was of great importance, as a result of which around 200 thousand compatriots from the diaspora moved to live in Soviet Armenia. The post-war years were years of creative and hard work, which made it possible to restore the material and human losses of the war and record new exceptional successes.

Thus, according to the latest all-Union population census of 1989, a steady increase in the number of the Armenian population was recorded in 13 republics, and a

decrease in two union republics: The Georgian SSR and the Azerbaijan SSR. In the case of the latter, the national liberation movement for the reunification of Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh, which began in 1988, resulted in the mass deportation of Armenians from this republic. As a result, over 360,000 Armenians left the territory of this republic in 2-3 years, mostly moving to Armenia, Russia, Turkmenistan, and partially to other union republics.

**The number, distribution and percentage of Armenians in the USSR
according to the All-Union Population Census of 1989¹**

Column N1

| - | The number | In the USSR by % | Population in % | Dynamics in % in 1979 compared to |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| USSR | 4,623,232 | 100 | 1,6 | 111,4 (+) |
| 1. Armenian SSR | 3,083,616 | 66,7 | 93,30 | 113,2 (+) |
| 2. Azerbaijani SSR | 390,505 | 8,4 | 5,56 | 82,1 (-) |
| 3. Georgian SSR | 437,211 | 9,5 | 8,09 | 97,6 (-) |
| 4. RSFSR | 532,390 | 11,5 | 0,36 | 146,0 (+) |
| 5. Ukrainian SSR | 54,200 | 1,2 | 0,10 | 140,2(+) |
| 6. Uzbek SSR | 50,537 | 1,1 | 0,25 | 119,3 (+) |
| 7. Turkmen SSR | 31,829 | 0,7 | 0,90 | 119,6(+) |
| 8. Kazakh SSR | 19,119 | 0,4 | 0,11 | 136,4 (+) |
| 9. Tajik SSR | 5,651 | 0,1 | 0,11 | 116,3 (+) |
| 10. Byelorussian SSR | 4,933 | 0,1 | 0,04 | 179,3(+) |
| 11. Kirghiz SSR | 3,975 | 0,1 | 0,09 | 121,0 (+) |
| 12. Latvian SSR | 3,069 | 0,07 | 0,11 | 160,4(+) |
| 13. Moldavian SSR | 2,873 | 0,06 | 0,06 | 147,1 (+) |
| 14. Estonian SSR | 1,669 | 0,04 | 0,10 | 197,5 (+) |
| 15. Lithuanian SSR | 1,655 | 0,04 | 0,04 | 173,3 (+) |

After the restoration of Armenia's independence in 1991, due to the disruption of socio-economic relations, economic transformations, new military-political realities, mass and still unceasing migration from Armenia commenced, mainly to the Russian Federation, European countries and the United States.

Thus, over the 70 years of the USSR, the Armenian population recorded a stable, dynamic and significant growth both in the Armenian SSR and throughout the Union, which is a great achievement. In the years of 1926-1989, the Armenian population in the

¹Aleksanyan 2016: 174-175.

Armenian SSR increased 4.1 times, the entire population—3.7 times.²

More than 2/3 of the Armenians of the USSR, or 3.083 million people, were living in the Armenian SSR, which was the largest concentration of Armenians in a small piece of our Motherland in recent centuries.

Due to low birth rate and continuous emigration, the number of the population of the RA in the thirty years of post-independence is around 3 million. At the same time, a significant change in gender and age composition has been manifested, causing serious demographic problems.

Taking into account the consistent growth rates of the Armenian population in the last three Soviet censuses, in 1970, 1979, and 1989, that is, natural growth of 400-500 thousand each decade, the Armenian population should have reached 4.5-5 million people by now, in case of normal development.

Thus, along with the successes recorded in the economy, science, education, culture, healthcare and other areas of life, one cannot underestimate the enormous achievement reached by Armenia and the Armenian people in the form of demographic progress during the Soviet years.

Considering the growth and continuity of labor migration from Armenia since the 1990s, it is important to study the issue separately from the standpoint of the quantitative growth of displacements, the qualitative changes associated with them, the identification of general patterns and features of migration processes and their impact. Since the 1990s, the increasing rate of chaotic population emigration from the Republic of Armenia and illegal labor migration have caused numerous challenges, including loss of qualified labor resources, deterioration of the demographic situation, disruption of national security, disproportionate territorial development and population migration from border settlements.

The impact of emigration on the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the population and labor resources of the Republic of Armenia cannot be definitely assessed. If we consider emigration as a factor that relieves the tension in the domestic labor market, then in the current conditions of socio-economic development, the loss of highly qualified specialists and labor potential can lead to a serious problem of unsatisfied demand for human capital. The “equivalent” of human capital loss in countries experiencing mass emigration becomes remittances from migrants to their home countries.³

Remittances of the population as a factor of socio-economic development are the second most important source of external financing after direct investments. They have a huge impact on the domestic labor market, consumption and imports, the state budget and other areas of socio-economic relations.

It is noteworthy that in 1992-1994, among emigrants, 75% - 80% of the outflow went to CIS countries - mainly Russia - and the rest were evenly distributed between

² Sakhvadze 2017: <http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2017/0723/tema04.php>

³ Tadevosyan *et al.* 2014

Europe and the USA.⁴ According to official statistics, at present, the population of the Republic of Armenia decreased by 21.3% or 777.1 thousand people in 1991-2011. This was only conditioned by the negative balance of external migration–1.120.3 thousand people, since over the indicated period, the population increased by 343.2 thousand people due to natural increase. Thus, it can be noted that since the 1990s, tens of thousand people, sometimes more than 100 thousand, have emigrated from Armenia every year.⁵

The relative accessibility of the “Russian” direction of emigration is predetermined, first of all, by the economic factor (the absence of a visa and fees for obtaining it, geographical location, the availability of road transport), the fundamental similarity of the socio-psychological environment, and, finally, the absence of a language barrier.

Distribution of emigrants by country of departure

| Country of departure | in 2008 | In 2009 | In 2013 |
|----------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Russia | 79,7 | 73,1 | 68,6 |
| Other CIS countries | 3,6 | 6,8 | 3,1 |
| European countries | 10,2 | 8,2 | 13,4 |
| USA and Canada | 5,0 | 7,9 | 12,9 |
| Other countries | 1,5 | 4,0 | 2,0 |
| Total | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 |

The specific weight of labor migration to Russia can be explained by the wide opportunities for legal and illegal employment in this country, the ease of doing business and obtaining the right to work, and employment opportunities in the service field.

It is interesting that Armenians who emigrated to the Russian Federation have the highest percentage of the intention of re-emigration–return to their homeland / 24.6%/. The intention to re-emigrate from Europe is more than twice lower–11.5%, and the intention to return from the USA and Canada is incredibly small–only 3%.

Since the total number of emigrants who left for Russia is 68.6%, and among labor migrants that number is higher - 79%, the return potential of the emigrants under study is on average 19.6%.

Among the purposes for emigrants' departure, job search emphatically stands out.

One of the immediate reasons for emigration is, as a rule, the contradiction among the individual's level of development, demands and possibilities on the one hand, and the conditions for satisfying them on the other. Potential emigrants have gradually come to believe that this contradiction may be resolved outside of the RA.

The main causes for emigration from Armenia are related to employment issues, including a shortage of jobs, both in general and by occupation, and, most crucially, the lack of jobs ensuring decent living.

⁴ Migration and skills in Armenia 2012: 10.

⁵ Atayan 2015: 67-69.

An important reason is also the lack of public trust in Armenia's development prospects and future. This is the only way to explain the continuous growth in the number of emigrants from Armenia.

Overcoming the causes of emigration, large-scale involvement of the economic capabilities and human resources of the Armenian Diaspora (repatriation) can change the situation.

Meanwhile, since 2022, positive dynamics of immigration have been recorded in Armenia, and the number of applications for citizenship is growing.

Only in 2022, about 20 thousand people received Armenian citizenship, and most of them are citizens of Russia and ethnic Armenians. However, even in 2021, their number was a little more than 8 thousand people.

The positive migration balance of border crossings in 2022 was 38 thousand. This means that more people arrived in Armenia that year than left.⁶

Also, in 2022, a large flow of labor migrants was recorded in Armenia, most of them were Russians. Moreover, the difference in border crossings (entries and exits) according to the passports of citizens of the Russian Federation amounted to 65 thousand people. This is almost 2.5 times more than the 2021 figure. Almost 10 thousand citizens of the EAEU were granted a residence permit with the right to work in Armenia. This proves that they settled and live in Armenia. In addition, about 2.5 thousand foreigners (not from EAEU countries) also received a residence permit.

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⁶ Sputnik-Armenia, 2023, <https://bit.ly/3Ruql90>

In 2022 in Armenia are fixed best показатели of immigration for 30 years: Armen Kazaryan, «Sputnik Armenia», 28.03.2023, <https://bit.ly/3Ruql90>

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ARMENIANS OF VAN PROVINCE DURING THE REIGN OF THE VICEROYS MAHMUD- KHAIRI, FERIT AND YAVER IN 1908-1909

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Abstract

In 1908 the Young Turk coup, the restoration of the constitution and the measures taken by the government raised certain hopes and great enthusiasm among the Armenians of Van, because from the point of view of the security of personal and national interests, the Armenians preferred the new constitutional rather than the old Abdul Hamid II dictatorial order. A period of rallies, meetings, fraternization of the Armenian and Turkish peoples began among the Armenian and Turkish population, which was a novelty in the social and political life of Ottoman Turkey. The Armenian political prisoners of Van were released, the activities of national parties were declared legal, and many figures of the Armenian liberation struggle were universally honored. However, the Young Turk revolution not only did not introduce revolutionary changes, but also caused deep despair among the Armenians of Van province.

Keywords: *Van province, Ali Riza, Mahmud-Khairi, Ferit, Yaver, Armenian-Kurdish relations, Nshan Kaljian, Hovsep Khlghatyan*

The Armenians of Van province during the tenure of governors Mahmud Khairi, Mahmud Ferit and Yaver

After the Young Turk coup, former governor Ali Riza continued to serve in Van province for some time. On August 23, 1908, the Armenian and Turkish “fraternal” people of Van, under the influence of revolutionary ideas and motivated by anger, deposed and expelled from the city Ali Riza, the governor of Van, who was a supporter of the Sultanate order and caused distrust of the military.¹ The latter, by telegram, appoints Bashkale muthasarif as his deputy, Province Governor A. H., who had been kicked out of Sarai before that. However, to manage the city instead of him, a council consisting of 7 people² from Armenians and Turks was elected, which was soon replaced by Mikael Hekimyan, an Armenian translator of Karin’s governorship. It was planned that, from now on, the position of the governorship of Van would be given only to Armenians.³ However, contrary to expectations, in August 1908, Mahmud-Khairi

¹ Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, Embassy in Constantinople, 1908, c.1595, sheet 88.

² "Arev", 1908, October 9, N 130.

³ "Asparez" 1908, September 18, N 6.

Pasha of Albanian descent took over the position of governor of Van, which was approved by the new central government and the military command.⁴ Before that, Mahmud-Khairi held the position of military commander of the province and saved hundreds of Armenians in January-February 1908, during the tense days of the treachery of the ARF member Davo and the discovery of the Van armories. This is how Vahan Papazyan, a member of the coalition, describes him: "One with a two-branched long beard, aged, good-natured, weak and unprincipled, although kind and open-minded towards us. In the first constitutional days, the poor man lost his head. He was informed about the events that shocked each other. He asked us for advice on what to do and what position to take. But he felt that his days were muted, he always confided his grievances and complaints to us - grievances against the center's unstable and indecisive policy and the narrow-minded and intolerant attitude towards the country's minorities. Although he was a Turkish official, he was an Albanian patriot and would not hide that he would like to see his homeland separated from the Turks: "Those will in no case become human", he would say..."⁵

After the short tenure of Mahmud-Khairi, in October 1908, Ferit Pasha, who was a member of the first Ottoman parliament, but had been exiled to Fiza (Africa) for 20 years, was appointed as the new viceroy in October 1908.⁶

On March 20, 1909, an unsuccessful assassination attempt was made on M. Ferit. There were people who even tried to blame the Armenians in this matter. However, the newly appointed governor categorically denied such fabrications and presented a certain Kyamil Bey to the investigative bodies.⁷

After Ferit, the acting governor of Van was his deputy, Yaver Pasha,⁸ during which the relations between him and the military commander of the province worsened. One of viceroy's telegrams reveals that he was angry with the military commander because the latter was a "reactionary" in his views and considered himself an opponent of viceroy.⁹

After the July 1908 coup, the situation in Van province seemed bearable for the next 9 months. On that occasion G. Zohrap writes: "Van, Karin, Baghesh, Kharberd, Mush are in normal situation now. The politics of exile of Armenians is not so active. However, individual incidents still happen. But in which part of the country have such incidents never happened? In those provinces and in all the cities of Turkey, Armenians are free to do their work, earn money, enjoy protection, and see respect from the government. Even Sultan Mahmud, Abdul Hamid and Abdul Aziz had not ever provided

⁴ Yeramean 1929: 92.

⁵ Papazian 1952: 27.

⁶ "Ashkhatanq", 1908, October 25, N 38.

⁷ Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, Political Archive, inv.482, list 717, sheet 12.

⁸ During the Turkish-Persian conflict of 1905-1908, Yaver held the post of general commander of the Turkish military. He was the one who bombarded and besieged Aghtamar with 12 ships in 1907 to capture seven Armenian revolutionaries. "Horizon", 1909, August 8, N 6.

⁹ "Mshak", 1909, May 2, N 91.

such a level of prosperity".¹⁰

The only disturbing circumstance was that for the fourth year, famine was regularly repeated in the province. We learn about this from R. Zardaryan's message of December 27, 1908, according to which in the winter of 1908/1909, 12,000 people suffered from starvation in Van province, many of them died, and people in Timar were fed only with sawdust and flax.¹¹

The situation in Van province during the coup d'état of March 31, 1909 and the April 1909 massacres in Adana

During the Abdul Hamid coup d'état of 31 March 1909 and the April 1909 Adana massacre, the contradictions that existed between the old and new regimes came to the fore. At the same time, Armenians were convinced that "they saw a multi-headed hydra standing in front of them, armed with claws and fangs against the hyena", that "the Turk, old or young, is the same wolf"¹² and that the Ittihat had already put on the robe of the sultan. On March 1, 1909, in "Hordzank" weekly published in Van, Aram Manukyan complained that the Ittihat refused to recognize the existence of "minor" nations, because it considered all of them "Ottoman".¹³

In the conditions of the general confusion prevailing in the province of Van, when news of massacre and intimidation was received from Adana, the disarmed Armenians of Van would also have been subjected to a terrible massacre, if the snowfall on April 7, 1909 did not "lock the Turks" and if Tayar Bey did not block the beastly appetites of the "Red Army".¹⁴

However, just a few days later, on April 10, 70 pro-Sultan Turkish soldiers from Aygestan, hearing about the new coup in the capital and the events in Adana, rebelled against their officers, armed themselves and shouted "long live the Sultan, no constitution", "no freedom, we only want sharia". Entering the city, they forced some Armenians to get down from the carriages and bow before them.¹⁵

Joining the Kurdish chieftains "Kyor" Husein, Shakir Agha, Mir Mhe, Said Ali and others, they prepared for the massacre. After learning about this, around 7,000 Armenians of the city gathered near the viceroy's apartment and demanded to prevent the danger. However, Yaver reassured the Armenians only with promises.

Fearing new riots, the people of Van closed the city's market for the next few days because an attack on the market was planned for April 13, which was supposed to be a signal to start new massacres in Van like Adana. However, on April 14, the threat of the massacre in Van disappeared after the capture of Yıldız ("Star" - A.H.), the Sultan's

¹⁰ Zohrap 1910: 18-19.

¹¹ Zardarian 2015: 79.

¹² Yeramean 1929: 101, 105.

¹³ "Hordzank", 1909, N 4, p. 84.

¹⁴ Yeramean 1929: 105.

¹⁵ Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, Political Archive, inv.482, list 717, sheet 19

residence in Istanbul, and the overthrow of Sultan Abdul Hamid for the second time.

On April 15, Van received the telegram of the change of power, which seems to have left the Turks and Kurds of the province in mourning.¹⁶ However, on the same day, the Kurdish gangs of Sarai Province, who had no information about the new change of power, following the example of the Turkish troops of Van, shouted “we demand sharia”, entered the telegraph office in Sarai, cursed and beat the Armenians, closed the club of the Young Turkish Committee and the reading room of the Armenians there, until they heard about the change and only then they calmed down.

On the next day, April 16, bandit leader Mir-Mhe, with his 40 bandits, attacked the village of Kanguar in Norduz province, killed seven Armenians and looted the village, because he had concluded from the sounds of 101 cannons fired in Van in honor of the new sultan Mehmed V's accession that the carnage in the town had already begun. In the atmosphere of inter-ethnic hatred, two Armenians were killed and one was injured in Archesh.¹⁷

Armenians of Van, which was the main exponent and defender of the constitutional order, also expressed its political demands. Thus, in the spring of 1909, when Mehmed V was proclaimed Sultan instead of Abdul Hamid, they closed the schools on May 1 and organized a rally in Van with the slogan “We will not be satisfied with Hamid's replacement and Muhammad's arrest, we must strive for the destruction of the crowns.” Afterwards, a large crowd of women and men marched to Karmravor Monastery to celebrate May 1st as Labor Day and organize a field fair. The Armenians offered the Turks to join their demand and participate in the May 1 celebration, but their offer remained unfulfilled. Moreover, the majority of the Muslim population of Van, being under the influence of religious fanatics, not only considered it incompatible for their women and girls to leave the harems and walk around the city with Armenians, but were also hostile towards Armenians in general, not hiding their true intentions: “No, it should not be like this, the Armenians, the infidels, have become too active, so... they should be massacred, we should repeat the massacres, which were in Cilicia.”¹⁸

That threat of massacres was discussed by a group of short-sighted Armenians, who turned to the help of the Armenian Eparchy of Van, which, as the only option for self-defense, offered to organize village guards, armed with means, provided by state. However, with the direct intervention of the deputy viceroy, the threat of massacre was averted and several Turkish provocateurs were imprisoned.

However, the situation did not change. Supporters of the old regime also planned to organize new protests similar to those in Adana on May 4, 1909 in Van market.¹⁹ As the press of the time noted: “the dark elements want to take revenge for Abdul Hamid's

¹⁶ "Mshak", 1909, May 14, N 100.

¹⁷ "Mshak", 1909, May 14, N 100.

¹⁸ "Mshak", 1909, June 6, N 119.

¹⁹ Matenadaran, fund 2, Kyuregh Srabyan archive, inv. 43, list 82, doc. 1044, sheet 1.

assumption of the throne with new massacres",²⁰ but the Armenians closed the market of Van, which helped to avoid the massacre.

Using the excuse, Yaver started persecuting representatives of Armenian parties "as if those upset the solidarity of nations", because according to the order received from Constantinople, it was necessary to cleanse the country of "reactionary" elements²¹. As a result, the chairman of the Van City Assembly, Nshan Kaljian, and the member-secretary of the Aghtamar City Assembly, Hovsep Khlghatyan, appeared in prison. The first one was accused without evidence as spreading the outrageous news of closing the Van market on May 4, and the second one as a rioter spreading slander against Gavashi kaimakam (governor - A.H.), hindering the internal peace of the country and the solidarity of the Ottoman nations.²²

Nshan Kaljian was one of the influential and intelligent members of the City Assembly, who was a lawyer by profession, knew Turkish well and used to avoid government provocations. In fact, he had the audacity to reject several proposals of Yaver Pasha to sign an agreement between the Armenians of Van and the Kurdish bandit leader Husein Pasha and some criminal chieftains. The authorities wanted to create the impression that there was internal peace in the province of Van, and that the Turks, Kurds and Armenians lived in peace and harmony.

Yaver was offered to the City Assembly to sign another letter as well, according to which he, as acting viceroy, allegedly ruled in the province well in the interests of the Ottoman homeland and could claim the position of viceroy in the near future. Along with these refusals, the Van City Assembly also dared to protest against Yaver Pasha's act of kissing the forehead of Sayid Bey, the rich man and criminal of Mandan village, in the presence of the members of the assembly.

Yaver considered the independent and disobedient activity of the City Assembly to be the cause of all this and wanted to take his revenge by imprisoning its influential members. The Turkish court, which was constitutionally independent from the declared executive power, unwittingly becomes an instrument of Yaver Pasha's treachery. Arshak Vramyan, the editor of "Azatamart" and Dr. Hovsep Davtyan,²³ were also persecuted in the general context of the anti-Armenian policy during Yaver's government. By the way, even after the massacres in Adana and the chaotic incidents in Van, A. Vramyan still cherished hopes of cooperation with Ittihad. During a conversation with Ariadna Tirkova, a Russian journalist and writer of "Stock Exchange Sheets" and "Russian News" newspapers, he expressed his belief that "yes, of course, Ittihad has many mistakes, but how long have they been in power?" Don't forget what a terrible legacy they got from the Hamid regime. They seek to establish legitimacy. At least they should be considered sincere friends of the constitution. If you knew what a

²⁰ "Mshak", 1909, June 6, N 119.

²¹ "Horizon", 1909, August 8, N 6.

²² "Mshak", 1909, July 5, N 144.

²³ "Kohak", 1909, August 15, N 12, p. 139.

terrible yoke the country lived under before the revolution. And then, among the Young Turks, there are righteous people who can be relied upon. Among them are the president of the current petition, Ahmed Riza Bey, Husein Jahid, and finally Tala'at Bey, who had no education, but was an ardent and just patriot, he understands that the salvation of Turkey lies in reforms." To Tirkova's question, what is the salvation of the Armenian people, after all, a massacre was organized in Adana and who can guarantee that it will not happen again, A. Vramyan answers sharply and urgently: "No, no, it cannot happen again, the massacres in Adana were a remnant of the old regime. Ittihad himself was upset. They did everything..."²⁴

Later, the main leader of the Young Turks, Tala'at, whom A. Vramyan considered one of the most honest and pure people, became the executioner of the Armenian people and the one who destroyed Vramyan and his party friends.

However, during Yaver's tenure, some measures were taken to overcome illegalities and injustices. During his term of office, the Gavash governor was notable for his anti-Armenian activities, against whose actions Bishop Hovsep, the vicar of the Catholicosate of Aghtamar, protested. In order to examine the problem, on Yaver's direct initiative, an investigative commission was created; one of whose members was also the deputy head of Van, Reverend Zaven.²⁵

In addition, on the initiative of the Turkish military of Van province during Yaver's reign, facts were collected and all the corrupt officials of the province were subjected to strict investigation and condemnation. Archak's mudir (governor - A.H.) was also found guilty. He had become a scourge on the heads of all Armenians of the province during the 1908 Dava incident and Van search.²⁶ As a result, a large number of fake and incompetent officials were expelled. Unfortunately, among the Armenians of Van, there were not enough Turkish speakers who could take over the vacant positions.

At the beginning of July 1909, Bekir Sami Bey,²⁷ an Ossetian, was appointed the new governor of Van instead of Yaver.²⁸

Attempts to regulate Armenian-Kurdish relations

In terms of a very clearly expressed differentiation of political views and inclinations, the Armenians and Kurds of Van have inadvertently found themselves on opposite fronts of activity since the very first days of the 1908 coup and the Ottoman constitution. If the Armenians were ardent constitutionalists, and the ARF was in agreement and cooperation with the Young Turks, then the Kurds, who represented an

²⁴ Tyrkova 1916: 76.

²⁵ "Mshak", 1909, July 5, N 144.

²⁶ "Ashkhatanq", 1908, September 14, N 4.

²⁷ Chelahsaty 2009, also Shlykov 2014. Also "Mshak", 1909, November 12, N 251, also <https://bit.ly/48jaBfT>, and https://www.turkcebilgi.com/bekir_sami_kunduh

²⁸ Later, Yaver Pasha participated in the 1912 Balkan Wars and was captured. See <https://bit.ly/48fV0xC>, also <https://bit.ly/3GKwAk7>

evidently anti-constitutional force, an enemy of the new regime, remained in the position of defending the Sultanate monarchy and continued to follow the same policy as in the era of Hamid.

Hoping to resolve the Armenian-Kurdish conflict, in early September 1908, the Young Turkish authorities invited to Van the Kurdish chieftains who had previously sworn obedience and loyalty, and who pledged and declared to live in peace and solidarity with the Armenians and to carry out activities exclusively according to the provisions of the constitution. However, contrary to the principles of peaceful Armenian-Kurdish coexistence declared by the Young Turks, the consequence of Kurdish impunity was that new crimes were committed by Kurds in the province.

After the revolution, the governorate of Van took some measures to punish the recalcitrant Kurds. As a result, Mlantsi Mahmad, Thakurtsi Huseyn and Shamzksi Sadam Bey were arrested for crossing the border and organizing looting in Persia. Haji-Tamir and "Kyor" Husein pashas from Haydaran were also brought to justice for the violence and massacres they committed against the Armenians in Arches-Aljavaz.²⁹ At the same time, attempts were being made to subjugate the bandit leader Mir-Mhe, who was destroying Shatakh, who was accused not only of killing Armenians and looting Armenian villages, but also of harming government troops.³⁰ Shatakh's Armenian party member Nikoghayos Aghasyan did a great job in that matter.³¹

Some work was done in bringing the Kurds to justice by the military commander of Van, Yaver, who arrested the Kurdish Sayid Bey near the border of the Archak district when he was the deputy viceroy. During the latter's imprisonment, the parliament, based on the just complaints of the villagers of Mantan village, decided that Sayid's thugs should leave the village. Although a message about the execution of the order was immediately telegraphed to Archak's mudir, it remained on paper, because Yaver demanded the mudir not to implement the decision,³² as a result of which Yaver "released him".³³

Conclusion

Thus, from August 1908 to autumn 1910, under the pashas Mahmud-Khairi, Mahmud Ferit, Yaver, Bekir Sami, the situation in Van province seemed to be bearable. During their reign, certain measures were implemented to overcome illegalities and injustices. At the initiative of the Turkish military of Van province, facts were collected and all the corrupt officials of the province were severely condemned. Conflicts between the old and new regimes emerged during the March 31, 1909 coup d'état and the April

²⁹ "Work", 1909, March 24, N 62.

³⁰ "Kohak", 1909, September 12, N 16, p. 188, also "Homeland", 1909, August 11/24, N 1448.

³¹ "Kohak", 1909, November 18, N 23, p. 256.

³² "Kohak", August 15, N 12, p. 139.

³³ "Kohak", August 15, N 12, p. 139.

1909 massacres in Adana, as Armenians were the main exponents and defenders of the constitutional order. From April 7 to May 4, 1909, following the example of the massacres in Adana, protests were also organized in Van and persecution of Armenian party figures began. Armenians put aside revolutionary illusions and saw the true face of Ittihad, as violence, arbitrariness and prison persecution began to rule again in Van.

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TROOPS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND THE DIFFERENCE OF CULTURES

Part I

Prussia, United Kingdom and United States of America

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Abstract

In the ancient world, it was accepted that a talented general can do everything. He must be able to train the troops, teach the commanders how to behave in every situation, he should personally plan the actions and finally implement and follow this complex mechanism. Military historians were inspired by such generals who crushed the enemy, and as a rule they were kings and emperors. However, the more military science developed and became more complicated, the less space was left for such commanders to operate. Back in 1640, the English general Oliver Cromwell created a planning organ for his troops, which was the prototype of modern headquarters. During the reign of the Prussian king Frederick II the Great (1740-1786), the office of the General-Quartermeister, the planning body for the operations of the troops, was created. In 1763 Friedrich II established a military academy in Berlin. In 1800-1803 in Prussia, Colonel Christian von Massenbach and General Karl von Le Coq founded the idea of the Main Staff (General Stab / Staff). Basically, in the Prussian army, that institute was formed little by little starting from 1785, which included only officers who graduated from the Potsdam Military Academy. It is accepted that even, in 1766-1771 and 1783, France also had a Main Staff. Moreover, according to some researchers, the French Headquarters were more suitable for their role. At the same time, the theoretical foundations of military science were being laid in Europe.

Keywords: *Army, Troop, Main Staff, Military school, Prussia, United Kingdom, United States of America*

The Prussian school as a synthesis

The Prussian school of military science was the first to sum up the theoretical knowledge and lay the scientific foundations of military work, passing from the theoretical to the practical.

The birth of military science and the educated officer that is its result can be considered August 6, 1808, when the military school of Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August von Gneisenau gave its first results.¹ This can be considered the basis of officer professional education throughout the world. In France, Marshal Laurent de Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, who fought after Napoleon Bonaparte (1804-1815), fought to prevent the nobles from returning their exclusive right to become officers. In Great Britain, it is true that as early as 1802 at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, an opportunity was created to become an officer, without the system of purchasing positions, which was the exclusive right of the nobility, but old customs were still preserved, which hindered the development of the army. Those manners were not purely military or barracks, the way of life of a person was changing, therefore the way of thinking, which caused a change in military work.

In 1810 Gerhard Scharnhorst founded the world's first military academy in Berlin, which was an educational institution equal to current military educational level academies. For a long time, there was no such structure in any country, where military affairs were studied at the level of science, where officers received a broad education in political science, history, economics, and other fields. In 1818, the command staff school was founded in France, but its quality was far inferior to the Prussian school. The real military academy was established in France only in 1878.² The Academy of the General Staff was founded in the Russian Empire in 1832, and its quality was very similar to the French command school.

The Prussian military academy had such a high quality that as of 1859, exactly half of the military literature published in Europe was published in Germany,³ and most of the publications of the rest of the countries either repeated what was published in Germany or were responses to the German military literature. The Prussian military education system with its Main Staff model was accepted throughout Europe and the advanced world in about a hundred years. First, they were repeated by the French, then by the British, and then only by other countries.

The German Main Staff had two distinct divisions: the Grand MS and a separate operational division, which was more responsible for the specific operations of troops and sometimes troop groups. New quality operations and wars were planned and born here. It must be said that this Prussian institution was blindly repeated in many armies. In 1813 in the Ground Forces of the United States, the Main Staff was established, in which there were several services.⁴ In many countries, even if formal, MSs were created, but it did not happen in the main rival country of the already unified German state, Great Britain. As early as 1821, the German MS was removed from the Ministry of

¹ Jany 1929: 426ff.; Jany 1933: 14ff.; Lehmann 1886: ch. 1; Seeley 1879: 397-423; Delbrück 1882: 117-145; Ritter 1954: 97ff.

² Irvine 1940: 149-153.

³ Vagts 1937: 242.

⁴ Huntington 2020: 210.

War and directly subordinated to the king. The king thus concentrated three governing bodies in his hands: the Main Staff, to which he gave priority, the Ministry of War, and the War Cabinet, which can be considered the prototype of the Security Council. In late 1883 the body became purely advisory and dependent on the other two bodies, with the MS becoming the main body. In Germany, MS officers were considered the most influential elite: they were called demigods in the troops.⁵

Here it is important to compare the German management model with other armies. That system and its value base were greatly developed under Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, who always insisted that an officer should be educated and proactive, prepared and independent.⁶ He often repeated: "The most unfortunate of commanders is the person who is harshly ruled from above. Every day, every hour, he has to explain to his superiors, justify his ideas, plans, every second he is disturbed by teleconnection. In that situation, the commander loses confidence in himself, decision-making ability and courage. He can no longer wage war. Bold decisions are made alone."⁷ Moltke clearly insisted that young and intelligent officers should serve in the German Main Staff, as described by German historians themselves, such officers whose heart belongs to the army and whose head belongs to science.⁸

In 1864, Moltke the Elder tried to plan everything ideally in the war for Schleswig and Holstein, so that the actions were quick, so that the enemy would not have time to understand what happened.⁹ The Main Staff contemplated blitzkrieg operations, also concerned with the problems of waging war on two fronts. First of all, Moltke the Elder solved the most important political problem: the army is the perfect vehicle for the realization of the national desire of a united Germany, but the army does not interfere in political affairs. The statesmen did not interfere in every detail either; the Main Staff was free in the military strategy and operational affairs of the army. No matter how much the military disagreed with the political leadership, they would rather resign than show any kind of rebellion. This was the result of traditions, established institutions and schools. This was the highest manifestation of gentlemanliness and honor. A unique system of civil control was formed in Germany, which, although it did not have the British-American level, was quite high and unique.¹⁰ Although German officers were sometimes belligerent, sometimes the opposite, they had absolute respect in society.¹¹ However, over time, militancy began to take precedence over common sense. The result was the WWI and its bitter consequences. During the WWI and especially after it, due to Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff and several other officers, the accepted norms of political institutions and military relations began to be violated.

⁵ Roediger 1900: 276.

⁶ Vlasov 2011: 135.

⁷ Kokoshin 1968: 3-29.

⁸ Gorlitz 1953: 493.

⁹ Vlasov 2011: 45.

¹⁰ Huntington 2020: 108-111.

¹¹ Rosinski 1939: 96ff.

The German model of military rule became more upgraded after the First World War, and rigid rule became more relaxed. The German model came closer to the Anglo-Saxon culture of governance, although it was far from being a direct copy of it. In any case, in the 1930s, in the newly formed German army, military headquarters were created, and the Main Staff lost its strategic-political decision-making capabilities, focusing more on operational art. The German Main Staff clearly worked like clockwork, as there was careful planning and the commanders of army groups were given adequate leeway.

German general Burkhard Müller-Hillebrand writes about the situation before the WWII: "The command of the new German army demands initiative and quick decisions from its officers in new, rapidly developing situations."¹² Genius of military art, field marshal E. von Manstein/ Fritz Erich Georg Eduard von Manstein/ in his post-war memoirs states that the successes of the Wehrmacht were hidden in the traditions of independence of the German army, down to the junior officers and soldiers, such traditions that they did not have in any army in the world.¹³

Thus, the German MS, which was initially a more absolute institution, and then a more planning and operational-level body, became the benchmark, and to this day, many countries around the world implement their armed forces through this body.

Hitler's distortions

At the strategic level, the accepted norms of army-state relations were increasingly undermined under Adolf Hitler. He first found ideological support among the military, generals who had many things in common: the revival of Greater Germany, anti-Semitism, order and discipline, diligence, rejection of materialism, etc. It was not difficult to find such people in the German army. And when he slowly began to rely on more stubborn and politicized officers, he began to get rid of the first group, because the first always expressed their opinion and did not like to remain silent. A clear resistance of the generals, led by Chief of the Main Staff Ludwig Beck, who later became one of the symbols of the internal struggle against Hitler, matured.¹⁴ Hitler forced him to resign, but his replacement, Franz Halder, over time also became one of the opponents of Hitler's policies. Part of the army was no longer with Hitler.¹⁵ The generals were against Hitler's aggressive and adventurous foreign policy, with which he actually started a world war, and also the material issues of army building.¹⁶ The arbitrary change in the composition of the German tank divisions, the issue of production of types of tanks, the issue of

¹² Müller-Hillebrand 2002: 277.

¹³ Manstein 1999.

¹⁴ Görlitz 1953: 324-339.

¹⁵ Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Washington, 8 vols. and 2 supplements, 1946, I, pp. 377-387; Rothfels 1948: 58-63.

¹⁶ Wheeler-Bennett 1953: 395-424.

heavy bombers, the formation of SS troops as an alternative to the army, etc. These were questions that Hitler decided personally, without consulting the generals. Hitler began to destroy the Wehrmacht Supreme Command "OKW" and the Ground Forces Command "OKH" with his will. He mixed them together, appointed himself the commander of all of them, then divided the functions, giving each of them the status of a specific command, but the situation did not change much. At the tactical and operational level in the German army, commanders mostly made independent decisions. Artillery General Wilhelm Keitel was in charge of his Staff during virtually the entire war.¹⁷ The more German armies were defeated the more intolerant Hitler became and the more he violated the institution of free will. Even at the end of the war, to move some divisions, the commanders of armies and army groups had to get permission from Hitler himself. All this weakened the backbone of the German army.¹⁸ When the Wehrmacht entered the USSR, Hitler specially appointed three oppositional, but not radical, decent and noble generals as army group commanders. He thought that he would bribe the latter with victories, success and glory. In a way, it worked for about half a year. However, when failures began, including because of his wrong decisions, Field Marshals Wilhelm von Leeb, Karl Gerd von Rundstedt and von Bock openly criticized Hitler. Of course, the latter were dismissed, but being oppositionists, they did not actively participate in Ludwig Beck's underground group. This internal struggle continued, but eventually Hitler was able to destroy the army and the country as a result of his wrong strategic decisions, the weakening of the German officer corps and the destruction of traditional schools.

The British School

A new world-class powerful army was coming to the scene, the American army, which at that time was distinguished by powerful headquarters. And talking about the level of American supply in general is unnecessary, especially since the American army did not have a man problem like the German one, except for a short time.

Here, let's try to understand what alternatives there are to this management system and how this case developed in general. Created by the unified German Empire, the MS evolved from war to war as the main body, but it worked particularly well for one big reason: the German army was primarily ground troops. In other words, this body planned, directed and coordinated only land forces, as a rule, at the time of its creation, it could not coordinate the rather weak German navy. And in those countries where naval power was of great importance from the beginning, it was more difficult to create such a unified military force. Great Britain was a prime example of this. The issue of a unified command in this country has been raised many times, but the Marines have never let the Army take over that unified command. During the war the work of

¹⁷ Megargee_1997: 60–80; Stone 2011.

¹⁸ Rothfels 1948: 60–63.

coordinating the affairs of the two great armies was really important, and the defects of their not working together were often seen; military types used different terms and concepts for the same phenomenon. In other words, the gulf of difference was really dangerous, and joint military operations were out of the question. It should also be noted that the level of military science reached by the German school was still unattainable to any country, that is, each military unit in these countries had almost always conducted its own separate war and had little cooperation with other military units. And wherever they cooperated, it was purely due to the good connections and cooperation of the commanders in the places. Such was Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, who created a clearly operating headquarters for his army in Europe, but it did not receive institutional development.

The problem became especially urgent for the British troops after the Crimean War (1853-1856), but as a result the Harrington Commission did not achieve anything in this matter.¹⁹ In 1904, the Army Council was created only in Britain.²⁰

In 1903, during the Spanish War, the American Armed Forces, which carried the British model, or as some specialists would later say, the Anglo-Saxon model, also faced the problem of cooperation between the two military types. The history of the development of relations between the American military administration culture and political institutions is a separate topic. It is in no way similar to European states. In this country, there was a cult of liberal ideas, republicanism, in which the concept of armed forces in peacetime did not fit at all. More than once, the question of not having an army at all was raised at the highest level.²¹ However, due to circumstances, that dead-end approach gave way over time. In the end, due to the geographical location, a powerful navy was first created, which could compete with the army in everything. Moreover, many argued that it was the American fleet that drove Spain out of the oceans, and that the army did not perform very well in the War of 1898, which was quite normal in a society where everyone was armed, armaments were rapidly developing,²² but everyone hated the service. The highest American military and political leadership understood that the army is a necessity and there is a need to coordinate the activities of these two types of troops.²³ A Joint Army and Marine Corps Council was created.

¹⁹ Pechurov, Sudakov 2004: 17-23.

²⁰ Hittle 1949: 127-145.

²¹ Palmer, Baker 1931: 40f.; Hartz 1955; Boorstin 1953; Rossiter 1955.

²² After the Civil War, American armaments developed rapidly and many of the samples created were sold to leading European and Asian countries, Russia, Japan, China, etc. Many of the American soldiers served as mercenaries in the armies of other countries due to the lack of an army in their country. In the United States, military science was quite backward, but any direction related to the navy was developing.

²³ In the history of the USA, this seemingly incomprehensible, but actually deep-rooted liberal extremism is well studied, but little has been written and spoken about it in our country. After the Civil War, American society got another reason to hate the war and the army. However, the ever-growing economy of the USA brought political realism and before the WW I, the American political elite realized that freedom and political neutrality cannot be unlimited either.

This body initially functioned as an advisory body, but it was the first such attempt. In fact, the first such attempt was made in the United States, followed by Great Britain, where in 1904 the Committee for the Defense of the Empire, a collegial body, was created apart from the Army Council. There, the military jointly decided strategic issues.²⁴ In the same year, the position of the head of the Main Staff was created in Great Britain, which in 1909 became the head of the Main Staff of the Empire.²⁵ This body was again largely a coordinating, planning and resource-calculating body,²⁶ and it had no great advantage over the First Lord of the Admiralty. Moreover, this system showed that collegial decision-making works better in this culture. The experience of WWI showed that this model works in power structures that support this value system.

The problem was also from the beginning that the British school was based on the mindset and ideology of the free man. The British navy was equal in size to the army. It was difficult to gather the leaders of each of the free and powerful military types under one leader. A general of one military type cannot well understand the characteristics of all military types.

As a result, in 1923, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) was established in Great Britain, where the First Admiral and the Chief of the Main Staff are alternately elected as the chairman of the committee. A third military unit, the Air Force, also joined the case. In other words, the British system returned to the institution of full collegial decision. Only the head of the committee had the right to report directly to the country's prime minister, that is, he received powers equal to the minister of war, and in some ways even greater powers.

This British model had its advantages and disadvantages. Opponents of the system explain the disadvantages as follows: duplication of resources and even steps, poor coordination of actions between troops.

The architects of the British system also had this fear.²⁷ The birth of the third major military force, the Air Force, confused all accounts. This type of military first caused problems for the rather well-established German military system. German land generals found it difficult to accept the idea that they could not control the activities of German submarines. The latter, operating on strategic infrastructures, were subject only to the supreme command, and from the middle of the war, the air force, which, bombing London, also sought such independence. The German ground generals wanted to use the big airships, the zeppelins, when planning major military operations, but they often heard the Kaiser's view that they should specifically bomb British industrial and strategic facilities.

This problem remained in virtually all countries, both the Prussian model and the British model. The experience of the WWI and intermediate wars showed that the

²⁴ Franklyn 1960.

²⁵ Oakeley 1906: 481.

²⁶ Campbell 1997.

²⁷ Hall 2002.

problem of planning and cooperation of joint actions of all military types is very complex and difficult.

American model

When the top US military was making plans as part of their duties during WWI, how to intervene in the European war, President Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) almost had all the generals arrested.²⁸ American newspapers wrote about the death of the American liberal mentality and the era of tyranny. The American Congress has presented many proposals regarding the coordination of military activities in this area. When Wilson had to send American troops to Europe due to geopolitical circumstances, he changed his views and tried to give different explanations for it.²⁹ During the WWI, many discussions were born in the American society already on this occasion. The American society and political elite put up with a standing army, but put forward unique preconditions that coincided with the values of liberalism.

In 1915, the American political elite put forward several important provisions, the author of which was the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels:

“You cannot have any institution in America that is not Americanized.

- Military defense, like the right to vote, is the duty of every citizen. It cannot be delegated to small select groups.
- A democratic country must have a democratic armed forces. This also comes from colonial times and its most extreme manifestation is the practice of electing officers. In milder ways, it emphasizes the desire to eliminate differences between officers and enlisted men, infusing the armed forces with a democratic-liberal ideology and relying more on individual initiative than on discipline and guidance.
- If armed forces are to be maintained, they must be used to achieve other socially desirable goals. Throughout American history, from the public activities of the Corps of Engineers to the present day, this is a mandatory element. It distinguishes Ruth Colquhoun from the view that the only purpose of armed forces is war”.³⁰

As a result of these provisions, the National Guard, which has the image of a militia, received an exclusive status in the United States, which still plays a major role in the American public life and security system. It is not just a military type, it has a strong perception of a savior, a guardian of social order and an institution associated with the symbols of freedom³¹. Here are the liberal, independent, right-to-choice foundations that

²⁸ Journals of Continental Congress 1774-1789, XXVII (June 2, 1784), p. 518, p. 524.

²⁹ Public Papers. New York, 6 vols., ed. By Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd 1925-1927, V, 83, 86.

³⁰ Huntington 2020. 164.

³¹ Official Proceedings of the Natl. Guard Assoc., 66th Annual Convention, 1944, pp. 28-29, 44; 1948, pp. 111, 242-244, 254-255; 1949, pp. 202-210. Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security (Washington, 1948), pp. 9-24.

explain the "Mission Command" traditions of initiative, free thinking and decision-making in the American military culture.

This establishment of the American force system, the creation of new types of troops, the establishment of the officer corps required many organizational complications that did not contradict the liberal constitution and thinking.

Military figures, of course, were looking for ways to coordinate the complicated phenomenon of war, the harmonious operation of military units, etc. The Germans were the first to succeed in this.

The level of symphonic harmony of at least two types of troops was reached by the German military machine during the blitzkrieg. However, it was possible to achieve this not by maintaining the rigid Prussian management system, but by creating a headquarters for the air force and the joint work of the headquarters. It was brilliantly executed, everyone admired it, but it must be admitted that it was done mainly at the tactical and operational-tactical level. The German air force did not have a strategic toolkit, but on the other hand, the commander of the air force had an important role in the hierarchy of the military and political leadership of the country.

In any case, it must be admitted that the German air force in its model was more of a support type for the Ground Forces; it worked more for the interests of the Ground Forces and almost did not carry out separate large military operations. It is no coincidence that the German Air Force never had a strategic bomber wing. And in Operative art, the need for separate management of strategic troop groups and operational troop groups grew. In other words, the management of large military groups caused new problems. In the 1920s in the USA, the generals of individual military units had problems with their ministers. The situation in the navy was especially difficult. The Secretary of Defense Henry Lewis Stimson has aptly observed: "The admirals came to a unique psychology in which Neptune was a god, Meheene was a prophet, and the United States Navy was the only true church."³² In other words, the crisis in the management of headquarters and ministries was obvious.

Following the British example, the same decision was reached in the USA, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC) was established in 1942. In the USA, after the First World War, the dead-end mentality of political neutrality was partially overcome, but not completely. The US was actually fighting two separate wars here: one in the Pacific area, sometimes reaching as far as the Indian Ocean, and in the European area, starting from North Africa and Britain. And here was a great feature. If Germany, fighting on two fronts, was often able to carry out strategic regroupings with forces and means, it was a problem for the USA, because it was almost impossible to transfer even one ground or air division from the Pacific area to the Atlantic one.

This top American body was the joint decision-making and management body at the strategic level for the entire Armed Forces.³³

³² Stimson 1947: 506.

³³ Leighton, Coakley 1995: 144.

In actual warfare, the next model after the Main Staff was the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The formation of this institute also has a long and interesting history, but one thing is clear: it is the only established competitor of the German Institute of the MS to date.

At first glance, it is surprising that Admiral William Lah was appointed the first head of this American body. At this time, the committee was still called the Joint Headquarters of the Army and Navy or the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, that is, the headquarters of the US President, where the headquarters of all military branches were united with the same rights. The de facto Army, Navy, and Air Force common chief was an admiral. However, on the other hand, General George Marshall, who was actually just an advisor to the president, had a similar role.

At this time, headquarters for coordinating operations at the level of strategic areas showed their great vitality. Experience has shown that, for example, the headquarters of the American Supreme Commander clearly performed its task, carrying out planning and allocation of resources at the strategic level, the rest was left to the headquarters, where General Dwight David Eisenhower and Admiral Chester William Nimitz fully found solutions. These were the powerful headquarters of the multinational forces, whose troops numbered in the millions, the equipment hundreds of thousands, and the supply routes in the size of half the planet. Of course, there were many disputes and problems between these commanders and subordinates, in particular with the commanders of other types of troops, the commanders of military groups of other countries, but they were settled on the spot, and the headquarters carried out the plans with great efficiency as of 1943. One pattern was clearly at work: as American troops grew, headquarters, that is, planning bodies were created on the ground, and only the troops were gathered under one flag, and the commanders of the operational chain themselves established the number of their headquarters and often personally selected the operational officers - detectives, supply service officers, etc. The American and British governance models also had certain characteristics. As one of the American army's management architects, General Omar Bradley, recalls: "Unlike the American Armed Forces, where the order is mandatory, the British consider the order as a basis for discussion. If there are differences, they are taken into account and the order may be changed as a result. In the U.S. Army, we work to understand all judgments from the beginning and then only give the order. After giving the order, no one can change it except the commander who gave the order."³⁴ As we can see, this is a significant difference, but it has some similarity. In any case, it is fundamental to listen to subordinates, in the USA they did it before the decision was made, and the British could do it even after the order. The American army learned a lot from the British army in this war.

Changes were needed to manage the US military, which had grown considerably during WWII. On the one hand, the army had grown, on the other hand, the air force had also grown unprecedentedly, which, together with the navy, had also received the opportunity to carry a strategic nuclear arsenal. These growing military forces tried to

³⁴ Bradley 1957: 159.

usurp priority and importance from one another, which often worried the political leadership. Back in the war, all this was understandable. Eisenhower had as many as 2,000 officers at his headquarters by the end of the war and was able to listen to service chiefs before making decisions. After the war, all this was becoming a problem for politicians. Again, this was the question of political control and relations between the top military.

President H. Truman, who liked to repeat: "War is too important a business to be entrusted to the military," worried about this competition and began major reforms. The American political leadership was primarily concerned about the enormous and sometimes obscure differences between these three powerful military branches, such as differences in terms, differences in officer training programs and educational models. All of them led to serious and pointless disagreements. The political leadership understood that no matter how to separate these types of troops, there are phenomena that are unacceptable and must be eliminated. First, Truman passed the famous National Security Act of 1947 with great difficulty. This law governed the entire American power system. Instead of the ministries representing the three separate military branches, the institution of a unified Ministry of Defense with a civilian minister was founded.³⁵ At first this single minister, called the National Military Department, was subordinated to three separate military ministers who still remained as members of the Security Council, and then this was abolished. James Forrestal, a former naval aviator and former Secretary of the Navy, was appointed the first joint Secretary of War. This exceptional politician was constantly in great disputes with his colleagues, but he did a great deal for the development of American aircraft carriers.

This law established the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the three major military branches, as well as the Marine Corps and the National Guard. The first head of the committee was General Omar Bradley. The Committee of Chiefs of Staff had a staff of 210 officers who analyzed the situations and planned everything.³⁶ This body, as a result of President Truman's major reforms, received the main function of strategic planning and management, but unlike the German one, it was a collegial governing body, that is, based on a more liberal model of governance.

Moreover, almost at the same time, in 1948, in the American city of Key West, a corresponding agreement was signed between the military branches, which reconfirmed the model that the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, with all its powers, leaves the commanders of strategic and operational units and military groups (unified commands, separate commands) free to make decisions.³⁷ These changes, by which the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff received clear functions from mere advisory functions, had great political significance. This was the time when American neutrality won a

³⁵ Cambone 1998: 228-232.

³⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff. Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1987. Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1988, Stoler 1982: 303-320.

³⁷ Trask 1985: 10.

certain victory in the great domestic struggle. This was the time of aggressive Soviet foreign policy and McCarthyism. American “neo-Hamiltonianism” was strengthening its position, albeit with difficulty and hard internal struggle.³⁸ The involuntary increase in the role of the commanders of the American occupation forces also contributed to this. In one way or another, the American generals had a huge role in the political life of West Germany, Japan and South Korea, even though they were very liberal. The USA was becoming a traditional empire and it was first of all important in terms of strengthening itself in the head of the American society. For the first time in the United States, the military was gaining great influence. The generals became president, secretary of state and were appointed to other high positions. It was definitely not accepted in the liberal society, the American society was afraid of the militarization of the state, but the situation was changing.³⁹

Chief of Ground Forces and Staff and future president D. Eisenhower was a staunch member of the “united” team. He was one of the team that insisted that the US Army should create as unified a Headquarters as possible. It was natural and understandable. He was a general of the ground forces, as well as the man who had commanded the largest headquarters and troops ever, whose joint command even with the allied forces had at least worked well.

As president, he made a big effort to make the US Joint Chiefs of Staff a more empowered body, so that military ministries and chiefs of staff would not have much power on the committee, and so on. As a result, President Eisenhower signed the Act on a stronger and more centralized Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 6, 1958.⁴⁰ All these names, Eisenhower, Bradley, Forrestal, etc. played a big role in this case. These leaders were uniquely educated, developed and open-minded people who had not only military but also good civilian education and connections; they were not guided by limited judgment. In the American military culture, this is an extremely important prerequisite for the highest military rank.

The Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, strengthened by the new law, already had 400 staff officers and could work directly with the president, without military personnel.⁴¹ The last major change that occurred in 1986 was interesting in relation to this structure. According to this amendment, the position of the first deputy head of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff was also confirmed, who is usually either an admiral or an air force general, thereby increasing the number of representatives of these military branches in the committee to a clear priority. To date, there have been four admirals, four Air Force

³⁸ A movement of moderate militants, opposed to supporters of neutrality and excessive public control over the military.

³⁹ It is true that the danger of the US becoming a militaristic state caused a powerful internal struggle by various layers of society, there was great resistance from the Congress, as a result of which only exceptionally open-minded and worthy generals got high positions in the state. The threat of becoming a new Sparta was neutralized by established state institutions. We will address this question later.

⁴⁰ Trask 1985: 22-25.

⁴¹ Barrett 1996.

generals and two Marine generals. With the 1986 amendment, the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, receiving more centralized functions of strategic planning, at the same time transferred the operational management more clearly to the commanders of operational military groups, that is, it decentralized and gave more freedom to subordinates.⁴² As they will say later, the "Mission Command" system was established. This was the need for changes born from the demands of fifth generation wars. That role made 2020 the first in the world to create a purely space force, the commander of which received the right to become a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

All this is culture, which is available only to a free environment, an educated environment, constantly evolving organisms. This is the environment that always exists in the American Armed Forces, because it is a set of civilized, social, scientific, religious and other values. The heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been the Chiefs of Staff of various branches of the military at different times, but it is highly symbolic that the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been nine times Army generals, six times admirals, twice Marine Corps generals, and four times Air Force generals. If we keep in mind that in the American Navy, starting from WWII, the flag ships are the aircraft carriers, that is, the admirals, and this position as a rule led such fleets, where the main striking means is the air force, then it will turn out that the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff led more are air-naval rather than army. This is the hallmark of American management culture. It should also be noted that General George Marshall of the American Army and Colin Powell, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, later became US Secretaries of State. As a rule, it is a consequence of the fact that the leadership of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, being a representative of the military-political body, has more broad-minded perceptions and ideas.

Here it is appropriate to remember the words of a general that we often use for our reasoning. German general, the last chief of staff of the air force K. Koller has noticed: "Any soldier usually thinks in terms of the range of action of his unit and the speed of movement of his weapon. Because of this, naval officers will not often (and army officers never) attain the scale of judgment and worldview that Air Force officers of almost all armies possess to one degree or another. What is an army corps on the ground with 50,000 men, 1,000 pieces of equipment and a bunch of artillery with a huge command system? And all of them are fighting on a front of 15-20 km. A huge monster, but he is only interested in the neighbors to the right and left. At the same time, an Air Force officer thinks considerably more deeply, and imagines it all differently. What is that corps front to a lieutenant who has to make a long-distance reconnaissance flight, a section of the map a finger's width, if not less?"⁴³

These are apt words to understand the differences in the mindset of officers according to their military types.

⁴² Goldwater-Nicholls DOD Reorganization Act, 10 USC 162, Combatant Commands, Assigned Forces, Chain of Command, Section (b), Chain of Command.

⁴³ Elmhurst 2006: 580.

In the American Armed Forces, the meaning of all this was objectively significant, because since WWII, the most mobile, fast, powerful operational and strategic groups in the American Armed Forces became the carrier (airborne) groups. This was a group in which the assembled ships had powerful air strike means, and these means are becoming more powerful today with all data, in which there was the possibility of any kind of attack on the enemy's sea and land areas, and even the ability to capture the near-shore land areas to an operational depth. The American operational art was first concerned with the issues of military science solutions for the actions of these operational groups.⁴⁴ As experience has shown, they should be subject to the commands of various directions and can form separate operational combined-gathering groups with airborne forces. Therefore, these commands and operational unified-gathering groups should have appropriate autonomy.⁴⁵

And if the commands of the strategic areas were unchanged and due to their political importance, they could deal with different problems, then the operational unified-gathering groups subordinate to them could be very different, formed according to the situation, have different composition and different problems, even army units could have a large place in them. With all this in mind, the US Strategic Command decided to form permanent headquarters for the operational combined-gathering groups under the command of all five (currently six) units without permanent troops and resources.⁴⁶ In 2003, the number of personnel was approved for these headquarters, which is up to 64 specialists and officers, and also the number of personnel of the commanders' headquarters, which had been reduced until then, was increased.⁴⁷ We think this is an extremely important decision, taking into consideration the fact that American commands are separated by extremely large areas, and they are almost like world divisions. In such strategic areas, according to the emerging needs of different principles, there should be permanent headquarters, several of which can be under one command.

From this point of view, the network-centric war theory developed by Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the head of the American Defense Reform Service, should be considered a great revolution⁴⁸. He developed the theory with Pentagon analyst John J. Garstka and Admiral Jane Johnson before he was in that position. The theory, to put it in simple terms, basically assumed the management of all troops and troop groups by means of a joint network by superiors, which was possible to achieve thanks to the

⁴⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States. 1993. Feb. W., D/C/ 20318, Executive Summary, II-III-2,3; Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1994, March 23, JP 1-02, JMGTM-094-95.

⁴⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, 1993, Feb., W., D/C/ 20318, Executive Summary, II-III-2,3.; Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, JP 1-02, JMGTM-094-95.

⁴⁶ R. Holzer, A. Svitak, Rumsfeld May Establish Joint Response Forces//Defense News, Jun. 2001, 11-17.

⁴⁷ J. T Bennet, Rumsfeld Tells...//Inside the Pentagon, 22 Jan. 2004.

⁴⁸ Cebrowski, Garstka 1998: 28-35.

modern intelligence and management means and the network of exchange of information between them. That is, what one sees, everyone can see and the commander, who can give an order at once and everyone will receive it as needed.

Of course, network management was not an idea created completely from scratch, which was put forward by the above-mentioned specialists at once, it was actively discussed in the American military science field, and moreover, it was partially applied even at the intra-service level. Back in the Gulf War, the US military used local area network systems to coordinate their operations.

In the beginning, almost all military branches or commands had their own separate networks with which to more effectively manage combat planning, decision making, strikes, supplies, etc. But the theory of network-centric warfare was born out of the idea of connecting these local networks together. In other words, electronic control networks are familiar to the American military, who during combat operations have been able to coordinate the actions of all types of troops at least at the level of operational strategy with great success. A few combat examples are notable. The first example occurred during the second Iraq War, when a Patriot missile guided by a ground-launched MIM-104 missile successfully hit an Iraqi missile with the ship's Aegis anti-missile guidance system.⁴⁹ The second glaring example happened on October 8, 2018, when an F-35B fighter belonging to the US Marines, being in the air, directed a HIMARS missile belonging to the Russian Federation.⁵⁰ In fact, there are many such local examples, and we will look at the technical management systems. These network systems of command are the best evidence that the US military has clear, unified command at the operational joint command group levels, and it is not at all hindered, moreover, supported by having a well-functioning Joint Chiefs of Staff institution and a strong operational joint command headquarters.

The next step was to put all of that together, as well as the maritime information. Now this process is actively going on in the American army. Such systems are one of the best technical solutions for resolving military differences during combat operations.

Thus, in the culture of American military management, a clear system of values and practices was formed over the years. Although due to the complexity of the problems, it was important to carry out the management of the military units in a unified way, even if according to the situation, it was carried out only temporarily, only within the framework of the given problems, and the main governing body, the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, remained in its main role. As much as the Army aspired to a German-style Main Staff, the world's most powerful air force and navy provided powerful counterarguments.

If we summarize those arguments, they are as follows:

⁴⁹ Fontenot, Degen, Tohn 2004: 97f.

⁵⁰ «Sensor to shooter»: The Marines just pulled off a historic feat with the F-35 and the Corps' rocket artillery Shawn Snow, Military Times. Oct. 8, 2018, <https://www.businessinsider.com/marine-corps-use-f-35-to-guide-himars-rocket-artillery-for-first-time-2018-10/?IR=T>

- Such large military units cannot be managed by one body.
- Strategic spanning the entire planet cannot be managed by a single body.
- The leader of one military type cannot master the characteristics of all military types equally well.
- The equal rights of the forces in the committee create counterbalances of the scales, which do not allow making bigger mistakes.

Very recently, the command of the space forces was created in the USA, the commander of which receives rights equal to the rights of military forces of any other dimension. In other words, space is considered as an important domain like land, air and sea. In the same way, the command of the troops of the cyber domain also gets the right, thus integrating the troops of all dimensions and domains into one governing body.

All the attempts of actual unifiers were met with great resistance, and from these debates almost always, according to the situation, the right decisions and solutions were born. They are true only because of one thing, the debate. Basically, this whole struggle can be explained as follows: at the strategic level, there was mostly a compromise of joint decision-making. Even if it did not work at the level of military headquarters or commanders, the political leadership intervened.

At the operational and tactical level, great independence and freedom were allowed, even if the Peter's Committee of the Staff did not give it, then the commanders born from an independent value system achieved it.

These decisions were often characterized by a competition of arms, especially in the air between the Air Force and the Marines, on the ground between the Army and the Marines, and in terms of the nuclear arsenal, between the Air Force and the Navy.

In other words, due to healthy competition and balances, the quality of the British and American armed forces won.

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DISCUSSION OF ARMENIAN NATIONAL-POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PERIODICAL “THE FIGHT” (1897-1901)

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Abstract

In 1887 the theoreticians of the Hunchakyan party, which was founded in Geneva, unlike other parties, believed that after the liberation of the Armenian people from Turkish and then Russian rule, a socialist social order should be established in democratic Armenia. Going ahead of the natural development of events, Hunchakians were engaged in propaganda of socialism in Western Armenia in the late 1880s - early 1890s.

Keywords: *Hunchakyan party, “The Fight” newspaper, Arpiar Arpiaryan, Armenian Question, liberation of Western Armenians, Turkey, Russia, Europe*

Introduction

The main goal of the Armenian national parties that entered the political arena at the end of the XIX^h century was the liberation of Western Armenians from Turkish rule. Although the goals of the parties were common, their practical approaches were different.

In 1887 the theoreticians of the Hunchakyan party, which was founded in Geneva, unlike other parties, believed that after the liberation of the Armenian people from Turkish and then Russian rule, a socialist social order should be established in democratic Armenia. Going ahead of the natural development of events, Hunchakians were engaged in propaganda of socialism in Western Armenia in the late 1880s - early 1890s. Time has shown, however, that Hunchakyan's actions as a whole, including the propaganda of socialism in Turkey, did not yield significant results. On this basis, the contradictions within the party intensified especially after the massacres of Western Armenians in the 1890s, when many party figures left Turkey and gathered in London to discuss the party's future course of action, but the deepening of disagreements led to its split.

Rejecting the previous practices of the party, Hunchakians, mainly Western Armenians, under the leadership of writer, publicist, national-public figure Arpiyar Arpiaryan, separated and created a new party, which was later called “Reorganized”. The new Hunchakians tried to use the party's official newspaper “Hunchak” to propagate their ideas, but after the leader of the Hunchakyan party, Avetis Nazarbekyan, managed to preserve his ownership rights to the newspaper through the London court, the reorganized Hunchakians began to publish the newspaper “The

Fight” in London in 1897.¹ The first issue of the newspaper announced that the party’s official newspaper “Hunchak” has passed into the hands of an individual (namely Av. Nazarbekyan - G. H), therefore “The Fight” will become the official newspaper of the newly created party.²

Searching for ways to liberate Western Armenians in the periodical “The Fight”

“The Fight” was a small four-page newspaper. Arshak Chopanyan, Levon Bashalyan, well-known figures of Western Armenian literary and social life cooperated with this periodical, but Arpiar Arparyan was the author of the ideological-political direction of the newspaper and the author of most of the articles.

The newspaper criticized the tactics of the old Hunchak leaders, who used the press to insult the Turkish authorities, not realizing that by doing so they were inadvertently warning the Turkish authorities about possible Armenian uprisings. According to “The Fight”, the Armenian people could be liberated only through a general popular uprising.³

“The Fight” theoreticians sometimes referred to examples of national-liberation struggle of other peoples, trying to demonstrate their struggle experience. The article “Tricolor Flag” draws parallels between the ways and means of national liberation struggle of Armenian and foreign peoples.⁴ The search for a solution to this super-problem leads “The Fight” to the conclusion that salvation lies in the unity of all classes of the Armenian people⁵.

However, promoting the idea of the consolidation of national forces, the periodical meant only the Western Armenians, and the intervention of the Eastern Armenians was considered harmful.⁶ Citing Nazarbek and other Eastern Armenian figures, the newspaper wrote that they strive to lead the liberation movement of Western Armenians without recognizing Western Armenia, and instead of patriotism, they wrap the ideology of socialism around the neck of the Armenian people. The disastrous consequences of that activity for the Armenian people were shown.⁷

“The Fight” emphasized that the uniqueness of the Armenian Revolution⁸ lies in its purely national character, because the Armenians are persecuted without discrimination, rich or poor.⁹

¹ To the newspaper has been discussed in several studies (Hambaryan 1990; Khurshudyan 2006; Hovhannisyan 2019).

² “The Fight”, 1897, №1.

³ “The Fight”, 1897, №6.

⁴ “The Fight”, 1897, №2.

⁵ “The Fight”, 1897, №18.

⁶ “The Fight”, 1897, №3.

⁷ “The Fight”, 1897, №14.

⁸ “Armenian Revolution” was understood as the liberation struggle of Western Armenians at the end of the 19th century

⁹ “The Fight”, 1897, №19.

According to the newspaper, everything that can divide the nation should be removed from the program of the newly created Reorganized Hunchakyan Party, regardless their social status, intellectual Armenians, clergymen and merchants should unite their abilities for the salvation of the nation and homeland.¹⁰

“The Fight” emphasized that the newly created party changed its program, abandoned the clause of class struggle and focused purely on the issue of national freedom.¹¹

Coverage of the politics of the European powers in “The Fight”

“The Fight” paid special attention to the issue of the policy of the great European powers in the Armenian Question.

The periodical promoted the idea that the support of the European states is necessary for the liberation of Western Armenians, but it cannot be enough and it was necessary to carry out an active and multifaceted national activity. The editor of the newspaper, Arpiaryan, believed that the Armenian Question will not reach a result if the Armenian nation carries out all its activities only in the journalistic, propaganda and diplomatic direction.¹² The publicist came to the idea that the subject peoples of Turkey should undertake the work of their liberation themselves, and not passively wait for the support from Europe.¹³ He expressed his belief that the European powers will eventually either reform Turkey or dismember it.¹⁴

The focus of the periodical was on Russia’s policy on the Armenian Question

Arpiaryan, understanding the essence of the Russian colonial policy, wrote that the Russian state was using the situation of the Armenian people under Turkish rule for its political purposes.¹⁵ Criticizing the regressive Russian policy towards the Armenian people, the newspaper sometimes went to the extreme, putting a sign of equality between the Russian and Turkish dominions. The idea that the destruction of Turkey was one of the unchanging goals of Russian foreign policy was raised in “The Fight”. In the newspaper was արծածվում էր the idea that the destruction of Turkey was the constant goal of the Russian foreign policy. It was also emphasized that Russia’s policy on the Armenian Question was variable and depended on political circumstances.

¹⁰ “The Fight”, 1900, №26.

¹¹ “The Fight”, 1901, №28.

¹² “The Fight”, 1901, №28.

¹³ “The Fight”, 1899, №16.

¹⁴ “The Fight”, 1899, №17.

¹⁵ “The Fight”, 1897, №7.

According to the periodical, the reason why the Armenian people ended up in such a situation was the lack of a unified national policy. The periodical saw the way out of the created situation in the unity of the intellectual, military and monetary (financial) forces of the Armenian people, which would provide an opportunity to save the present and secure the future¹⁶. "The Fight" also emphasized the idea that the Armenian people could become a tool for Russia if Turkey's anti-Armenian policy intensified.¹⁷

Coverage of the movement of Young Turks in "The Fight"

At the end of the XIX century, during the rise of the national liberation movement of the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire, the movement of the Turkish opposition forces, the Young Turks, was launched against the dictatorship of the Sultan. The participants of that movement saw the further development of Turkey in the establishment of constitutional order in the country and during their struggle sought to cooperate with other political organizations opposing the Sultanate regime: Arabs, Macedonians, Bulgarians, including Armenian national parties.

In this context, in 1896, A. Arpiaryan had meetings with some leaders of the Young Turks in Paris (in particular with Ahmed Reza - G.H.). According to Arpiaryan, there was no general agreement between them during those meetings, because the leaders of the Young Turks declared that the Armenians should abandon the demand for reforms in Western Armenia. Understanding the true goals of the Young Turks in the national issue, Arpiaryan called on Armenian national parties to be realistic and not to follow abstract ideas. He came to the conclusion that the Young Turks were more hostile to the Christians of Turkey than the Old Turks.¹⁸

Coverage of the conflict between Arpiaryan and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in "The Fight"

"The Fight" also highlighted a painful reality in Armenian public life, the problem of the competition between political parties, which was clearly expressed in the form of the conflict between Arpiaryan and the ARF. In particular, in the late 1890s, the news about the so-called betrayal and espionage by Arpiaryan, thrown into the arena by the ARF, made a big noise in the western public life.

A number of well-known figures of the Western Armenian public life of the time came out in support of Arpiaryan.

The articles of A. Chopanyan, L. Bashalyan V. Malezyan and others, published in "The New Life" and "The Fight", completely deny Arpiaryan's treachery and being a spy of the Turkish police. The fake news spread by the Constantinople Committee of the

¹⁶ "The Fight", 1898, №9.

¹⁷ "The Fight", 1900, №23.

¹⁸ "The Fight", 1897, №7.

ARF proves that their real purpose was to undermine Arpiaryan's great authority and popularity, a circumstance that the ARF viewed as a serious obstacle to increasing its influence in Constantinople.¹⁹

The publication of "The Fight" was stopped in 1901, the reason for which was the intensifying intra-party disagreements within the reorganized Hunchakyan party and Arpiaryan's departure from the party.

Conclusion

Thus, the study of the articles published in the newspaper "The Fight", the organ of the reorganized Hunchakyan party in 1897-1901, shows that the focus of the periodical was the policy of the European great powers in direction of the Armenian Question, anti-Armenian destruction policy of the Ottoman Turkey, the Young Turk movement, and the relations between the Armenian national parties. The search for ways and means of liberating Western Armenians was in focus of their publications. Rejecting the fighting tactics of the old Hunchakians, who were surrounded by the dogmas of socialism, the chief editor of "The Fight" A. Arpiaryan after long preparation put forward the idea of a common uprising, whose propaganda was undertaken by "The Fight". Although "The Fight" was published for a short time, it left a noticeable mark in the history of the Armenian liberation movement and social-political thought of the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX century.

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¹⁹ "The Fight", 1897, 6 1900, 24,25,26.

THE PLAIN OF ERZURUM IN THE BRONZE AGE (Environment and society)

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Abstract

The plain of Erzurum is one of those parts of historical Armenia that had played an important role in the political and economic life of our region throughout centuries, beginning from the IV mill. BC until early modern times. In the article are presented several key aspects of this area – geographical position, environment, economic potential, and brief archaeological history.

Keywords: *Erzurum plain, Bronze Age, agriculture, Sos Höyük, Karaz, Güzelova, political landscape*

Environment

The plain of Erzurum took its shape in the Quaternary period, as a result of the collision of Eurasian and Arabian plates. During its last period – Pleistocene (ends approximately in 9700 BC), in the course of tectonic processes the northern part of the plain is largely composed of lavas and pyroclastic units. In the basin sedimentary strata are widespread which includes lacustrine deposits and extensive.¹ While low magnitude seismicity is frequent, higher magnitude earthquakes also happen.² Through the region under study passes the North East Anatolian Fault which proceeds to the north-north-east from Erzincan in the direction of the Great Caucasus,³ hence the high seismicity of Erzurum plain.

Due to flat landscape, the plain of Erzurum along with that of Erzincan is the most convenient route that connects Southern Caucasus with Asia Minor and Syrian-Mesopotamian region. The plain of Erzurum could be treated as a “corridor” which has open access from both sides. During different historical periods this road was used by migrants and armies.⁴

In antiquity through the plain proceeded the important trading and military road – Karin (Turkish Erzurum) – Bagaric – Satala – Sebasteia, as it is shown in the Peutinger

¹ Collins 2005: 122.

² Collins 2005: 122. Earthquakes in Basen in 1924 and 1983 in Basen [Turkish Pasinler] and Horasan).

³ Türkoğlu 2009: 33 and the Map on p.35.

⁴ For example, continuous migrations of the Kura-Araxes migrants to the west and south-west from their Transcaucasian homeland about 3000 BC onwards, durative Ottoman-Safevid wars in late Middle Ages, Russian-Turkish wars in the XIX-early XX century etc.

map. Besides this road another road comes from Trebizond and follows through the modern Republic of Armenia to Iran.⁵

The landscape and climatic conditions of this ellipsoid plain with an elevation of about 1900 meters above sea level are not homogeneous. From the north and south it is surrounded by mountain chains with an elevation of 2000-3000 meters (Kargapazarı Mountains to the north and the Şahvelet and Palandöken Mountains to the south) and several fertile valleys between them. Two biggest valleys are that of Aşkale to the west of Erzurum and Basen that is divided from the former by the Deveboynu volcanic range. In the south are located several volcanic ranges and mountains which are intersected by depressions and small valleys.

This region possesses with 488.454 hectares of agricultural area, of which most suitable 143.843.8 hectares, suitable 344.612.4 hectares and less suitable 768.783.0 hectares.⁶

The difference in elevation between mountains and valleys is considerable. Correspondingly, the climate between the north and the south is noticeable. In the north and north-east the climate is milder and in the south is characterized by cold and even dry climate.⁷

The plain of Erzurum possesses with excellent opportunities for the development of agriculture and animal husbandry, of course, especially during the periods of normal climatic conditions. Winters are cold, the thermometer shows 15-20 below zero, and in summer it rises to 20-28 above zero. The region is well watered. Average annual precipitations reach 432.2 mm.⁸ The soil is fertile, particularly the western part of the plain, Derjan (Turkish Tercan), the sources of the River Kharshit, Bayburt, and Basen. Besides cereals, also vegetables are cultivated (carrot, beet, cabbage, pea, cucumber, etc.).⁹ Although yearly precipitations are enough for agricultural activities without artificial irrigation, the prolonged winter in early spring could endanger sowing and harvesting.¹⁰ Cold and sometimes dry summer seasons could be harmful for agriculture and favors the raising of livestock.¹¹

⁵ See Manandyan 1930: 101-124 (for this and other roads).

⁶ Özgül, Çomaklı 2021: 503.

⁷ Işikli, Can 2007: 154.

⁸ Özgül, Çomaklı 2021: 501.

⁹ See Schtrecker 1873: 5. The author mentions that the agricultural products could secure the needs of local population and also people involved in the caravan trade.

¹⁰ Yakar 2000: 385. The abundance of annual precipitations is not enough for agriculture and sometimes requires artificial irrigation during dry seasons (Schtrecker 1873: 6).

¹¹ Sagona *et al.* 1995: 193-195. The British officer R.Kinneir who travelled through this region in the first half of the XIX century mentions that in Erzurum, comparing with Gümüşhane, in June the corn hardly reaches 7-8 cm in height (Kinneir 1818: 351). He adds also that in winter season the town of Bayburt is isolated from its neighborhood due to thick cover of snow.

The region of Gümüşhane, to the west of Erzurum, has better environmental conditions that favor agricultural activities. The Kharshit valley comprises “one continued garden of fruit trees”.¹²

One of the main components of economic potential of Erzurum is natural resources.¹³ Pontic mountains that surround the plain from the north had great number of rich deposits of iron, which were employed still in the antiquity (at least from the II mill. BC), and also not far from Erzurum.¹⁴ Thus, it could be assumed that metallurgy and crafts connected with it was one of the important aspects of the lifestyle of the population,¹⁵ along with agriculture and animal husbandry.

During the time span between the Early Bronze Age (EBA) until the Late Bronze Age (LBA)(mid-IV mill. BC – late-II mill. BC) the Erzurum region comprised flat steppe zone, and the foothills of the mountains surrounding it were covered with dense forests. Here the fauna mostly consists of sheep and goats, less frequently bovids and pigs.¹⁶

Except some mounds where are fixed traces of ancient settlements (*Karaz, Büyüktepe, Sos Höyük, Pulur* etc.), throughout the plain there are very few places for the foundation of more or less large and safe settlements that are naturally protected, hence open landscape and migrations could jeopardize their existence. Here should be expected the existence of small settlements located along the slopes of mountains that surround the plain or in the intermountain depressions. In this regard the pattern of the Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age is important. Due to harsh climatic conditions, settlements on the mounds are located in the lowest parts of the plain, where it is considerably warmer. In contrast, the settlements in the mountains are additionally fortified, a fact which testifies in favor of constant threat from outside.¹⁷ It is worth to mention that most of the LBA settlements of the Erzurum plain are small in size and scattered on the large area, with no visible traces of their concentration in some region¹⁸ which might be taken as proof for the absence of political centralization.

¹² Kinneir 1818: 348.

¹³ The detailed description of natural resources of the Armenian Highland and Upper Armenia in particular see Karajian 1920.

¹⁴ Muhly 1985: 72 (Map); Siegelová and Tsumoto 2011: 285, Fig. 2. He mentions that actually every settlement has its own source of iron.

¹⁵ The excavations at *Karaz*, one of the EBA settlements of the region (EBA II, late IV - early III mill. BC) had revealed the existence of metallurgy (Yakar 1984: 78). The local population produce arsenic copper which comprises about 75 percent of all products made of copper (see also Yener 2000: 46-47, 51, 677).

¹⁶ Houwel-Meurs 2001 (citation by Rothman 2004: 125). This data had been revealed on due to the materials excavated at *Sos Höyük* and *Büyüktepe*.

¹⁷ Karaosmanoğlu, Işikli, Can 2003: 345ff. One of such fortified settlement is *Pirtin*, 35 km to the west of Erzurum on the road from Erzurum to Erzincan. On the southern part of the cyclopean wall is preserved the wall of about 2-3 meters high. The architecture of the wall is different from that of the Urartian fortification practice (Işikli, Can 2007: 162).

¹⁸ Yakar 2000: 411.

Erzurum plain in the IV-early II millenniums BC.

Although archaeological surveys in the plain of Erzurum had been conducted since the mid XX century, not too many sites have been fixed and studied. More or less satisfactory results had been achieved in regard to the Early Bronze Age (EBA) and LBA. As to the EIA, until now it is poorly understood.¹⁹ Among the most well studied sites are *Sos Höyük*, *Pulur*, *Karaz*, and *Büyüktepe Höyük*.²⁰

Sos Höyük

This important site is located at about 40 km to the east of Erzurum, near Çökender, one of the northern tributaries of Araxes River, on the mound which occupies approximately a space of 150x150 meters (height 12 meters).²¹ The cultural layer of the mound extends from Late Chalcolithic Va level (LC) until Middle Ages (1100-1300 AD).²²

From LC until the end of the MBA the settlement shows continuous occupation without break. As to the situation during the transition from the LBA to EIA it remains unclear.²³ The importance of *Sos Höyük* is connected with its location between Southern Caucasus and Asia Minor which could illustrate interrelations of these two cultural areas.²⁴

From the very beginning (about 3500 BC) the settlement was closely connected with the Transcaucasian cultural world (Kura-Araxes I).²⁵ Ceramic types unearthed during excavations had clear parallels with the Kura-Araxes ceramic repertory.²⁶ The clay of low quality, variety of vessels and their sizes as well as the absence of standardized production points on the assumption that these wares were aimed on local domestic purposes but not for export.²⁷ The general impression that could be deduced

¹⁹ The results of excavations conducted in different sites of the plain (*Sos Höyük*, *Pulur*, *Karaz*, and *Büyüktepe Höyük*, *Güzelova*, *Bulamaç Höyük*, *Çiğdemli* etc.) are published in the next studies - Kökten 1944; Koşay, Turfan 1959; Koşay, Vary 1964; 1967; Sagona, Pemberton and McPhee 1991; 1992; 1993; Sagona, Sagona and Özkorucuklu 1995; Sagona Sagona, Erkmén, Sagona, Thomas 1996; Sagona, Erkmén, Sagona, Howells 1997; Sagona, Erkmén, Sagona, McNiven and Howells 1998; Sagona 2000; Sagona and Sagona 2000; Güneri 1995; Güneri 2008; Güneri *et al.* 2004; Işikli, Can 2007. See Güneri 2008 for the map of all archaeological sites (Map 1).

²⁰ For the most sites until now is absent clear stratigraphy, except *Pulur*, *Karaz* and *Güzelova* (Sagona 1984: 65ff.; 2000: 330ff.).

²¹ At present the mound actually never exists since the modern village of Yiğittaşı which surrounds the mound had expanded for agricultural and domestic purposes (Kibaroglu, Sagona, Satir 2011: 3073).

²² Excavations of *Sos Höyük* took place between 1994-2000 by the team of A.Sagona and the results are summarized in several studies (see n.18).

²³ Sagona 2000: 329f.

²⁴ Palumbi 2008: 64.

²⁵ Sagona 2000: 340.

²⁶ Palumbi 2008: 66f. Chemical analysis of 39 sherds unequivocally proves that all they were produced here and could not be regarded as imports (Kibaroglu, Sagona, Satir 2011: 3082): Such an assumption rests on the structure of the clay which is mixed with small pieces of basalt and other stones. The source of the stones are the mountains located at the northern fringes of the plain of Basen.

²⁷ Kibaroglu, Sagona, Satir 2011: 3082.

from this is that the population of *Sos Höyük* was part of the Kura-Araxes cultural area. Also, the round hearths, which have parallels in the Upper Euphrates region and in some Transcaucasian Chalcolithic and Kura-Araxes I sites (particularly in Shida-Kartli in Central Georgia) point of the east. Besides this here are found fireplaces and andirons characteristic for the Kura-Araxes culture.²⁸ Cultural influence of Southern Transcaucasia is especially well expressed from the 3000 BC and continues for about 1500 years. From approximately 2500 BC here is seen the influence of the Trialeti culture.²⁹

Unlike ceramics, the architecture of *Sos Höyük* shows the existence of two different traditions. One of the peculiarities of the site is the absence of unified building planning. As it was assumed by A. Sagona, at *Sos Höyük* met the bearers of two cultural traits - Transcaucasian and Anatolian, and he concludes that here one might see some sort of a hybrid culture.³⁰ Anyway, the South-Caucasian affiliation of *Sos Höyük* is much stronger as it is seen from the EBA I period onwards.³¹

Some concerns remain in regard to the absence of items from metals and workshops for their production. Most of the tools are made from obsidian which could be found nearby.³² This speaks in favor of the assumption that the population of *Sos Höyük* practiced primitive lifestyle and, probably, had minimal foreign contacts, especially in the case of the location of the site on the road connecting East and West. Apparently, the population of *Sos Höyük* practiced simple agricultural-cattle-breeding lifestyle and was unaware of specialized production (particularly in the sphere of craftsmanship).

The situation described above had been changed in the MBA. The settlement experienced a strong Trialeti influence, at the same time keeping local cultural traditions. Although here were unearthed significant buildings (late III mill. BC - early II mill.), which chronologically correspond to the Trialeti tombs, but all in all are registered periods when the mound served as a temporary residence that lacks serious building activities.³³

Pulur

Among archaeological sites of the Erzurum plain *Pulur* is the best preserved one which is located about 16 km far from Erzurum, 3 km to the south-east of the town Ilıca.³⁴ The distance from *Pulur* to *Sos Höyük* is about 50 km. *Pulur* comprises a large

²⁸ Palumbi 2008: 70.

²⁹ Sagona 2000: 340.

³⁰ Sagona, Sagona 2000: 67; Palumbi 2008: 70f.

³¹ Sagona, Sagona 2000: 67; Palumbi 2008: 223.

³² For the sources of obsidian in the plain of Erzurum see Kobayashi and Sagona 2007: 186-188. They could be found on Basen, along the road that proceeds from Erzurum to Bingöl, on some distance from the site of *Pulur*. Layers of obsidian could be found at surface (in the form of clusters), and also in the alluviums.

³³ Sagona, Sagona 2000: 68; Sagona 2000: 340.

³⁴ Excavations at *Pulur* had started in 1960s (Koşay, Vary 1964; Koşay 1976) and later were continued by the team of M. Işikli, University of Erzurum (on the results of surveys see Işikli, Can 2007: 159f., Işikli 2008)).

mound (3 hectares, height 10 meters), of which is excavated only a part. The stratigraphy of material remains shows that we deal with a single habitation period.³⁵

The settlement at *Pulur* began to function at least from LC until the EIA (the existence of some possible breaks in habitation, their chronology and duration are problematic).³⁶ During the EIA, like in *Sos Höyük* and *Güzelova*, the settlement continued to function, that could be proved by considerable number of ceramical remains.³⁷

On the north-eastern edge of the mound are present strong traces of the LBA and EIA habitation, and on the north-western slope significant material remains of the LC. The width of the former cultural layer equals 4.41 meters, which has two extensive breaks, probably as a result of destructions.

165 among 300 sherds from *Pulur* are dated to the LBA and the transition to the Early Iron Age. They are mostly handmade and only very few were produced on a wheel. Similarly, only some sherds are well burnished. The rest were burnished under medium or low temperature. As to the clay, it has low quality and is mixed with sand and small pieces of stone.³⁸ In this regard the ceramics of *Pulur* is paralleled with that of *Sos Höyük* (see above). Here are absent the traces of the so-called "Proto-Kura-Araxes" period which might be taken as a proof for the assumption that the bearers of the Kura-Araxes culture had appeared here not earlier than the mid-IV mill. BC.

The coal excavated in the Late Chalcolithic level points on the date between 4242-4075 BC.

Karaz

The next site of the region under discussion is *Karaz* which is located at about 50 km to the west of *Sos Höyük*, near the village Kahramanlar. The study of the well-known archaeological culture Kura-Araxes begins exactly at *Karaz* still in the mid-XX century³⁹, and the whole culture was named after it.⁴⁰

The habitation level of *Karaz* is impressive (about 9 meters), the earlier part of which reaches 3.5 meters, and is divided into three subphases which ends with about 1-1.5 meters sterile layer. The next period of habitation (2 meters in width) has two subphases. The next period of habitation is more brief, about 0.5 meters which is not divided into subphases.⁴¹

³⁵ Sagona 2000: 331.

³⁶ Işıklı 2008: 270.

³⁷ Işıklı and Erdem 2009: 255-259.

³⁸ Işıklı 2008: 271.

³⁹ On the results of excavations at *Karaz* see Koşay, Turfan 1959.

⁴⁰ In the course of excavations had been suggested the term "Karaz culture" (Koşay, Turfan 1959: 359f.), which thereafter became parallel term for the "Kura-Araxes culture" or "Early Transcaucasian culture" (sometimes it is used by some archaeologists).

⁴¹ Sagona 2000: 331.

Between the first and second phases has been fixed changes which are reflected first of all in the shapes of ceramics.⁴²

Archaeological investigations of the settlements of Erzurum show human activity still from the LC and later in the EIA. Contemporary to these settlements are known archaeological sites also in the neighboring River Chorukh basin, in the area of Bayburt.⁴³ During the Early Bronze Age this region definitely was incorporated into the Kura-Araxes cultural region, a fact well established throughout the plain of Erzurum and its neighborhood. Ceramic types of the plain actually are identical with their Transcaucasian parallels.⁴⁴

Our knowledge of the following period of MBA actually until today remains obscure due to the lack of archaeological excavations.

The LBA of Erzurum and neighboring Bayburt does not allow to reconstruct a complete picture of economic and political activity of the population, but the remains of material culture unequivocally speak in favor of the assumption that life in this area continues without break.⁴⁵

As to the transition from the LBA to the EIA, archaeologists assumed that in the Early Iron Age Erzurum plain was densely populated.⁴⁶ Like the previous period, this region continues to have close contacts with Transcaucasia.⁴⁷ But the reconstruction of the situation in this region encounters some doubts in regard to this period.

Due the uncertainty in the stratigraphy of the EIA sites sometimes archaeologists are forced to suggest considerable duration for their existence. Particularly, A.Sagona was inclined to date the EIA at *Sos Höyük* with 1000-800 BC, and mentions that this period in the settlement is the most problematic one.⁴⁸

In regard to the origins of ceramics of Erzurum plain in particular and the whole local culture during the transition from LBA to EIA one should mention the groundless assumption reached by S.Güneri.⁴⁹ According to him, in the XII century BC took place migration of population from the steppe zone of Central Asia (Khakasia, Tuva) and Southern Mongolia which resulted in the appearance of ceramics made through incised technique.

⁴² Sagona 2000: 331.

⁴³ These are *Ivceklerin tepesi*, *Siptoros Höyük* and *Hindi Höyük* (Yakar 1992: 512). Some other sites are also identified, but they remain unstudied yet.

⁴⁴ This ceramics by its types, coloring, application and burnishing techniques is identical with the Kura-Araxes types of contemporay Transcaucasian wares (Işikli, Baştürk 2009: 161f., here also the statistical evaluation of the EBA pottery from several sites).

⁴⁵ According to J.Yakar, during this period the population had contacts with Anatolian (Hittite) culture (Yakar 1992: 512), since excavations had revealed a significant portion of western ceramics (Güneri 1987).

⁴⁶ Işikli, Can 2007: 164.

⁴⁷ Işikli, Can 2007: 164.

⁴⁸ Sagona 2012: 255-258.

⁴⁹ Güneri 2002: 58-75. this idea was critisized by A.Sagona and Cl.Sagona (Sagona and Sagona 2003: 107).

Political landscape

For the discussion of the plain of Erzurum and its neighborhood an important problem should be born in mind - political organization of the local society during the whole Bronze Age. While the sites located on the plain show little opportunities for the existence of a more or less advanced political organization, although such possibility could not be ruled out (for some archaeological arguments on this problem see below). During the III mill. BC this region remains outside the geographical area documented by the contemporary Mesopotamian cuneiform sources. The same is true for the II mill. BC. Neither the Hittite cuneiform texts of the XV-XIII BC, nor the Assyrian ones compiled during the reign of Tiglathpileser I (1114-1076 BC), contain any clue for the assumption that Hittites and Assyrians had reached this region.⁵⁰ As to the Hittite texts, they refer to some political entities that were located in the Upper Euphrates region - Išūwa, Kummaha, and the plain of Erzincan.⁵¹ Two tribal units - Azzi and Hayaša most probably should be looked in the plain of Erzincan or in its close neighborhood,⁵² but not in the region of Erzurum.⁵³

Although all known archaeological sites that are located in the plain show little traces for the existence of statehood, surveys conducted in the mountain ranges surrounding the plain had revealed several fortified settlements. Preliminary dating of these sites (some probably belong to the Urartian period) makes any conclusion premature. Anyway, taking into account the open landscape of the plain, it should be reasonable to assume the next scenario for the social and political development of this region.

Political center(s) should be looked in the nearby mountains which guard their agricultural sections located on the plain. Hence, the assumption that after the fall of the Hittite Empire and until the advance of Urartu in the plain of Erzurum could have function some political entity (or entities). Archaeologists have fixed a chain of about 10 fortified settlements which surround the plain from both sides (from north and from south), that stretches from Erzurum to Erzincan. These are *Pırtın* (35 km from Erzurum to Erzincan, near the road) and *Umudum Tepe* (18 km to the north of Erzurum), *Küçük Geçit Kalesi* (along the road from Erzurum to Aşkale), *Uzun Ahmet* and *Saksın* (near the pass of Deveboynu, that controls the road leading to Basen). In this same region, in

⁵⁰ In some older studies which deal with the geography of the Assyrian conquests in the north it has been suggested that Tiglathpileser I concluded his campaign in ^{KUR}Dayaeni (approximately in the plain of Erzurum and the valley of River Chorukh) by reaching the Black Sea (Harutyunyan 1970: 29-52; but later scholars had come to the conclusion that the "Sea of Nairi" should be identical with Lake Van (for the geographical limits of the campaigns of Tiglathpileser I most recently Shibata 2022: 172-179).

⁵¹ See Kosyan 2022 (corresponding entries).

⁵² See Kosyan 2004: 38-39, 43-46, 47-50, 98-99 (entries Aripša, Azzi, Hayaša, Duqq/kk/qqam(m)a) with references on current localizations suggested by other scholars.

⁵³ The suggestion made by Gr.Kapancyan in regard to the location of Hayaša in the Erzurum plain (Kapancyan 1948: 42-46, 54-64) is could not be strengthened by valuable arguments. In his earlier studies this location figures also in the article of J.Yakar (Yakar 1992: 50).

the area looking towards the plain of Basen are located some other fortified sites (*Beşiktepe, Hopbik, Ziyarettepe, Pasinler/Hasankale*).⁵⁴ All these fortresses comprise cyclopean masonry where were used rough-hewn stones of different sizes. The architecture of walls has nothing to do with Urartu but has local character. One may suggest that the local political entity was governed by Urartians.⁵⁵

Later, the plain of Erzurum and surrounding regions were incorporated into the kingdom of Greater Armenia and was known as Upper Armenia. Finally, during the World War I it lost its Armenian population.⁵⁶

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⁵⁴ Işıklı, Can 2007: 162f.

⁵⁵ As it was mentioned by P.Zimansky, the Erzurum plain “is remarkably free of any trace of Urartian culture, let alone political control” (Zimansky 1985: 10).

⁵⁶ For the ethnographic history of the plain of Erzurum see Tarbassian 1975.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMIT – Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran und Turan.

ANES - Ancient Near Eastern Studies.

AnSt – Anatolian Studies.

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THE PROBLEM OF THE RETURN OF WESTERN ARMENIAN REFUGEES IN 1902

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Abstract

Part of the Western Armenians who survived the mass massacres organized by Abdul Hamid II in 1890s was forced to migrate and settle down around the world. Only 50,000 refugees found shelter in Eastern Armenia.¹ The latter survived owing to various funds. However, aid and alleviating the condition of the Western Armenian refugees to some extent did not solve the difficult problem of their survival. It was necessary to take steps to return them to their place of birth, which was a vital necessity for the Western Armenians. The catastrophic decrease in the number of the Armenian people had a very negative impact on the demography of Western Armenia, which was an important part of the policy adopted by the sultan. That is why hundreds of depopulated settlements were inhabited by Muslim tribes. Under the name of “muhajirs” (refugees), they settled down in Western Armenia and Cilicia.²

Keywords: *Western Armenian, refugees, return, Gr. Golitsyn, Governorate of the Caucasus*

The problem of return of refugees

It was obvious that it was necessary to take steps to transfer the Western Armenians to Western Armenia, but first it was necessary to prepare the basis for that process. But despite all that in 1901, by the order of Gr. Golitsyn, the governor of the Caucasus, the refugees faced a difficult situation. Golitsyn, who hated all non-Russian peoples,³ issued an order in November 1901 that the refugees who came to Transcaucasia since 1893 would either leave or accept Russian citizenship.⁴ At the same time, he added that those who wish to return will get relief. And those who do not want to leave will accept Russian citizenship and will be obliged to:

- to enlist in 1902 like the rest of the nationalities of the empire.

¹ Ananun 1926: 11, “Droshak”, 1902, N 3, p. 42.

² Barkhudaryan *et al.* 2010. 544.

³ Z. Kh. Ibragimova, *World of Chechens. XIX century*, Moscow, Probel, 2000, p. 150, 151. /1024 pp.: ill./, <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3269125.html>

⁴ Ananun 1926: 12.

- they will have the right to purchase real estate outside the urban area 20 years after becoming a Russian citizen.
- the abovementioned rules apply to refugees who crossed the border before February 1, 1901, and those who arrived later will be deported.⁵

The goal of the Russian government was not to return the Western Armenians at all, because his goal was to create Armenia without Armenians. And the moment of realization of that desired goal had arrived. This is evidenced by Golitsyn's secret report made in Petersburg, which he presented to the Council of Ministers in 1901, announcing that he had finally found a way to get rid of the dangerous Armenians: "to send the Armenians to Siberia, to free the Transcaucasia from the presence of the Armenians and to establish in their place the Orthodox immigrants from Russian regions."⁶ However, the Council of Ministers did not respond to this idea and Golitsyn continued to use all his hatred towards Armenians on the issue of returning Western Armenian refugees.

They found themselves in a difficult situation after the order was issued. The Armenians found themselves in a desperate situation. Accepting Russian citizenship would mean renouncing the place of birth, and it was impossible to return, first of all, because the Turkish government would not allow it, and besides, they were not sure that it would ensure their safety. The Western Armenians in the governorate of the Caucasus engaged in all kinds of work: some were workers, some others were porters, merchants, servants, farmers, shepherds, cultivators and so on. They did everything just to earn money⁷ and were satisfied with the limited possibilities. Also, they could breathe freely for a while, to plan and clarify their further steps.⁸

As a result, Armenians were divided into two groups: "the one who wants to return is "the village man, the farmer", and the merchant has already found his warm place outside the homeland."⁹ For example, according to the list made by the chief of Police of Tiflis, 361 people out of 494 accepted Russian citizenship, and according to the list made by the Police chief of Baku, 52¹⁰ out of 72 families accepted Russian citizenship. It can be concluded from all this that Armenians were afraid to return to their homeland because they had no confidence in security. Therefore, the refugees began to find some way out to stay in the Governorate of Caucasus for a few more years hoping that after some time situation will change in their place of birth. They began to appeal to the governors to allow them to take refuge in the Governorate of the Caucasus for some time. Not receiving any answer, they thought the issue was resolved until the order of the governor of Tiflis was issued on August 5, 1902. The refugees who will stay in the

⁵ Lazean 1957: 115-116.

⁶ "Droshak", 1902, N 3, p. 44.

⁷ "Apaga", 1907, N 9, p. 3.

⁸ "Hnchak", 1902, N 5, p. 37.

⁹ "Mshak", 1902, N 181.

¹⁰ "Mshak", 1902, N 222.

country until August 10 will be considered Russian citizens. In order to get out of this situation, they convene a meeting and decide to move to the border and put pressure on the Turkish government to allow them to return to their birthplace.¹¹ A large number of Armenians reach Kars, where the border guards, after delaying until the end of the month, do not allow them to cross the border.¹² But contrary to that, the number of people returning to their homeland in Kars was increasing. And already on August 24, their number reached 1000.¹³ They were forced to live in the villages of Basen for about a month, but they could not cross the border. There was even an attempt to move to Persia, but the Russian border guards returned them to Kars.¹⁴

But they were not allowed to cross the border and they even threatened to shoot the refugees if they tried to cross the border. Having no other way out, on September 23, 1902, Armenians turned to the foreign ministers of Russia, France and England, explaining their situation and asking for help to get out of this unbearable situation.¹⁵ Before receiving any answer, they also addressed the Catholicos of All Armenians and the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople with petitions. They offered the refugees to form small groups and secretly go through Persia to the Motherland. Accepting this variant, the first group of 120 people moved to Etchmiadzin, but there they were arrested by the tsarist authorities and locked up in the Kaghzvan prison.¹⁶

It is not known whether the British and French governments responded to their petition, but when Gr. Golitsyn, the governor of the Caucasus, received that petition, he lost self-control. In 1903, he turned to the Minister of Internal Affairs, proposing:

1. to deport abroad all those Armenians who settled in Russia after February 1901
2. to close Russia's borders to Western Armenians, even if they have a passport
3. to transfer (or it would be more correct to say exile) to the remote regions of the empire, all the refugees, who had settled in the empire.

Those proposals of the governor were discussed in Petersburg in 1904 at the Council of Ministers and the following was decided:

1. to do a favor those Armenians who settled in Transcaucasia after 1893 and want to go abroad
2. to do a favor those Armenians who are going to move to the internal border of the empire
3. to allow others to live in the Caucasus, with the exception of Yerevan Province and Kars Province, that is, Eastern Armenia, finding that there will be a consolidation of Armenians, which will cause anxiety for the government.

¹¹ "Droshak", 1902, N 11, p. 163.

¹² For details, see pp. 163-165 *ibid*.

¹³ Hambaryan 1999: 18.

¹⁴ "Droshak", 1902, N 10, p. 160.

¹⁵ "Droshak", 1902, N 9, pp. 132-133.

¹⁶ Hambaryan 1999: 19.

4. to allocate land plots to Armenians, settled in the Caucasus, after 20 years.

Although these decisions were more favorable than Golitsyn's recommendations, they did not go beyond the anti-Armenian policy of Tsarism.¹⁷

In fact, from the beginning, this order contained several goals, one of which was to send the Western Armenian refugees to the remote regions of Russia. That order was justified by the fact that the Western Armenians, having a desire to restore the Armenian kingdom, could spread similar ideas among other peoples of the Caucasus and cause serious trouble to the sovereignty.¹⁸ However, this was also decided by both powers, because Golitsyn knew for sure that the Ottoman government would not accept the Western Armenian refugees back, because its plan - Armenia without Armenians - had finally been realized. And in fact, by imposing Russian citizenship, they fulfilled the main goal of the Sultan and simultaneously carried out the policy of assimilation of Armenians.¹⁹ With this policy, during the Russo-Japanese war, the Tsarist government did not aim to strain its relations with the Ottoman Empire and in this way ensure border peace.

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¹⁷ NAA, fund 560, list 22, file 282, sheet 19.

¹⁸ NAA, fund 560, list 22, file 282, sheet 2.

¹⁹ Hnchak 1902, N 5, p. 38.

THE QUESTION OF THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA IN 1918-1920

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Abstract

In 1917-1918, the unpredictable course of events led to the re-establishment of the Armenian statehood, which forced the creation of its own armed forces as a guarantee of its existence, which made the young republic dependent on almost all powers in terms of arms acquisition, in particular after the October 1917 Russian coup. From the Entente countries, Britain and France, which became major actors in the Transcaucasian region and were guided by their hidden deep interests, the assistance to the Republic of Armenia was conditional, partial, inadequate and in many cases outdated. Allied military-political representations in Transcaucasia and Armenia gradually replaced the initially cautious approach with outspoken pro-Muslim practices, and the interests of Britain and other countries became more in tune with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Armenia appeared in the role of a beggar for help, including the delivery of weapons and ammunition, which was incomplete, low-quality, accidental, completely outdated.

Keywords: *Armenian Army, weapons, gun, Entente allies, Republic of Armenia, Great Britain, Baldwin Oliver, Cloud Stokes, Turkey, war, armed forces.*

In the spring of 1920, the British version of reorganizing and arming the Armenian army seemed to be on the agenda, and it seemed that it could become sort of a support for Armenia's many problems, and contribute to the delayed establishment of the army. At the same time Av. Aharonyan and Poghos Nubar added to the issue of problematic weapons and ammunition for the Armenian army, the issue of inviting military advisers, instructors and inspectors, the memorandum about which was sent through the RA Foreign Ministry to the conference of the allied powers in London in March 1920, but received their skeptical and evasive response, which was followed by the incomprehensible struggles especially in the British cabinet and in particular in the British Ministry of War (War Office), causing some disappointment in the Armenian party and military circles. The issues of financing the invitation of no less than 30-40 councilors went from one cabinet to another, and although J. Malcolm asked for an annual loan of 100,000 pounds for five years, Av. Aharonyan and P. Nubar expressed readiness to provide bonds, as in the case of providing American flour, but the case

took a diametrically different course. During that time, the discussions were artificially prolonged, the amount of the loan was increased to 500 000 pounds, which would make the work of British advisers possible, but the end of April came, and neither the treasury nor the war ministry moved even a bit, because sending them to the Republic of Armenia without their support was considered a dangerous occupation.

In regard to the "borrowing of independence" in July 1920, A.I. Khatisyan visits the British Foreign Ministry and again requests to send military as well as financial advisers, not denying the lack of funds on behalf of RA and assuring the request for the salary to be paid or to compensate the experts in a loan or other way. The British Army Council reacts, and Curzon finds further steps in that direction desirable, and the ice seems to be melting. Ideally, the advisors would be headed by a division general attached to the RA Military Ministry, assisted by three senior colonels, who would be responsible for infantry, cavalry and artillery training, and oversee artillery, supply and medical services. The reorganized 40,000-strong army was to consist of 30,000 infantrymen, who would be deployed in 3 military divisions, each consisting of 3 brigades (brigades), each of which in turn would consist of 3 battalions. 2,000 horsemen were to be divided into 5 regiments, each with 400 swordsmen, and the artillery force was to consist of 3,000 men, the other services - 5,000 men. Over a dozen British officers were to be attached to the infantry, 2 to the cavalry, 3 to the artillery, and 5 to the other services. According to that draft, the officers would not be limited to an advisory status, but would also have broad executive authority. Along with that, working conditions were defined: salary, business trips, customs duties, etc.¹ However, everything was predetermined from the beginning, and on August 26, the British Foreign Ministry only informed the Ministry of War about the negative decision. "taking into account the peace terms recently concluded between the Armenian government and the Soviet authorities of Russia, according to the news, His Excellency considers that the proposal to send British officers to the Armenian army should be suspended for the time being",² although the opposite issue was also raised - the sending of Armenian officers abroad. From this point of view, the meeting of the government on March 7, 1920, which, based on the report of the Military Minister, decided to send 8 officers abroad, opening a loan of about 6 million rubles for this purpose.³

As directly testified by R. Hovhannisyan, the delivery of 25,000 rifles and 40,000 uniforms by the British Ministry of Defense should have been made only after Av. Aharonyan and Poghos Nubar Pasha signed for the transportation costs and to deposit the treasury bonds required by the English Bank, i.e. to give them to the British.⁴ The Bolshevik riots of May jeopardized the implementation of that deal, and despite a number of expressions in the British cabinet regarding the fate of the Yerevan

¹ Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 415.

² Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 416.

³ Protocols of the sessions of the Government of the Republic of Armenia, 2014, 405-406.

⁴ Hovhannisyan 2007: 563.

government, in the end, unlike the British negative approach to the aircraft, Osborne even declared that British promises to Armenia should be honored, even if Armenia should adopt the Soviet regime.⁵

In London in April 1920, Colonel Cl. Stokes meets with Deputy Foreign Minister J. Tilly and continues to put pressure on the Foreign Office, receiving an offer from him on 3 April to return to Transcaucasia to replace the ailing Chief Commissioner J. Oliver Wardrop, but Stokes persisted, saying that the appointment would be of no use to him if only the Armenians were to receive arms. Colonel Cl. Stokes is worried by British Assistant Foreign Secretary John Anthony Cecil Tilly's explanations that whatever the actions of Great Britain are, a decision has already been made to provide Armenians with means for self-defense and that Armenia's interests should be paramount in terms of military supplies. Stokes counters this by arguing that such a policy would "throw Azerbaijan into the arms of the Turks" and, as the Azerbaijanis fear being left at the fragile mercy of the Armenians, it would lead to confrontation and a joint Turkish-Azerbaijani attack. Thus, supplying arms only to the Armenians would actually be a very disservice to them, not to mention the elimination of all British influence in Baku."⁶ This position of Stokes was enough that, after a conversation with Lord Curzon, it was decided to allocate certain quantities of weapons both in Azerbaijan and in Georgia. Stokes believed that Armenia, in the interests of survival, should make friends with Azerbaijan and Georgia, which should be equally armed, which allegedly could contribute to their rapprochement, which J. Milne was categorically against it, although in the end, after a struggle, there was even a proposal to put the control of the distribution of weapons and ammunition on the same Stokes and a number of other officers.⁷

Prime Minister Khatisyan's circular of March 8, 1920 (N 602) related to the principle regulation of military administration is one of the interesting steps on the way to establishing the army: "in non-coded telegrams, never touch on matters of war or national defense and security".⁸

Nevertheless, even the delivery of ammunition, weapons and clothing by the British was not done "cleanly", because as the subsequent processes showed, a significant part of the rifles supplied to the Armenian Army turned out to be unusable, to which the Government of the Republic of Armenia on May 19, 1920, listening to the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in English of a proposal to buy arms worth a million pounds, approved and authorized the Armenian delegation to sign the proposed terms. The Treasury allocated 75 percent of the market price for arms and ammunition, 5 percent for munitions, 50 percent for used clothing, 100 percent for new clothing, and 75 percent for harnesses and saddles.⁹

⁵ Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 424.

⁶ Hovhannisyan 2007: 545.

⁷ Hovhannisyan 2007: 545.

⁸ NAA, fund 210, inv. 1, list 7, sheet 34.

⁹ NAA, fund 199, inv. 1, list 146, sheet 96.

In the period from May 1 to October 20, 1920, 29,000 sets of clothing (coats, jackets, hats, shoes) and weapons (cartridges, belts, water bottles, etc.) were received from Great Britain and allocated to the Armenian army, as well as 25,000 units of firearm. A significant part of the rifles supplied to the Armenian army turned out to be unusable. Military historian Artsrun Hovhannisyan has a very subtle observation-clarification regarding the above: often the names of the weapons and other technical details were wrongly stated. According to A. Hovhannisyan's Canadian rifles mentioned above are sometimes mistakenly called "Bosh" in Armenian literature. The hand machine guns were of the American "Lewis" model. The combat qualities of Canadian rifles were considered by the Armenian military to be heavy, inconvenient and useless, and in fact they had problems that the Canadian troops had abandoned during the First World War. According to the author, "they had certain problems with reliability, and even English and Canadian sources admit it. The Armenian sources spoke negative about the combat qualities of Canadian rifles."¹⁰ In particular, such an opinion was voiced by S. Vratsyan, the famous Hajduk captain K. Sasuni, that those rifles were heavy, uncomfortable and unusable...the weapons actually had problems. During the First World War, they were happy to give them up.¹¹ However, later, military scientist Artsrun Hovhannisyan, in the second volume of his absolutely spectacular book "Art of War" published in 2020, contradicting himself a little, which sounds subjective, states: "However, we believe that our sources are also somewhat exaggerating everything and seem to be trying to find an additional excuse for further defeats. The author in Great Britain personally had the opportunity to interact with and even shoot this weapon and make sure that in fact the weapon is a very powerful and especially accurate rifle, it just has some problems with the bolt and required some skill to operate it."¹²

Observing this issue, it is difficult to agree with Y. Ter-Hakobyan that during the Turkish-Armenian war of 1920, the Armenian army was "well dressed and armed thanks to the British assistance... the Armenian soldier was no longer naked, but was clothed from head to toe like the British army",¹³ which is completely denied by the many facts brought by us, the fact that it was just outdated weaponry that the British did not need, that was lying in the British military reserves as a reserve product, etc.

On May 10, 1920, during the meeting of the United Delegation, Poghos Nubar Pasha again discussed the issues of army organization and recruitment, but many uncertainties were clearly seen. Italian Prime Minister Francesco Nitti¹⁴ speaking about the number and capacity of the Armenian army in connection with the report to General Gabriel Ghorghanyan, states that in terms of expectations, if they have ammunition,

¹⁰ Hovhannisyan 2020. 2: 170, 248-249.

¹¹ Vratsyan 1993: 508; Sasuni 1926: N 5, 80.

¹² Hovhannisyan 2020: 249.

¹³ Ter-Hakobyan 1921: 86.

¹⁴ Francesco Severio Nitti (1868-1953) - Nitti Francesco Severio Vincenzo de Paola, Italian politician and statesman, Prime Minister of Italy from June 23, 1919 to June 15, 1920.

they can increase the number of the army to 40 thousand, saying that the British have sent, and the Greek government sent a thousand rifles, but as it turned out later, a significant part of the British weapons was simply not suitable.¹⁵

The British and their war office shifted the center of gravity to the field of weapons and ammunition transfer to the armed forces of Armenia, and here they had uncertain approaches, moreover, they confused it with the processes of withdrawing their troops from Batumi and Transcaucasia. The British intention to subjugate the Armenian army had been a subject of controversy for months in the cabinets of the British Ministry of War, it was not aimed at strengthening the Armenian state, but was more aimed at blocking the South Caucasus from Bolshevik Russia, although there were deviations here as well. It was related to the long-range strategy of the British cabinet, ostensibly for the sake of securing appropriate commercial and economic interests with Soviet Russia for the beginning or, in the case of Turkey, for the life support of ambiguous intentions to have their interests in the Middle Eastern corridor in the event of new military and political developments, which were already noticeable and still uncertain at that time, but already from the starting points of the new strategy being outlined. Here it is appropriate to add that it was not at all a manifestation of a benevolent attitude on the part of the British, or at all it was not aimed at providing disinterested assistance to the "friendly" Armenian state in the creation of its armed forces. The May 1920 Bolshevik riots led to Allies' dissatisfaction with the RA government and seemed to jeopardize the implementation of the deal, and despite a number of statements in the British cabinet regarding the fate of the Yerevan government, in contrast to the British negative approach to aircraft, Osborne even stated that British promises to Armenia must be honored even if Armenia accepts a Soviet regime of government,¹⁶ while demanding severe punishment for the rioting Bolsheviks. In this regard, Art. One can hardly agree with a controversial statement of Hovhannisyan, which is also denied by the many archival and other facts cited above: "At first glance, especially in the case of the supply of aircraft, the unfriendliness of the British Ministry of Defense is obvious, they really did not want to provide aircraft, but on the other hand, it was a clear truth that such devices are very expensive and complicated, and their operation is problematic for the Armenian side. At the same time, it will be more useful to use that money for other weapons, which the Armenian army needed more... airplanes were considered a strategic, political weapon at that time. Providing such funds is quite problematic, and the British authorities were afraid that these funds would end up in the hands of the Bolsheviks."¹⁷ Such an interpretation is unfounded, especially since with the Sovietization of Armenia, those weapons would either fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks or their friendly and allied Turks, and how it happened.

¹⁵ Aharonyan 2011: 118.

¹⁶ Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 424.

¹⁷ Hovhannisyan 2020. 2: 250-251.

And yet the political calculations were in most cases based on the expected help from the Entente allies, on the British infantry stationed in the Transcaucasus, which was the only visible external support for all the Transcaucasian republics against renewed Turkish encroachments from the south and Russian infiltration from the north. In that sense, the announcement about the unexpected withdrawal of those troops from the Transcaucasus in August-September 1920 shocked the naive Caucasian peoples, because such disloyalty and deceit were not expected. After that, the promises of military assistance by the British and other allies also became inconsistent, particularly for the Republic of Armenia, which was already considered a doomed and hopeless state, and its people were even subject to the end, which no one really wanted to help, and the Italians also found it unprofitable to deal with Armenia. , which led to the disastrous and capitulation Turkish-Armenian war in the autumn of 1920, when Armenia fell from the supposed "heights" of Sevres and even at that moment, not sobering up from the Sevres scandal, begged for salvation from the allies, and in particular from Great Britain. The British rifle and trooper, as Oliver Baldwin, an officer of the Armenian yard, was keenly aware, turned out to be useless and useless, the Armenian army, which was praised externally by the allies, suffered a crushing defeat from the Turks, and the Armenian government, stubbornly clinging to the Treaty of Sèvres, in the infamous "negotiations" of Alexandropol by Kyazim Karabekir¹⁸ signed the unconditional capitulation of the Treaty of Sèvres under heavy bayonets, followed by the fall of the First Republic and the inevitable and forced Sovietization, which was almost repeated in the 2020 Artsakh War, when the joint Azerbaijani-Turkish forces capitulated the Third Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of Armenia, begging for help, was shamefully left blind. during the process, both by the OSCE Minsk Group and by the allied countries of Azerbaijan in that war, and especially by the Russian Federation, for which it seems that the Armenian people were not on the map and could not be seen.

Nevertheless, during that entire period, RA tried to solve the problems. still on March 20, 1920, the Council of Ministers heard the report of the Minister of Military Affairs on a number of issues, including 1) in terms of giving officers 1000 rubles each for summer uniforms, the question should be addressed to the Allied Powers and rejected, 2) first of all, meet the needs of the troops, leaving out 16,000 bushels of flour and 4,000 bushels of rice or semolina per month and decides to satisfy it, 3) To ask the Allied countries for linen, footwear and clothing for 30,000 people, as well as 30,000 Lebel rifles, 10 million Lebel bullets and tri-barreled rifles bullets, and finally goods-carrying, passenger-carrying and sanitary vehicles, on the basis of which it is decided to initiate a corresponding petition¹⁹.

¹⁸ Karabekir Kyazim Pasha - commander of the XV Army Corps stationed in Erzurum, general, professor, is the son of Mehmed Emin Pasha. He participated in two Balkan wars, was captured by the Bulgarian troops in 1913, became a major in 1914. At the beginning of the First World War, in 1915, he headed the XIV Army Corps, then became the Chief of Staff of the First Army and later the VI Army. On December 22, 1918, he was appointed commander of the First Caucasian Army Corps, and on March 2, 1919, he was appointed commander of the XV Army Corps.

¹⁹ NAA, fund 199, inv. 1, list 100, sheet 48.

It is interesting to note that Hamo Ohanjanyan's series of letters written to Al. Khatisyan from April 6 to April 22, 1920 are full of concerns about the procurement of weapons and ammunition, which is very necessary for Armenia, and in particular the financial difficulties related to their transportation from Batumi and Poti to Armenia, which were difficult to obtain, which even did not provide the Caucasian Bank, which seems to be favorable towards them, to which it was provided with salt for 80 rubles, which it resold for 380 rubles, in order to provide it to Armenia.

In addition to that, the fact that, as written in Ohanjanyan's April 6 letter addressed to Khatisyan, the Georgians themselves did nothing, but forced the Armenians to share with them, otherwise they caused delays in cargo transportation from Poti and other places. And the April 8 letter informs about the negotiations with Italy's representative M. Gabba and France's military representative Lt. Col. E. de Corbeil to exchange Armenian cotton and leather for bullets and "Lebelle", in response to which Corbeil promises that it is possible for the Constantinople letter addressed to General Anton Denikin and to be provided from the flows of the Salonika war cargo. Ohanjanyan also wrote that Italy's military and political representative Colonel M. Gabba assured that they rejected Azerbaijan, but according to their agency information, it was confirmed that this was not the case, because 40-50 wagons of military uniforms and other military property, and to some extent ammunition, which the Azerbaijanis received from the Italians, entered Azerbaijan from Poti.²⁰

In H. Ohanjanyan's letter to Al. Khatisyan dated April 14, 1920, it appeared that they went to negotiations with Georgia for arms, in which generals Kazbegi and H. Kishmishyan, noting that the Georgians were willing to allow the transportation of only "Lebel" rifles, 1000-1600 rounds, "Colt" machine guns, designed for three-line cartridges, instead asking for three-inch mountain cannon shells and howitzer shells, "Lewis" machine guns, which the Armenian side answers that they also need them.²¹

The situation was also complicated in the organization of the Armenian uprising; in particular the British government, the Ministry of War and its military-political representation in Transcaucasia caused great obstacles.

In the report submitted to the Council of Ministers on February 28, 1919, RA Military Minister Hovhannes Hakhverdyan, referring to the state of the Armenian Air Force, informed the government about the unfitness of the existing aviation equipment and only one operational aircraft, that the situation could be rectified after a few months, when it would be possible to destroy two collect another one from the existing planes. Hakhverdyan also informed that there were 5 pilots, 1 observer-pilot, 1 mechanic-instructor, 3 engine operators, 6 engine operator's assistants, 2 drivers, 2 driver's assistants, 10 foremen in the air force.

Based on all this, the RA military minister proposed to the government to form an aviation squadron and send a number of military personnel to France to learn aviation

²⁰ Balikyan 1996: 74.

²¹ Balikyan 1996: 81-82.

and acquire new equipment. General Hovh. Hakhverdyan informed that the study in France will last about 1-2 years, after which it would only be necessary to acquire modern air force equipment. General Hovhannes Hakhverdyan also noted in the report that according to Antoine Poidebar, the missionary, archaeologist, pilot, scout captain and then major representing France in Armenia, it was considered appropriate to use the airborne squadron mainly for the protection of the state border.

Based on all that, General Hovh Hakhverdyan asked the RA government to send 5 to 6 officers and 15 to 18 soldiers to France to study aviation, as well as to buy new planes and necessary equipment.²² According to the "Christian Armenia" encyclopedia, Captain Antoine Marie Joseph Poidebar, the military representative of France in the Republic of Armenia, was awarded the "St. Gregory the Illuminator" order established by the Catholicos of All Armenians Gevorg Y. Surenlyants probably before October 1, 1911.²³

In the Transcaucasus, relations with the British military-political mission are particularly bad, due to the disputes over the purchase of two attack and two reconnaissance planes with their own funds in February 1920 and the reluctance to conclude a deal with Armenia. In addition to this, the British military authorities in Transcaucasia and Armenia, in addition to emptying the Kars and arsenals of the republic, in the person of the military governor of Batumi, General William James Norman Cooke-Collis, unequivocally blocked the transfer of 2 airplanes to Armenia, which were bought by the RA leadership in Paris, fake arguing that it is necessary to find out the "origin" of these airplanes.²⁴

Finally, although British military personnel in Paris, including Brigadier General W. Beach assures the RA delegation that took part in the case that there is no objection against the operator, after completely unnecessary delays, the first two of the 12 airplanes bought in France are sent with Air Force captain pilot Arthur Ghulyan, but as soon as they arrive, they are confiscated by the British governor of Batumi on the way by Brigadier General William James Norman Cooke-Collis, who refuses to hand them over to the Armenian government, saying he is awaiting further instructions from his government.²⁵ It is then falsely argued that the French military authorities said that they had not been informed of such a deal, so that the British Ministry of War, which did not like the less lenient approach of the French, confirms Collis's right in the order of rejection.

On March 7, 1920, Cooke-Collis telegraphed to the War Office that the aircraft were apparently the first of 12 aircraft destined for Armenia, and that he was holding them pending instructions from London. However, on March 19, the British Army Council sent a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the decision of the Supreme

²² Hovhannisyan 2018.

²³ Ter-Minasyan 2004. N 2 (104), 79-105.

²⁴ Makhmuryan 2014: 211.

²⁵ Hovhannisyan 2007: 556. Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 417.

Council of Allies on arming Armenia did not say anything about the supply of aircraft, and the French military authorities did not provide any information about such a deal, so the Ministry of War approves the general governor's step.²⁶ The British also disliked the fact that the aircraft were purchased from France, a constant competitor, raising suspicions among them. The Armenians were forced to convince the British that there was no secret in buying 2 aircraft for their landlocked country, especially since the neighboring countries, Georgia and Azerbaijan, were already acquiring additional aircraft and munitions from the disintegrating White armies.

The issue of the release of the aircraft lasts for weeks, the Armenian government sends many petitions to Paris, London, Batumi and elsewhere to lift the British blockade, with which the French military mission in the Caucasus also appeals in connection with the confiscation of the aircraft intended for Armenia by James Cooke-Collis, but in vain.²⁷ Meanwhile, the RA Prime Minister and Foreign Minister tried to overcome the arbitrary obstacles created by the British military-political representation on the way to the creation of the Armenian Air Force.

In the letter of Foreign Minister Khatisyan dated March 31, 1920 (N 2035) addressed to M. Tumanyan, the advisor of the RA diplomatic representation in Georgia, it appeared that a telegram was received from Batumi that the military governor of Batumi, General Cooke-Collis, again refused them permission to transfer the two aircraft to Armenia. Captain Aniev, who was in Batumi, warned the Foreign Minister that it was necessary to take immediate steps, because the airplanes were damaged by the rain in the open air. Based on this, Al. Khatisyan asked M. Tumanyan to urgently contact the French and American military and political representations in Tiflis.²⁸ On April 6, 1920, in a letter addressed to Khatisyan, Ohanjanyan addresses the issue of airplanes and documents the mediation undertaken by French General Francis Depere to the British, adding that John Wardrop at the latter's insistence telegraphed Cooke-Collis, who almost agreed, but at the last minute, for some reason again hindered the request for airplanes available to Armenia.²⁹

When Commander Harry Luke, a member of the staff of High Commissioner Admiral John Michael de Robeck in Constantinople, arrives in Yerevan in April 1920, Prime Minister Khatisyan complains that the Allies expect the Armenians to defend themselves, but block 2 aircraft and a shipment of ammunition purchased from General Denikin, and at the same time they do nothing to limit the military build-up of neighboring states. Luke reports to his superiors that the 2-aircraft issue raises serious questions about the sincerity of the British government.

On April 7, 1920, the leaders of the Ramkavar club in Egypt, Levon Mkrtichyan and Vahan Malezyan, appealed to the High Commissioner of Great Britain, Field

²⁶ Hovhanisyan 2015. III: 417.

²⁷ NAA, fund 275, inv. 5, list 211, sheets 78-79, Hovhannisyan 2007: 55.

²⁸ NAA, fund 275, inv. 5, list 211, sheets 78-79.

²⁹ Balikyan 1996: 3.

Marshal Edmund Allenby in Cairo, that, being a moderate party and followers of the democratic principles of Poghos Nubar Pasha, and encouraged by L. George's speech in the House of Commons, they asked for a how many aircraft for the defense needs of the RA government, promising to cover the transportation costs with their own funds. Allenby also sent a message to London, informing him that in the Middle East, according to the Royal Air Force Commander R. Groves, there were more than 700 surplus aircraft with engines and another 150 without engines that could be put to work, also finding that some of the obsolete machines parked in Alexandria could be sold with permission from the Air Ministry.

Before that, James Malcolm, the latter's representative, intervened in the case on the instructions of Poghos Nubar, who raised the issue of the aircraft before the British Foreign Ministry, which later became the subject of a long dispute between the latter and the Ministry of War, expressing great confusion as to where the Armenians would get money from, how they would transport and by what means, raising the issue of pilot personnel or finding that this initiative should not be encouraged, because it is possible that these aircraft will fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks. Or the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 5, 1920, that some of the best pilots of the former Russian air force were Armenians, who could make the aircraft look like the device, if the materials and spare parts were provided, was not convincing, thinking that it would be logical to do everything possible to the friendly people in the Caucasus in order to support, directing the inquiry to the Army Council.³⁰ Even after Curzon's statement that the advantage of raising the morale and resistance of the Armenians was much greater than the danger of the aircraft falling into enemy hands, the matter did not move, and the process was not significantly affected by the call of the Foreign Office to the Army Council to reconsider the matter. There is a question of transferring the problem of surplus aircraft to the Liquidation Department, after which the War Office washes its hands, and War Office officials under Churchill continue to avoid unnecessary ships.

Finally, as if a solution was found, on July 18, 1920, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the High Commissioner E. Allenby that the proposed sale was approved subject to satisfactory bilateral arrangements being reached in discussions between the Armenian delegation in Egypt and the liquidation department's agent in Cairo. Seeking to help, Deputy Foreign Minister John Tilly tried to show the Ministry of Munitions Curzon's personal interest in the matter. In his opinion, the fact that the objective of the policy of His Majesty's Government should be to help the Republic of Armenia to reorganize its armed forces, His Excellency believed that the Republic of Armenia should be granted the easiest possible terms so that they could acquire the most suitable aircraft.³¹

In 1920, various specialists in the field of aeronautics came to RA from different countries. Armenia bought a certain number of airplanes from England, which, however,

³⁰ Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 420-421.

³¹ Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 422.

having appeared in Batumi since the beginning of 1920, were not transferred to Armenia due to the arbitrariness of Cooke-Collis. From May 1 to October 20, 1920, the specialists of the air force repaired 6 helicopters, some of which were unable to fly due to malfunctioning or missing propellers. The processes of establishment of the air force did not go smoothly and encountered many obstacles. In addition, the unfortunate accident at the airport, the victim of which was the pilot Mihran Khayeyan³² (may be Khayeyan as well). Ruben H. Babayan and Nikolai Khorozov were also among the first Armenian pilots. Two French planes were sent from Batumi to Armenia on June 16, 1920 by train, accompanied by Ghulyan-Rilsky.³³

But the British side took no steps. Artificial barriers, first by the War Office and then by the Ordnance Office, prevented any surplus aircraft from being sent to Armenia. Months passed and in August 1920, the situation in the Caucasus took such drastic turns that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was no longer willing to pursue the issue, and the surplus aircraft of the United Kingdom Air Force did not appear in the skies of Armenia.

In May 1920, Khatisyan again complained to Luke, the British High Commissioner in Transcaucasia at that time, that the blocking of the planes confirmed the claims of the Bolshevik rebels that Armenia had been abandoned by the Allied Powers, based on which Luke urged the Foreign Ministry to ensure the release of the planes, which was their real will have a moral effect and consequence far greater than its value or importance.³⁴ On May 15, 1920, Av. Aharonyan, reminding about many memorandums and other documents, saying that everything was in vain, reminding about the latter's promise to sell some weapons to Armenia, but the British authorities in Batumi blocked the delivery of 2 airplanes, which were bought and sent by the Armenian delegation, that the weapon promised in January has not moved yet. Concluding, Aharonyan reports that the time has come when the Armenian nation has the right to know whom to rely on for advice, help, protection, salvation and justice³⁵. And already on May 17, the British Foreign Ministry, reacting quickly, reports that they have already applied to the Ministry of War to release the aircraft, which remains suspended in the air, and despite this assurance, the Ministry of War has been resorting to dodge ships for about 2 weeks, giving ambiguous instructions to General Milne, if the latter deems it expedient for the Armenians to receive them, then he is authorized to carry out their release. On May 26, Curzon formally complained to the Army Council about the delays, and only in June did General Cooke-Collis finally lift the artificial blockade he had set up, the main recipient of which was the British War Office, which did not want to strengthen the Republic of Armenia – the enemy of their friends Azerbaijan and Georgia.

³² Matteosian 1998: 135.

³³ Hovhannisyan 2018.

³⁴ Hovhannisyan 2015.III: 418.

³⁵ Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 418.

Armenia had a reason to question the willingness and orientation of the Allies to help Armenia, it was manifested many times in the attitude of W. Churchill, who headed the War Ministry, again in another matter related to aircraft, in connection with several hundred British surplus aircraft in Alexandria, a batch of which the rich Armenian community in Egypt had expressed a desire to buy and send to Armenia. The Armenian community of Egypt was dominated by the influence of the Constituent Ramkavar Party and the Armenian Benevolent General Union, which regardless of its disagreements with the federal government, made certain changes in its strategy, expressing a desire to participate in the demonstration of aid to Armenia, especially since both organizations were closely related to Poghos Nubar and with the Armenian National Delegation. The ringleaders hoped that Great Britain would provide the Little Alliance, Armenia, with spare aircraft and parts for free or at nominal prices, and that their party would pay the £100-£200 required to transport each aircraft from Alexandria to Batumi.³⁶

On May 24, 1920, on the instructions of the British government H. Luke, gave authorized by the RA government Av. Aharonyan and Poghos Nubar Pasha 1 million 60000 pounds, according to which the military loan was granted for one year at 5% rate, but with the condition that the weapon should be purchased from the British government.³⁷ However, the peculiarity of the situation was that the Menshevik Georgian government, taking advantage of the opportunity, demanded that the RA government leave 23 percent of the weapons and ammunition to be delivered through its territory to Georgia, which was ratified by the relevant agreement signed between the two neighboring states on May 26, 1920.³⁸

Certain hopes were attached to Lloyd George's government, which on May 25, 1920 made a speech in the House of Commons, addressing the problems of Armenia, expressing hope that Armenians will defend their independence; they are exceptionally intelligent people, that they can easily organize an army of 40,000, that they will be happy. to assist them in arming their army, which will increase their self-respect, and when they have done this, the Turk will have too much respect, not for them, but for himself, to make any other attempt at massacres in that direction.³⁹

Those processes were ambiguous. On June 5, 1920, US Ambassador Davis sent a top-secret coded telegram to Washington, in which he was informed that the British government had released a military loan of 1 million pounds to Armenia, for which 25,000 rifles, 50 million bullets, 400 machine guns were to be purchased, 12 field cannons, 32 mountain cannons and military equipment for 40 thousand soldiers, adding that France also intends to deliver Russian rifles to Armenia through the transit routes of Georgia.⁴⁰ And already on June 10, 1920, in the report sent to the Ministry of Foreign

³⁶ Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 419.

³⁷ Galoyan 1999: 187.

³⁸ Galoyan 1999: 188.

³⁹ Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 420.

⁴⁰ Galoyan 1999: 188.

Affairs, Luke informs about the additional document he received from the RA government in confirmation of the 1 million 60 thousand pounds sterling previously given to Aharonyan and Poghos Nubar Pasha to pay for the weapons supplied to Armenia. After submitting detailed invoices to Paris on July 26, 1920, Poghos Nubar and Av. Aharonyan handed over thirteen bonds worth £829,634 9 shillings and 3 pence⁴¹ to Ambassador Lord Edward Derby, which after signing could be used at the discretion of the Government of the Republic of Armenia. Ammunition was unloaded at Poti, and six months after the Supreme Council of Allied Powers agreed to send arms to Armenia, the first shipment of supplies crossed the Sanahin border crossing by train in the Neutral Zone and entered RA territory.⁴²

And thus, a part of the purchased weapons was sent to Armenia in the summer of 1920, but as it turns out from a document of the British Ministry of Defense dated August 10, 2,500 rifles were left to Georgia, and on September 10, during the meeting with Luke, Al. Khatisyan makes a statement that the RA government has already received all the military equipment, and is also informed about additional supplies from France and Greece.⁴³

Therefore, we cannot agree with the conclusion of Artsrun Hovhannisyan, according to which significant military assistance was provided by Great Britain and the supply of weapons was free,⁴⁴ especially since it arrived too late, and as we said above, that only a third of the weapons and munitions arrived, in a certain sense, unsuitable. One more adjustment we should note. Partially agreeing with Artsrun Hovhannisyan with the conclusion that Great Britain played a major role in the reunification of Kars, Nakhichevan, as well as other areas with the Republic of Armenia, that British troops worked hand in hand with Armenian forces to liberate those areas,⁴⁵ which is a very controversial process. has had and not always favorable for the Armenian side, let's take the forcible withdrawal of weapons and artillery from Kars by the British, which militarily significantly weakened and weakened the Armenian army at the time of the fall of Kars and ultimately contributed to the independence of the Republic of Armenia in the Turkish-Armenian war of the autumn of 1920. Therefore, Artsrun Hovhannisyan's in his one-sided approach to the issue of Armenian-British cooperation, the author ignored the extremely tough, openly anti-Armenian position of the British on the issue of Artsakh-Syunik, as a result of which it was annexed to Azerbaijan.⁴⁶

The arrival of British weapons in Armenia was a disappointment, especially since it was preceded by a cold-hearted British bureaucracy and a heartless attitude towards a small ally and the poor quality of the ammunition transferred. It was well noticed by A.

⁴¹ Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 427.

⁴² Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 429.

⁴³ Galoyan 1999: 187.

⁴⁴ Hovhannisyan 2019: 28.

⁴⁵ Hovhannisyan 2019: 28.

⁴⁶ Virabyan 2022. N 1 (15): 39-73.

Babalyan: "...two years of pleas and appeals were in vain, we received clothing and ammunition for 40,000 soldiers from the British government...".⁴⁷ It is sad that even during the disastrous days of the Turkish-Armenian war, the issues of the quality of arms and ammunition received from England were disputed, when the matter was already over.

In addition, on September 29, the Turks were already in Sarighamish, and on October 30 in Kars, which was left almost defenseless and had resisted to the extent possible, the capture of which, which at that time contained enormous reserves of munitions of the Russian imperial army, was absolutely impossible for the Kemalites. It was a great success.⁴⁸ According to K. Ataturk, there was almost no resistance,⁴⁹ and the Turks, encouraged by this, continued the attack, which forced Yerevan to appeal for help to the Entente again on October 30 and to the United States on November 5, but without results, and already on November 6, the Turks took Alexandropol.⁵⁰

None of the great powers wanted to interfere with Bachman, Armenia was left to the whims of fate.⁵¹ The Turkish attack was accompanied by slaughter, and in fact it became the most brutal ethnic cleansing in the territory controlled by them, S. Vratsyan's government was forced to record the desperate situation of Armenia, which was followed by the infamous Treaty of Alexandropol, Armenia capitulated, which was also the first international document of the Ankara government.

It turned out that the arms and ammunitions and munitions bought from Great Britain with treasury bonds deposited in the Bank of England (gold as a collateral) arrived late and had quality problems, one third was pocketed by Georgia, almost one third fell into the hands of the Turks, as well as At one time, with the permission of the British officers, the reserves of the extremely rich weapons and ammunition of the Russian Imperial Army in Erzurum were looted. And the rest of the weapons most likely fell into the hands of Bolshevik Russia, which hastily Sovietized Armenia, which directed it against neighboring Georgia, forcibly Sovietizing it, and what's more, a part was again allocated to friendly Turkey, which directed it against Armenia and Greece, crushing them with which the odyssey of this problem had its sad end.

The letter of Prime Minister Ohanjanyan dated August 28, 1920 to the head of the RA delegation in Paris Aharonyan regarding the quality of the rifles given by the British shortly before the Turkish attack is noteworthy. Ohanjanyan reported in it that the Armenian army is spread over a distance of 750 km, without weapons and ammunition, and the "Ross" rifles sent by the British are in bad condition and most of them are not usable, and the Greeks gave the Armenians 4,000 rifles of a type completely unknown to the Armenian army. half of the 3,800 rifles sent by the French had to be given to the

⁴⁷ Babalian 1997: 182.

⁴⁸ Mukhanov 2009: 187.

⁴⁹ Mustafa Kemal 1934. 3: 118-119.

⁵⁰ Elchibekyan 1957: 172-173.

⁵¹ Mukhanov 2019: 142.

Georgians as the price of transportation and transit, and more than half of those that arrived in Armenia need repair, the 5 million bullets received from General Wrangel and other sources are rusted and may not work, adding to that the important fact that Armenia's transportation system is paralyzed, as trains and cars do not move due to lack of fuel, there are few horses left, and very little bread for the soldiers.⁵²

This is also confirmed by the report of Lieutenant Charles Valadier, a member of the French military mission in Yerevan, on October 15, 1920, who inspected the Kars front on October 9, according to which "some of the battalions of the Armenian army operating on the Kars front had already received new arrivals." "Ross" rifles, which, despite their weight and stiffness, gave almost all infantrymen the opportunity to have a weapon, the Armenian army is trained to use "Lebel" rifles, and the recently received "Ross" rifles from Britain cause problems, it is a great inconvenience for people with a weapon arming, the mode of use of which is unknown. For this reason, "Ross" rifles were mainly distributed only to reserve and irregular forces."⁵³

In this regard, much can be understood by referring to the letter of November 8, 1920, sent by Av. Aharonyan from Paris to the RA Foreign Minister, about discussing the issue of Armenia at the general meeting of the League of Nations to be held in Geneva, about buying weapons: "Mr. Minister, I consider it my duty to address the following points in your letter dated September 27.

1. It was very surprising to us, especially to General Korkanian, that you consider the guns from England unusable because of their weight. However, it is surprising that the British conducted the entire war with this exact system.

2. We were saddened that the rifles we received from France were so few - only 1,900, and that too in need of repair, but we were informed by Marshal Foch's headquarters that a large number of rifles with bullets were sent to us from Bulgaria. At the same time, these days we will buy 5000 Lebel rifles. General Korkanian has written to the military minister in details about this all".⁵⁴

However, the facts showed that the British rifles were very different from the Mosins, Lebels and other types of weapons used in the Armenian army. Harcourt, a representative of the semi-private foundation for Armenian refugees in Yerevan (Lord Mayor's Fund), later accused the British Ministry of War of dumping useless rifles on Armenians and then charging a fee for them: "At the same time, the usefulness of the cargo was greatly diminished by the fact that the Ministry of War took the opportunity to attach to the Armenians Canadian Ross rifles, which had already been tested in France and proved useless for general service.

The rifle is heavy, difficult to use, and the mechanism is complicated, it is easily out of order, and there are no shoulder straps to carry them with the rifles sent to Armenia. In addition, this rifle also has an almost useless bayonet, which on all

⁵² Hovhannisyan 2016. IV: 235.

⁵³ Hovhannisyan 2016. IV: 282.

⁵⁴ NAA, fund 200, inv. 2, list 158, sheets 1-2.

examples of rifles tested in Erivan did not mount well and wobbled. It can hardly be expected that a gun that was useless for the military exercises of the British troops could be useful to the illiterate peasants of Armenia".⁵⁵

One of the reasons contributing to the defeat of the Armenian troops in the 1920 Turkish-Armenian war was considered to be that the allied states of the Entente supported their younger ally to the extent that their interests dictated, in many cases supplying the Armenian army with old-fashioned, obsolete weapons and outdated, worn-out weapons lying in British army depots in Egypt and elsewhere, rusting, in many cases without the necessary spare parts, which they sold if they wished or expediently or at half price to backward nations or to belligerents in countries mired in civil strife. And it was, of course, an accepted practice, by which it was possible to keep a monopoly on renewable weapons in one's own hands, and to have the ability to impose on the other, which such traditionally strong countries as Great Britain, which held almost until the end of the 19th century, could afford the privilege of machine production, thanks to which it was able to maintain a high reputation as a manufacturer of high-quality weapons. And the Republic of Armenia was in the background and was forced to be satisfied with secondary weapons of others, there was simply no alternative, and there could not be, because relying on illusions has devastating consequences.

This is evidenced by L. George's coalition government minister who served in the Armenian army in 1920, British politician, member of the British Labor Party, journalist, son of three-time Great Britain Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, Labor MP and campaign participant journalist and cousin of the famous writer Regard Kipling at Khatisyan's invitation.⁵⁶ In 1920, he met Alexander Khatisyan, the second Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, in Cairo, with whose agreement he volunteered to serve in the army of the First Republic of Armenia as an officer in the uniform of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia in 1920-1921. Oliver Baldwin arrived in Yerevan in the autumn of 1920 as an artillery instructor and enthusiastically began training the artillery units of the Armenian Army. RA Minister of Defense Ruben Ter-Minasyan awarded him the military rank of lieutenant colonel and assigned him to train the military regiment of the Yerevan region.

O. Baldwin wrote in his memoirs how insignificant British aid to the Armenian army was, that the rifles sent to Armenia were of the old "Ross" system, which "were almost guaranteed to explode after the first shot, the military boots sent were too small for an

⁵⁵ Hovhannisyan 2015. III: 429.

⁵⁶ Baldwin Ridsdale Baldwin (Oliver Ridsdale Baldwin -1.03.1899-10.08.1958) - during the First World War, in 1916, he joined the Irish Guards and served in France. However, just weeks later, the Republic of Armenia was subjected to Kemal-Bolshevik aggression, occupied and divided by these two internationally unrecognized groups. On December 9, 1920, the Bolsheviks arrested and imprisoned Baldwin, and he was later imprisoned by the Turks for another five months. He was only able to be freed after the February 1921 uprising. Oliver Baldwin was also a member of the ARF until the end of his life and had a party membership card. – "Yaraj", 1928, May 30, daily newspaper, Hovhannisyan 2011. N 39 (904) 06.10.2011 - 12.10.2011, Baldwin 1933: 23. <https://meroughin.am/2022/04/16>, <https://bit.ly/48E70cP> (date of viewing: 1.08.2022)

Armenian peasant and for long legs, therefore useless",⁵⁷ and besides, according to Sepuh, the soldiers were generally untrained and did not know how to use the newly received rifles: "That rifle was new to me, and I have been fighting for so many years".⁵⁸ As for London, referring to the Canadian historian Margret McMillan, it is noted that Great Britain, recognizing the Transcaucasian republics, supplied them with low-quality weapons "The Ministry of Defense took advantage of the situation, in order to get rid of the surplus of Canadian rifles of the "Ross" company, which were distinguished by their failures even in non-combat conditions".⁵⁹

Reflecting on those bitter days, Oliver Baldwin clearly wrote: "Kars fell on the morning of October 30, and the entire Armenian army returned irregularly to Alexandropol.

The true story of treachery, incompetence and idleness that enabled the capture of this hitherto impregnable fortress may never be revealed, but the fact remains that under the cover of a dense fog the Turks passed all the distant fortifications and entered the city before the High Command awoke. It is remembered that during the irregular battles that followed, only two fortresses opened fire. Panic then gripped the garrison and a headlong flight began, leaving the Turks with thousands of prisoners, including the entire general command staff and half-destroyed arsenal.

Individual stories of heroism will always be remembered, but the appalling negligence of General Bek Pirumov and his staff is inexcusable. It was obvious that Bolshevik propaganda was undermining the morale of the troops, but what made the general's aide refuse to wake his superior when the police commissar rushed to give the first news of the Turkish advance will probably never be known. The sight of the Turks advancing with their flags led the Armenians to believe that the Russians were with the enemy, for in the hazy dawn the Turkish flag resembled the Soviet flag.

As the army fled, many of the civilian population were unable to reach Alexandropol. Their murdered bodies were seen in the waters of the river a few weeks later and were photographed by several members of the American Middle East Relief Fund.⁶⁰

Vratsyan claims the same, saying that some of the Armenian troops were hastily armed with "Ross" rifles, newly received from England, which they were not used to.

The organ of the Social-Democratic Hunchakyan party "Young Armenia" also has an interesting observation about these rifles: "instead of helping our soldiers, the Canadian weapons delivered by the British at the last moment greatly harmed them. They were not only the worst type, outdated, most of them were useless weapons", whose columnist S. Snaryan adds to what has been said that there was also a lack of

⁵⁷ Baldwin 1933: 200.

⁵⁸ Baldwin 2022: 36; "Latest news", February 8, 1921.

⁵⁹ Mustafaev 2018: 223. MacMillan 2003: 443.

⁶⁰ Baldwin 1924: 24-25.

weapons, cannons, machine guns and helicopters, adding to that the difficulties of communication and especially food.⁶¹

However, it is important to record the fact that a significant part of the weapons purchased from Great Britain never reached Armenia, because at the end of the 1920s, when the Soviet government was already established, a large batch of these weapons fell into the hands of the Kemalist troops, which was reported by Great Britain. A senior official R. Mac Donnell, in a writing dated February 24, 1920, stated that the weapons delivered to Armenia increased the military reserves of the Turkish nationalists by almost 100 percent, for which General K. Karabekir sent a telegram of thanks to the British military authorities.⁶² Everything has been said, to which nothing needs to be added, especially the higher authorities of the Allies in the Transcaucasian region and in Constantinople, who were supposed to control the disarmament of Turkey, which had lost the war, practically did not pull a finger, and with their responsible position contributed not only to the arming of the Kemal troops, but also to the largest arsenals. - the looting and looting of arms and ammunition from Erzurum, Kars and other places, including facilitating the placing of British-French arms in the hands of the Turks, who used them against the Armenians and Greeks.

Naturally, not by chance, we have already said about this, all of this was also contributed to by the extremely delayed, last-minute delivery of British weapons to Armenia, that too during the difficult days of the war, when there was no chance of reorganization, and that too half-finished, often of poor quality, without spare parts, and one-third of which only belatedly reached the Armenians, one-third to the Georgians and the same amount to the Kemalists. Obstacles were raised in the issue of military advice and instructors of the Armenian army, the delivery of aircraft and many other issues. In the end, the plans of the British regarding their satellites in the Transcaucasus were not fully implemented, and if they were implemented, then at the cost of the sacrifice of the Transcaucasian peoples, and mainly the Armenians, and the British hand never reached Baku's black gold, the oil. Of course, V. Lenin's call for anti-colonial revolution to the Muslim world, which effectively put pressure on England, which they quickly grasped and went on the defensive, changing the political course and everyone got what they got in the international game. Russia regained imperial control in Transcaucasia and a commercial contract with England, M. Kemal, through Lausanne, his Turkish republic and became the "father of civilization". It turned out that M. Kemal and V. Lenin were wise enough not to cross the line drawn by their adversary, England, that is, to enter into a struggle for border territories.

According to that, the representative of Great Britain in the Republic of Armenia Cl. Stokes offered his services to the British Cabinet to contact Kemal through agents in Tiflis. And based on this, Colonel Stokes even cynically and without any conscience advised the British General Staff in Constantinople to suspend the preparations for

⁶¹ "Young Armenia", 1921, N 9.

⁶² Galoyan 1999: 188.

loading the weapons and ammunition for the Republic of Armenia on ships, because the Armenians have already reached an agreement on peace with the Turks, offering to hand over these weapons and ammunition to Georgia, which, in his opinion, is fully prepared to fight to the end against both the Bolsheviks and the Turks. Based on this, the British Ministry of War quickly made a decision to prevent the delivery of additional weapons to Armenia, and on November 13, the Admiralty issued an order not to supply any more fuel to Armenia.⁶³

Of course, it was not only Great Britain that acted like this and gave priority to its interests, so was the newly created Soviet Russia, armed with outwardly extremely impressive slogans of self-determination of nations, whose leader Lenin became the strategic ally and spiritual father of the Muslim world. This is very vividly demonstrated by the complex games of Lenin's delegate Boris Legrand in Yerevan in October 1920 and the conditions proposed by him. British colonel Claude Stokes, who advised the RA government to sharply reject the conditions of the Soviet side, is also surprised by the dexterity of Boris Legrand, of Jewish origin, who, resorting to double standards, seems to offer acceptable conditions for Armenia on the one hand, but with a sharp rejection in the matter of weapons in response.⁶⁴

Various authors and military specialists have repeatedly recorded that, naturally, in such a situation, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia could not effectively organize the defense of the country, in connection with which the military and political representative of Britain in Transcaucasia, Lieutenant Colonel Stokes, stated, that they refrained from supplying arms and munitions to the three republics, which would have enabled them to face various threats, including the Bolshevik threat, but at the same time giving importance to securing their economic and political interests in the Transcaucasian region.

It can be said that all this had a negative impact on the security of RA, and practically all the tactics contributed to the capitulation defeat in the 1920 war against Turkey, after which the First Republic, abandoned by the allies and deceived by the request for arms and ammunition support, ceased to be able to defend itself and was practically destroyed. In this regard, the solemn speech of Oliver Baldwin, the son of British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin (in French) at the event organized in Paris on May 28, 1928 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Republic of Armenia, which was also attended by the former leaders of Georgia and Azerbaijan: "Hello, (in Armenian). When I heard Armenian folk songs a while ago, I thought I was in Armenia. Nakhijevan, Dilijan and all of Armenia, which I love so much, appeared in my mind. I served in the Armenian army, saw the Bolshevik occupation on December 2, 1920, and then saw the uprising on February 18 with sympathy.

Today, on this solemn occasion, the main thing that I have to tell you is as follows: never trust the words and promises of big states. England completely forgot Armenia.

⁶³ Hovhannisyan 2007: 787.

⁶⁴ Zohrabyan 1997: 229.

England forgot even her former warriors. They will die of a hunger and no one cares about them and today they are victims. Trust only in your strength, your children and your grandchildren. They are the only ones who will put the tricolor flag on Ararat again. I believe that the day is not far when chaos will erupt again in the Middle East. But, Armenians, if at that time you trust only in your own strength, then I believe that you can succeed...”⁶⁵

However, both Great Britain and the British military-political mission in Armenia, including the son of the British Prime Minister who appeared there at that historical moment, Oliver Baldwin, who served as a general in the Armenian army, the outwardly beautiful, but highly controversial and obscure, complicated character still needs to be revealed and appreciated. From the valuable memoirs left by him, it is evident not only that the activities of the British officer in search of adventure are outlined in both positive and dark aspects, the charge meter of his devotion to Armenia, but also that he was often not always impartial in his actions and evaluations of events and cases, as a witness of his. Much of the information reported and presented was simply inaccurate, misrepresented and suffering from one-sidedness. O. Baldwin's memoir also documents his lack of firmness towards Armenia, for example, documenting the extreme measures he takes to save his own skin to escape the oppressive reality of Armenia, citing the Bolshevik slaughter as the reason, until then thinking that he had fallen into heaven and that the trials were only they are for the Armenian people, not for himself, whom Khatisyan invited to serve in the establishment of the RA armed forces, he also came, but he failed the first great tests and looked for ways to leave that unfortunate country at any cost, as did the American colonel Haskell, who gained a reputation of a philanthropist as others.

And so, according to his own testimony, on the way to escape from Armenia, he quickly gets rid of the badge awarded to him by the RA government, which he allegedly cherished from the beginning. "The only thing I decided to get rid of was my Armenian military badge, which I immediately threw on the Russian stove, where it rang carelessly." Colonel Oliver Baldwin's Caucasian silver belt, which was exchanged for one Turkish pound, with which he bought cottage cheese, suffered the same fate.⁶⁶

There was no longer the fairyland full of adventures of the adventurous Baldwin, and what was the need for the badge of the country's army, which the British naively and blindly relied on, which he carelessly and easily gave up, which was not an act worthy of a true officer. However, the reality was this, just as it was a harsh and obvious reality of Great Britain's abandonment of its small and helpless ally, Armenia - Artsakh, Syunik-Zangezur and Nakhichevan were donated to neighboring Azerbaijan by the efforts of the British and other European countries, and finally, with their help, Armenia appeared under Bolshevik Russia and Kemalism. In the clutches of Turkey, and in the greatest BOOK of humanity, the promised land remembered in the Bible was ravaged

⁶⁵ "Yaraj", 1928, May 30.

⁶⁶ Baldwin Oliver 2022, 220, 297.

and mutilated, and the Armenian people were subjected to extermination and terrible, inhuman torture and violence, genocide.

It is obvious that for both the British government and Oliver Baldwin, the Armenian activities were only an episode, touching, even if observable. But only in August 1920, in the city of Alexandria, Egypt, from a chance meeting with the first Prime Minister of RA Al. Khatisyan and an invitation to serve in the Armenian army, a small touch of adventure was born, which was based on purely self-centered adventurous impulses, the reflection of which was the memoir left by Oliver Baldwin.

And thus, the unpredictable development of the events of 1917-1918 led to the recreation of the Armenian statehood, which forced the creation of its own armed forces as a guarantee of its existence, which in terms of the acquisition of weapons and ammunition put the young republic in a state of dependence on almost all powers, and in particular after the October 1917 Russian coup. The Entente countries, Great Britain and France, which became the main players in the Transcaucasian region, were guided by their hidden deep interests, as a result of which the support provided to the Republic of Armenia was conditional, incomplete, inadequate and, in many cases, out of date. The military and political representative of Great Britain in the Republic of Armenia, colonel Claude Stokes, advised amicably to come to terms with the idea of defeat, just as today Russia advises to go to find the edges of peace and friendship with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, which still continue the bloody feasts, provocations and the encroachments against the Armenian people and the Armenian statehood.

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POLITOLOGY

PROBLEMS OF LAW AND MORALITY IN THE PUBLIC SPEECH OF MATTEOS MAMURYAN

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Abstract

The presence of legal culture in the Western Armenian reality has been significantly contributed to by the political publicity reflected in Armenian periodicals and journals. In this respect, the “Eastern Press”¹ published in Smyrna at the end of the 19th century, whose editor Matteos Mamuryan repeatedly commented on legal and political issues, was of exceptional importance. Its concept is based on the ideas of protection of historical and political rights of the nation, national-civilizational identity and freedom of self-government. Analyzing the legal philosophical ideas of American and Western European thinkers, Mamuryan reinterpreted them in the context of national existence and compared them with the legal views of Armenian authors.

Keywords: *“Eastern Press”, Matteos Mamuryan, law, morality, legal understanding, freedom, duty*

According to Mamuryan, the starting point of a person’s legal understanding is the knowledge of the law and the origins of the law, its types and nature, the relationship between law and morality, which determine the nature, trends and purpose of the law-making processes. In his regard, the concept of “law” cannot be defined unequivocally, which he clarifies in the preface of one of Harutyun Svachyan’s articles: “It is true, the so-called Law is a very big, complicated problem, many points of which will still remain unsolved, so that, having various appearances with successive human progress, it has not yet received a certain limit.”² Definitions of law change due to the problems of time, way of philosophizing, understanding of law and methods of its application.

Based on the natural law theories by H. Thiersle and H. Ahrens, Mamuryan divides law into two types: “natural or initial, derivative or conditional”.³ Natural rights “...simply arise from the nature of man, they are equal to him and from the noun.” They

¹ “Eastern Press” is a literary-political periodical published in Smyrna in 1871-1909 and 1919-1922. The periodical reflected the national political goals of the Western Armenians, the constitutional ideas, and discussed the tyrannical policy of the Ottoman government towards the subject nations.

² Svadjian 1881: 137.

³ Mamuryan 1875: 121.

are implemented regardless of human will or any condition, because they are absolute: "Every person will enjoy this right regarding his life, freedom, dignity, etc."⁴ Mamuryan argues the special ontological status of natural law, that is, its immutability and independence from human consciousness and legal assertions.

Conventional or derivative right does not derive from human nature, but "...will be obtained by human activity: the condition that gives birth to them can only be brought about by an individual or several other individuals." However, conventional (positive) law is the result of formalization and implementation of natural law. As an example, Mamuryan mentions the ownership right, which "...can arise from an activity, that is, from pre-occupation (première occupation) or work. but according to him, it is a preliminary right that will arise from human personality, although the ways of obtaining it are different and different⁵. In the same way, he affirms that the rights defined by treaties and covenants must derive from the principles of natural law, otherwise they will not be considered valid. At the same time, he emphasizes that "Conventions can never produce or delete a natural right", as well as oblige any people to renounce their nationality or religion. Therefore, "Man's natural rights are inalienable, being part of human nature, they are beyond the capricious will and moods of individuals, cannot be destroyed by the deed of my person and not by his sin..."⁶

Mamuryan distinguishes five natural rights: individual (person) freedom, dignity, right of religion and worship, freedom of education and right of possession. According to him, "there is no other natural right that is not included in one of these rights."⁷

A. Considering autonomy as the primary right of a person, "being the master of one's own person", the thinker affirms: "Individual freedom is a right in itself, and a condition for the use of other rights." Without this freedom, other rights lose meaning. By alienating individual freedom, a person is deprived of all abilities, so personal freedom is a "multifaceted right" that manifests itself in different ways. For example, the laws of all countries confirm the inviolability of the right to human life and set the maximum penalty for murder, but "... death is a punishment, and it cannot define the right of an individual, just as the prison sentence does not define the individual freedom itself, and the penalty of a fine does not define the right of criminality." In other words, although criminal punishments are defined in accordance with the committed crimes, they cannot generally alienate the right to human freedom. With this point of view, Mamuryan also condemns suicide, because the right to life "...requires that a person does not harm his life, as well as the government protects him from hostile attacks and natural dangers."⁸ Therefore, one of the main functions of the state is the fight against epidemics, drought, hunger and extreme poverty.

⁴ Mamuryan 1875: 122.

⁵ Mamuryan 1875: 122.

⁶ Mamuryan 1875: 122.

⁷ Mamuryan 1875: 123.

⁸ Mamuryan 1875: 123.

According to Mamuryan, the legal protection of natural rights is in accordance with the civilizational development of peoples, and "...will be more or less secure depending on the location and situation".⁹ In civilized states, human natural rights and freedoms are constitutionally protected as the supreme task of the state. In backward countries, this problem is neglected because "Man is lawless by nature, in his savage state... he has neither moral nor intellectual lawfulness".¹⁰ Examining the problem in the context of morality, the thinker affirms that humanity is still guided not by moral standards, but by political and economic interests: "And to say... that man has been civilized, law-abiding, justice-loving, and truthful, to claim that the feelings of humanity, selflessness... will develop so much in our social situation that... every law, prison, prison, and that is corporal punishment... brotherhood, There will be harmony in actions, movements, ideas, it is just a daydream."¹¹ Therefore, the "civilized" world also has a problem of self-education and reform.

B. Mamuryan interprets dignity as the "essential value of a person's personality", the source of which is reason. He distinguishes a person's honor from worthiness, because honor does not come from a person's nature, but "...it will arise from his moral course, his deeds, and the consciousness confirms it".¹² A person has honor in front of God, people and his conscience, his decency is verified by his actions, therefore, individual honor, family honor, national honor, political and public officials' honor are manifested in society in different ways. According to Mamuryan, a dignified attitude is the guarantee of the permanence of both individuals and nations. Dignity also implies the fulfillment of obligations towards one's own person, family, nation and state: "the superiority, moral courage and solidarity of a nation will be found in the consciousness of defeat, which will resist all worldly bad tendencies and calamities."¹³ It is the duty of the people to develop their moral virtues and "...shine among humanity as a dutiful and right-loving person".

C. Mamuryan examines the freedom of religion and worship as natural right on different levels. Freedom of worship has always been valued as an inalienable right, however, according to the thinker, "...freedom of worship is not simply the ability to worship God."¹⁴ People perceive religion through doctrine, advice and ritual, therefore, it is necessary to respect the rituals of different peoples, the unique ways and right to believe and interpret the faith, the national way of counseling. Religious tolerance and freedom of religion are interrelated. For free-thinking peoples, the spiritual identity of each nation is legitimate. Meanwhile, in dictatorial countries, religious conversion becomes state coercion: "...when a ruler or a government arms against a religion he

⁹ Mamuryan 1875: 123.

¹⁰ Mamuryan 1897: 405.

¹¹ Mamuryan 1897: 407.

¹² Mamuryan 1875: 124.

¹³ Mamuryan 1892: 483.

¹⁴ Mamuryan 1875: 124.

doesn't like and bans its worship ceremonies, he will commit violence by only allowing his religion to be practiced.” Therefore, if in the status of subjection, Mamuryan declares the principle of the unity of the nation and the church in the internal relations, then in the relations with the occupying state, he emphasizes the sovereignty of the Armenian Church, the spiritual independence of the nation and the freedom of religion: “the right is freedom and freedom consists of the mutual independence of the Church and the State.”¹⁵

D. Freedom of thought, speech and education. Mamuryan argues these natural rights as mutually binding values. According to him, “in society, a person has the right and freedom to express his ideas in print, orally, and explain them in any other way through publication.”¹⁶ Publicism is a manifestation of the degree of civilization of nations, a wide arena for self-expression and discussion of national issues. Emphasizing the necessity of the press in the national-political life, the public speaker urges: “he who has a voice should draw a bright line on national rights, keep his mind awake and shine his pen as a sword of justice and revenge against the known and unknown enemy of our home and church.”¹⁷ At the same time, he criticizes the Ottoman laws restricting the freedom of the press, noting that “it is still impossible to reach an unlimited freedom of writing in this friendly building situation and mutually contradictory and unnatural laws.”¹⁸

According to Mamuryan, free thinking is both a right and an art, which is the result of developing mental abilities. But not everyone is given the ability to think independently and express their ideas. Moreover, free thinking, which is not easy even under conditions of independence, is impossible under dictatorship. Therefore, “a true contemplative is a super-selective and influential factor in the expansion of enlightenment.”¹⁹ In this context, the thinker also analyzes the role of public opinion as a manifestation of national thinking and freedom of speech. In his view, the public opinion of a polite people with a free press is a moral law that affects not only individuals but also governments. Public opinion “...is the sign of public interest, it is the conscience and judgment of a people that will issue a verdict on this or that issue. This judgment is as straight and legal as the conscience and mind are enlightened and just”.²⁰

So, public opinion is given meaning by the people's judgment and fairness. According to Mamuryan, the conditions for the formation of public opinion are legal freedom and moral virtues, recognition of rights and responsibilities, awareness and participation in national affairs.

¹⁵ Mamuryan 1875: 125.

¹⁶ Mamuryan 1875: 125.

¹⁷ Mamuryan 1966a: 458.

¹⁸ Mamuryan 1966a: 457.

¹⁹ Mamuryan 1896: 386.

²⁰ Mamuryan 1874: 346.

E. The right to own the country's natural raw materials and resources. According to Mamuryan's conviction, "the freedom to allocate objects to the outside world as one's material life will come from the constitution of a person." A person is obliged to satisfy his physical needs, therefore, appropriating the natural resources of the country "...is an undeniable, more noble right than all other rights". He distinguishes between the rights of appropriation and ownership, considering the first a natural right and the second a positive-conditional right: "...material acquisition is one of the manifestations of freedom, ownership is one of its results."²¹ Moreover, the work through which a person possesses natural things also derives from the right to appropriate.

Mamuryan's concept of natural law is completed with an original interpretation of the problem of freedom. According to him, the source of freedom is the will and reason given by God. Proclaiming the slogan "freedom is the thoughtful mind...the honest leader",²² he conditions freedom with human reasoning. By developing his intelligence, a person directs his will towards the good, the true and the beautiful, and "...the person is truly free whose mental and moral abilities have this triple goal and the desire to achieve the same goal more and more every day".²³ But the thinker also values the free activity of a person not only for his own personality, but also and especially for the realization of national interests and goals. For this purpose, he classifies the following manifestations of freedom in society:

- individual freedom, which "...will belong to the individual by himself",
- family freedom - to protect the "home-sanctuary" from external threats,
- civil liberty - to protect the rights of citizens,²⁴
- political freedom, which "encompasses and protects the members of the nation, and is the shield of all other freedoms",²⁵
- religious freedom, by which the relationship between the human conscience and God, the right to exist of different religions,
- epistemic freedom to guarantee human cognitive activity and the development of its results in society,
- economic freedom, which makes it possible to ensure the well-being of the people. It is divided into different branches: freedom of labor, exchange and trade.

Mamuryan interprets the right to property in a broad sense, in the context of individual freedom. According to him, "freedom will begin with the person of a person, a person is born a soldier, and his... first soldiership is his person, his abilities, for one

²¹ Mamuryan 1875: 126.

²² Mamuryan 1966b: 78.

²³ Mamuryan 1871a: 478.

²⁴ Mamuryan 1871a: 479.

²⁵ Mamuryan 1871a: 480.

thing, his noble nature, which cannot give, entrust, sell, kill without the heavenly and committing a heinous crime against natural law. A person's ego is not transportable.”²⁶

From the starting point of the right of personality, he justifies the right to appropriate the results of work. If a person is the free owner of his personality according to nature, then he is also obliged to “... be the sovereign owner of all the things that will come from his personality, which will form part of his being thanks to his work”.²⁷ The source of property rights is not positive law, but natural law. Positive law only regulates, preserves property by legal means. Freedom of work implies the right of a person to freely choose any field of activity. According to him, “work is a necessary law of nature, an essential condition of existence”,²⁸ and the freedom of work is a gender concept that includes all other economic freedoms, being their sum.

Mamuryan discusses the issue of preserving natural rights. Although man is endowed with natural freedoms, he is “... by nature friendly as well... and due to mutual relations, he is subject to political laws.”²⁹ These laws establish rights and responsibilities that are balanced by oversight by government agencies. Sometimes governments conduct policies to limit or prohibit individual, social, political, economic activities and rights of a person, suppressing the vital forces of the people. As a result of all this, according to Mamuryan, the state “...will open a door to destructive sects and will indirectly contribute to the cause of socialism and communism”.³⁰ He condemns Socialism and Communism as “bad” theories based on wrong principles, which restrict the free thought of a person, instill anger and hatred in the people, often becoming the cause of an unnecessary revolution.

Mamuryan interprets the meaning of the concepts of law, legality, responsibility, and the relationship between rights and obligations. According to the source of origin, he divides laws into eternal-natural and positive (conditional) types: “there are ... laws that are based on eternal principles and when they are changed, they will lose their force and purpose.” Such are the moral laws, some traditional ecclesiastical rights, which have historically turned into laws and are valued as immutable rules protecting the church's autonomy.

Positive laws “...being based on temporary *pito* and *paraga*, will be considered changeable and... perfected”.³¹ They derive from natural laws and do not lose their essential principles during formalization, which, of course, are sometimes violated in the legislative process, international covenants and political agreements. According to Mamuryan's description, “legislative texts... are a bulwark against the laws of nature.”³² One of the consequences of civilization is that man has deviated from the laws of justice

²⁶ Mamuryan 1871a: 480.

²⁷ Mamuryan 1871a: 481.

²⁸ Mamuryan 1871b: 525.

²⁹ Mamuryan 1871a: 482.

³⁰ Mamuryan 1871a: 483. Also, Mamuryan 1867: 654.

³¹ Mamuryan 1885: 57.

³² Mamuryan 1966a: 459.

and nature. Therefore, "...the person himself should be the one who gives the law to the people, and the people should be the ones who establish the law that made the person".³³

Mamuryan argues that the basis of law-making is the customary law of specific peoples, historically tested traditions and national spirit. This point of view of him and other Armenian thinkers (Marcos Aghabekyan, Grigor Otyan, Malakia Ormanyan and others) is consistent with the ideas of Edmund Burke, Charles-Louis Montesquieu, Benjamin Constant and the historical school of law. F. C. Savigny, the representative of the mentioned school, affirms that the whole history of law is the slow, smooth unfolding of that substance which originally exists in the bowels of the popular spirit. Therefore, "every law will be shaped by customs and popular belief, and then it will be approved by legislation, always by bringing the influence of the king, and not especially by the power of the legislator."³⁴

Examining the above-mentioned issue on a historical-comparative basis, Mamuryan confirms that God has determined by his will that "...people choose their friendship with the strength and courage of their nature".³⁵ For example, Americans have adopted Biblical laws as the constitutional basis of their state; England prefers its traditional laws. From the beginning, the Armenian people were governed by unwritten laws and did not need "mixed" laws at all, because "natural memorized rules, which were part of the habit, were enough". Moreover, if all the foreign and controversial laws are dissolved, the Armenian nation will be able to govern itself according to traditional regulations. According to the thinker, if some nations need special positive laws, "for us, our have become a habit and their spirit has been imprinted on our good."³⁶ He concludes that ancient nations cannot be ascribed the characteristics and standards that characterize modern states.

Comparing the legislative principles of theocratic, monarchical and constitutional states, Mamuryan considers only the constitutional government as acceptable, which "...based on justice and morality, will establish the law of mutual relations of every person, and therefore of national rights and obligations",³⁷ while monarchical governments publish laws: to assert their autonomy and violence.

Keeping in mind the changeability of positive laws, he does not consider even constitutional laws to be perfect, which must be improved in accordance with the requirements of the time. And the thinker determines the enforceability of the laws, first of all, by obeying the laws published by the legislators: "when the custodian of the law will throw down the law by which he will govern, how will the governed take it up and keep it?"³⁸

³³ Mamuryan 1966a: 492.

³⁴ Legal Conference 1896: 515.

³⁵ Mamuryan 1966b: 73.

³⁶ Mamuryan 1966b: 112.

³⁷ Mamuryan 1966a: 491-492.

³⁸ Mamuryan 1873a: 356-357.

Thus, Mamuryan proclaims the equality of all before the law as a fundamental principle of the legal state. At the same time, he rejects both the absolutization of the idea of equality and extreme inequality: "if the doctrine of cosmic equality cannot be theoretically put into practice, it is also unforgivable to use natural inequalities as a pretext to create artificial ones."³⁹ According to him, in the legislative and diplomatic processes it is especially important to take into consideration the differences in the nature and national characteristics of various peoples, which are the reason for the natural inequality.

In Mamuryan's concept, the coverage of the problem of the ratio of right and debt is remarkable. He defines these concepts in their interdependence and interdependence: "the law is a practical duty, and its foundation is in the moral. Law is the ability by which a person performs what he is ordered to do by defeating all the obstacles that someone else's will will rise against him to prevent the performance of his duty."⁴⁰

The source of duty is conscience, through which a person distinguishes between good and evil. Reason judges the morality of human actions as well as the truth of ideas. According to Mamuryan, the society where an individual can freely do good and exercise his rights is legal. Duty is the measure of right, and where there is no duty; there is no right to exercise. With that, "...the idea of debt will determine the extent of the right, and just debt will only determine the limit of all rights (emphasis is by L. S.)."⁴¹

Responsibilities are multifaceted, the primary of which is to maintain independence. On the moral level, Mamuryan emphasizes dedication, benevolence, patriotism, etc. He justifies that the understanding of morals is not unambiguous among all peoples: "morality in practice...changes according to the place, the climate, the good, and the demands of religious and political institutions."⁴² Moral fundamental rules determine family, public, national relations and the extent of responsibility.

However, according to Mamuryan, people still do not have enough humanity, altruism, as well as understanding of spiritual values as a basis for regulating relations. His big dream was that people "...morality should be based on such broad and universally useful principles that each nation, each society, each tribe, each family would not be seen as isolated individuals... with their narrow moral ideas... but a harmonious body."⁴³ It is obvious that the thinker is referring to a new type of humanistic civilization, which will be a self-governing universal society with a common spiritual and moral value system formed on the basis of the national originality of the peoples.

³⁹ Mamuryan 1893: 32.

⁴⁰ Mamuryan 1873b: 165.

⁴¹ Mamuryan 1873b: 166.

⁴² Mamuryan 1895: 193.

⁴³ Mamuryan 1895: 196.

SUMMARY

The article analyzes the legal and political concept of Matteos Mamuryan, the core of which is the issue of the relationship between law and morality. According to the thinker, the basis of law-making is the customary law of specific peoples, historically tested traditions and national spirit. The essential human rights are self-determination, freedom of thought, dignity, freedom of religion, education, work and the rights to own its results. It is argued that the legal protection of natural rights is in accordance with the civilizational development of peoples.

However, examining the problem in the context of humanism and morality, Mamuryan confirms that humanity is still guided not by moral standards, but by political and economic interests. Therefore, not only the dictatorial states, but also the “civilized” world has a problem of self-education and reform.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE QUESTION OF RE- DEMARCATION OF THE SOVIET-TURKISH BORDER IN USSR-TURKEY RELATIONS (1960s-1970s)

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Abstract

After the Second World War, the possibility of changing the situation of the Soviet-Turkish borders set by the Treaty of Kars at any moment created an atmosphere of fear in Turkey. Although later, in 1953, the USSR officially renounced the territorial claims presented to Turkey in 1945, the issue of reaffirmation of the Kars Treaty has become one of the most sensitive topics for the Turkish side in Soviet-Turkish relations. After the restoration of independence of Armenia in 1991, it was moved to the agenda of Armenian-Turkish relations, so the study of the topic has relevance in our days.

Keywords: *USSR, Soviet Armenia, Turkey, Treaty of Kars, Soviet-Turkish relations, Soviet-Turkish border, territorial integrity*

The tension observed in the Turkish-American relations related to the Cyprus Question in the 1960s creates favorable conditions for the warming of ties between the USSR and Turkey. The high-level mutual visits that took place during the 1960s and 1970s, during which the main goal of official Ankara was to receive assurances from Moscow regarding the preservation of Turkey's territorial integrity, create a neighborly atmosphere. In other words, Turkey wanted to reaffirm the Soviet-Turkish border set by the 1921 Kars Treaty. This was due to the fact that after the Second World War, the Soviet Union, taking into consideration Turkey's open support to Nazi Germany, as well as referring to the need to restore historical justice, presented Turkey with territorial claims related to the regime of the Black Sea Straits and the return of two provinces captured from Soviet Armenia - Kars and Ardahan. In other words, in 1945 the USSR officially questioned the legitimacy of the Kars Treaty. And although the Western powers later defended Turkey's territorial integrity, and the USSR officially renounced its territorial claims after J. Stalin's death, the issue of the legitimacy of the Kars Treaty is still a topic of the official Ankara agenda. The Turkish authorities needed assurances from the USSR that the issue would not be raised again. Anxiety increased even more when events dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide were being held in Diaspora and Soviet Armenia. They found a wide response in the Turkish press, which forced the President of Turkey, Cemal Gürsel, to issue a statement on April 23, 1965 saying: "The press should not deepen and present the Armenian problems as they are. They should know that there were no Armenian massacres...".¹ Despite such

¹ Koldaş 2003: 81.

statements, the Turkish leadership did not hide their concern and at every meeting demanded the Soviet authorities to reaffirm the Soviet-Turkish border set by the Kars Treaty.

Especially during the visit of A. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to Turkey on December 26, 1966, Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel did not miss a single moment and demanded from the USSR that the relations between the two countries develop “on the basis of mutual respect for territorial integrity”.²

However, in September 1967, Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel makes an official visit to Moscow and Baku, receiving a warm welcome³. In the subsequent years, 1968-1969, high-level Soviet-Turkish meetings, the issue of re-demarcating the border was mainly discussed. The Turkish press also published different news on those occasions, which strained the situation in the country. For example, on June 29, 1969, the “Sabah” newspaper wrote, “The Russians have started demanding territories from the Turks. At the beginning of 1969, the first attempt was made. Declaring that the Turkish-Russian border is not justly adjusted, therefore a new border should be re-demarcated.”⁴

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey officially denies these rumors, stating that they do not correspond to reality. The statement says: “Russia has not applied to Turkey with the demand of correcting the borders. The Turkish and Russian border was adjusted by the 1921 Moscow and Kars treaties.”⁵ Meanwhile, on September 23, 1965, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR sent a letter to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow in order to conduct redemarcation, to which the official Ankara gave a positive response.

Turkey proposed to start the negotiations in Ankara and discuss the following issues:

1. drawing up maps of border regions,
2. determination of the period for starting technical works,
3. determination of the composition of the group performing technical works,
4. determination of the border sections that should be reflected on the border maps,
5. aerial photography, determination of technical parts,
6. after the preparation of border maps, the formation of a special commission, which was supposed to deal with the settlement of border disputes.⁶

As a result, on February 28, 1967 and July 5, 1968, new agreements were signed between the two countries regarding the correction of the borders, according to which the parties will adjust the Soviet-Turkish border, pointing out that the geographical maps

² Altan 1986: 129.

³ Milliyet 30. 09. 1967: 1.

⁴ Sabah 29. VII.1969.

⁵ Oran 2012: 779.

⁶ NAA, fund 326, inv. 5, list 3, sheets 67-68.

prepared in 1926 do not correspond to the technical conditions of those days.⁷ For this purpose, a Turkish-Soviet mixed commission was formed, which started its activities in Moscow on January 20, 1969, and continued in Ankara from February 24 to March 28, 1970. The composition of the delegations was the same. During the negotiations, the parties agree and sign a number of documents on re-demarcation.⁸

It should be noted that during the period of 1969-1970, rumors were spread in Yerevan that together with the Armenian demands, the issue of Ani is again on the agenda. Soviet Armenia offered to replace the Turkish-populated region of Amasia of the Armenian SSR with Ani, which was rejected by the Turkish authorities.⁹ I would like to mention that this information has not been confirmed, but the reality is that the issue of demand has always been on the agenda of the Armenian society.

The ongoing processes had a historical-political context. As we mentioned above, the Turkish side needed the USSR to once again recognize the Kars Treaty and declare the inviolability of the Soviet-Turkish border. Both the Turkish authorities and the press have repeatedly spoken about it, stating that the wording about the inviolability of the borders in official documents is “the expectation of the Turkish society”.¹⁰ One of the vivid evidences of this is the joint statement published at the end of the visit of Turkish President Cevdet Suna to Moscow in 1969, that both sides accept the border set by the Kars Treaty.¹¹ And on August 17, 1972, official Moscow and Ankara issued another statement, where they characterized the Soviet-Turkish state border as a “line of peace and cooperation”.¹²

In addition, analyzing the article published by Ilter Türkmen, the Turkish ambassador to the USSR, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey and Soviet-Turkish relations, we arrive to the conclusion that the latter puts forward a number of principles, thus trying to flatter the Soviet authorities and achieve to sign a new political document in favor of Turkey. Those principles are:

1. Soviet-Turkish relations are accelerating on the basis of the traditions of peace, friendship and good fellowship established by Lenin and Atatürk.
2. Mutual respect for each other's dominance and equality.
3. Respect for territorial integrity and integrity of borders.
4. The two states do not interfere in each other's internal affairs.
5. Respect for the signed pacts.¹³

As a result, Turkey achieves its goal and on December 29, 1973, the solemn ceremony of signing the documents on the re-demarcating of the Soviet-Turkish border and the adoption of the joint Communiqué took place in the building of the Ministry of

⁷ NAA, fund 326, inv. 5, list 3, sheets 69-70.

⁸ Hasratyan, Moiseev 1981: 213.

⁹ Msrlean 2012: 178.

¹⁰ Altan 1986: 131.

¹¹ Harris 1972: 31.

¹² Özbay 2013: 17.

¹³ Türkmen 1973: 2.

Foreign Affairs of Turkey in Ankara. In the Soviet-Turkish joint document, at the request of the Turkish side and owing to persistent efforts, the following phrases were included: "By re-demarcating the Soviet-Turkish border determined by the Moscow and Kars Treaties of 1921", "the Parties are convinced that the Protocols of historical significance signed as a result of this joint work, documenting the purpose of maintaining peace and security between the Republic of Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics fix the invariable limits ...".¹⁴

The signed documents entered into force on April 29, 1975 after the exchange of documents in Moscow.¹⁵

At the same time, we should note that in the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet-Turkish relations entered an active phase of economic cooperation. In 1972, the Turkish press was discussing the five big Soviet-Turkish economic programs, the 363 million dollars loan and the fact that in recent years the turnover between the two countries has reached 90 million dollars.¹⁶ In 1974 the USSR, unlike the USA, refrained from condemning Turkey's military action in Cyprus, which contributed to further deepening of Soviet-Turkish economic relations. In addition to economic ties, attempts were made to accelerate political relations. In 1978, two documents were signed between the two countries.¹⁷ The first was related to the development of Soviet-Turkish economic relations, the second was a political agreement on the principles of joint cooperation and neighborliness.

Despite all this, the relations between the two countries in the 1970s, as a rule, did not get warmer, but more resembled a temporary truce, which sooner or later had to turn into a phase of tough confrontation. Turkey not only remained loyal to its Western allies, but also performed quite well the role of defender of NATO's southeastern front. Moreover, by resorting to propaganda and diplomatic games, it assured the world community that its eastern borders were threatened and received material and military support from the West in defense of those borders. Although starting in 1963, the USSR maintained and affirmed through agreements, communiques and other official documents that the Soviet Union respected the territorial integrity of Turkey and had no territorial ambitions.

The Turkish side achieved its goal: the issue became a topic of discussion in the Western press, showing the world community that its country's borders were threatened. On October 13, 1977, the British periodical "The Times" published an article entitled "Forgotten land that could become NATO's battlefield." The latter addressed the concerns related to the eastern border of Turkey. The columnist writes that the NATO command in Izmir is of the opinion that after the Second World War, the USSR failed to implement the plans related to its southern borders. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war,

¹⁴ Harutyunyan 2008: 179.

¹⁵ Koritsky 2005: 66.

¹⁶ Hale 2003: 236.

¹⁷ Hale 2003: 247.

such a situation was created in the Middle East that it was not excluded that the Soviet army will make an unexpected attack on the eastern borders of Turkey.¹⁸

Thus, border concerns did not become an obstacle for the development of relations with the USSR for Turkey. Turkey's foreign policy of this period can be described as purely realistic, because Turkey was able to solve a number of problems in this way: Cyprus, border, economic, etc., while remaining loyal to its Western allies. As for the issue of the Kars Treaty, after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the independence of the Republic of Armenia, a part of the USSR-Turkey border established by that document also became de jure the Armenian-Turkish border. Both the legal-political and technical issues related to that border continued in a new way, which collided with Armenia-Turkey interstate issues and acquired a different character.

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¹⁸ Hale 2003: 247.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

STATE IN THE REALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ACTS

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Abstract

The article examines and assesses a) the departure of the UN Sixth Committee from the initial installation of the introduction of the Nuremberg principles into the system of international law *jus cogens*; b) the flawedness of the exclusion of the very possibility of qualifying the behavior of the state as internationally criminal is substantiated; c) the methodologically vulnerable aspects of the study of the topic of state responsibility for international criminal acts in the International Law Commission are indicated and possible ways of overcoming them are proposed.

Keywords: *Nuremberg principles, weak transitivity of guilt in a collectively committed crime, denazification of Germany as punishment of the Third Reich, motives for not including the Nuremberg principles in the rank of jus cogens, gaps in international criminal law, non-state subjects of an internationally criminal act, subject - bearer of internationally significant force*

Preamble to the topic

After the introduction on October 1, 1946 in Nuremberg by the International Military Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the IMT or Tribunal) of the verdict against the leaders of Nazi Germany and the adoption in 1948¹ of the UN Convention for the Prevention of Genocide, crimes against humanity are not only not excluded from international practice, but its regular repetition becomes political in everyday life. At the same time, the subjects of such crimes are often covered by gaps in international law, including in terms of the institution of the state as a possible actor in such an act. In theory, the issue rests not only on unresolved problems of international law, but also political motives, often hidden in the interlines of documents and discourses on the topic. Decades of discussion of the problem within the framework of the International Law Commission (ILC)² in 1996 culminated in the completion of a document entitled "Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind" (UN doc. A / 51/10).³

¹ https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/genocide.shtml

² The UN ILC is directly accountable to the Legal Committee established on December 11, 1946 (also known as the Sixth Committee) of the GA. In our text, for the name "International Law Commission", the forms "ILC" and "Commission" will also be used in parallel.

³ If it is not detrimental to the text, the title of the document will be used briefly as Code.

But he also left open the question of the criminal responsibility of states, which is key to international justice. The Commission decided to confine itself to considering questions of individual responsibility for internationally criminal acts. In 2001, the United Nations Legal Affairs Committee (Sixth Committee), under whose auspices the ILC operates, of the UN General Assembly (hereinafter referred to as the UNGA or GA) presented a new report on the topic (A/56/589 and Corr.1). On its basis, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 56/83⁴ "Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts." The document "Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts" presented by the ILC, on which the UN General Assembly resolution 56/83 was adopted, differs significantly from the draft Code, in the development of which it was developed.

We set the task to trace the transformation of the idea of the place of the state in the realities of international criminal offenses and to identify the vulnerable aspects of the study of the topic in the ILC. The article is aimed at revealing the gaps in international law that serve as a legal shelter for states that commit grave crimes against humanity. The Republic of Azerbaijan (AR) acts in this way, which implements the policy of genocide of the Armenians of Transcaucasia, initiated by the Turks and the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic (ADR), and then continued by the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (AzSSR).

The subject of a genocidal act

In a general setting, consideration of the topic in theory faces the problem of sharing guilt between the participants in a collectively committed serious crime (subjects under jurisdiction can be individuals, spontaneous or organized crowds, gangs, organizations, and finally, the state). The complexity of the issue in legal phenomenology is manifested in determining the measure of responsibility on the one hand of the state and its subordinate institutions and, on the other hand, of individuals - ideologists, organizers, performers and accomplices - in a jointly committed act. The interval of divergent opinions about the division of guilt between them is wide, at the beginning and at the end of which there are the names of two Romans - the ancient Roman historian of the first century Cornelius Tacitus, who is sure that "where there are many guilty, no one should be punished", and the Italian lawyer of the XIX century Pellegrino Rossi, who considered such reasoning stupid, since the perpetrators go unpunished. The complexity of the task is already evident in domestic legal proceedings, which may also have jurisdiction over crimes that pose a danger to peace and general security. National justice will not face serious conflicts if the state itself, which was in charge of the case, is not complicit in the crime. But if it is itself the subject of criminal liability in the case, then the imperative of global security indicates the inevitability of the establishment of a supranational institution of justice endowed with appropriate powers.

⁴ https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/russian/ilc_2001_v1.pdf

The very idea of such an institution arose historically relatively recently, when the danger of the *jus ad bellum* principle characteristic of the classical system of international relations became obvious. The first in 1872, after the end of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, it was voiced by the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gustave Moynier, who proposed by a special Convention to establish an International Judicial Body to punish the perpetrators who violated the Geneva Convention of 1864 on improving the situation of the sick and wounded in the warring armies. Then this idea was outlined by the Russian international lawyer Count L. A. Komarovsky, who expressed the conviction that the foundation of such a court was only a matter of time and that not only theoretical, but "much more practical needs will force states to embark on the path of its implementation".⁵ The next step in the development of the idea of a supranational institution of justice was the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted in 1907, which provided for the liability of the signatory states to pay damages in the event of their violation of the conditions of land war established by the Convention.

Vespasian Pella's doctrinal breakthrough

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the idea of legal responsibility of states, as they say, was in the air. It is well known that a breakthrough in this topic was made in 1925 by Romanian international lawyer Vespasian Pella. In his work "Collective Responsibility of States and Criminal Law of the Future" he defended the idea of the legality and necessity of criminal responsibility of states. The theorist of international law saw the realization of this idea as a decisive condition for the preservation of international peace and stability. Pella believed that the state as a subject of law is endowed with an objective, independent of the will of people, with a substantive status not inherent in ordinary organizations (legal persons), the establishment and dissolution of which are made by the subjective will of people. "The fact," writes Pella, "that not only the leaders alone, but also the State as a whole can be the object of criminal measures, can contribute to the development of resistance to criminals who are at the head of the State".⁶ But this breakthrough realized by Pella was destined to remain only a breakthrough in theory. Smoldering in the ontological depths of the phenomenon of international crime, the contradiction between law and politics, power and justice, truth and expediency made itself felt.

The State as a subject of international crime at the Nuremberg Trials

The horrors experienced by mankind during the Second World War seemed to lead to the realization of the need to urgently introduce into the system of international criminal jurisdiction the doctrinal ideas of V. Pella. The victorious powers did not

⁵ Kamarovsky 1881.

⁶ Pella 1957: 83.

question that it was Nazi Germany⁷ that was the main culprit of the crimes committed against humanity. But at the Nuremberg Trial (1945-1946), which was historically the most appropriate moment for the development of this fundamental topic for international justice, they actually bypassed it in terms of theory, despite the fact that in the sections of the verdict relating to its justification, the accusations addressed to the Third Reich prevail. This is what the defendants' lawyers referred to in their argument that the subject of international law can only be a State and not a natural person, which, as they submitted, cannot be such in principle. The defendant for the crimes committed against humanity during the war, as the defense argued, can only be the Third Reich. The Tribunal sets out their argument as follows: "It was argued that international law only dealt with the acts of sovereign States without imposing punishment on individuals, and it was further argued that where the act in question was an act committed by a State, the persons who practically carried it out were not personally responsible, but stood protected by the doctrine of State sovereignty".⁸ To this the Tribunal responded unequivocally: "In the Tribunal's view, both these contentions must be rejected".⁹ The Tribunal referred "to the long-recognized fact" that "international law imposes duties and responsibilities on individuals in the same way as on States".¹⁰

In support of this thesis, the prosecutors cite Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provided for "the establishment of a special tribunal, composed of representatives of the five Allied and Associated Powers at war with Germany during the First World War, to prosecute the former Emperor of Germany 'for gross violations in the field of international morality and for failure to respect the sanctity of treaties'".¹¹ Chief Justice Stone's statement in *Ex Parte Quirin* (1942, 317 U.S.) is also mentioned: "From its inception, this court has applied the laws of warfare as including that part of international law which prescribes the status, rights and duties of enemy states as well as their individual agents in time of war".¹² A generalization of the key legal theory issue addressed in this proceeding is provided by the theoretical argument that "crimes against international law are committed by human beings, not by abstract categories, and it is only by punishing the individuals who commit such crimes that the established rules of international law can be respected".¹³

The pathos of the Prosecutors' arguments prior to the above specification of the punishable subject essentially boiled down to the substantiation of the following two

⁷ In the course of the process, the idea of the criminal responsibility of states was raised more than once.

⁸ Nuremberg Trials: 608-609.

<http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/np8/index.html>

⁹ The Tribunal, in part of its justification, also refers to its Charter adopted in London, which states that "individuals have international obligations that exceed the national duty of obedience imposed by an individual state." See Nuremberg Trials: 608-609.

¹⁰ Nuremberg Trials: 608-609.

¹¹ Nuremberg Trials: 608.

¹² Nuremberg Trials: 609.

¹³ Nuremberg Trials: 608-609.

theses: a) the responsibility of the State as a possible subject of a crime against humanity is generally recognized; b) the consideration of the acts of individuals as potential subjects of an international crime needs legal justification. It is in the context of substantiating the second thesis, "to show that individuals may also be punished for violations of international law", that the Tribunal turned to relevant case law, taking the first thesis for granted. But the Tribunal's generalization that "only (emphasis added - A.M.) by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be respected" suggests a devaluation of the role of the State in criminal acts. But the Tribunal's verdict suggests otherwise. The fact is that the formula "only by punishing individuals" in the verdict did not at all exempt from punishment the subjects referred to in the verdict as "abstract categories".

The punishment of the Third Reich as a state

The Allied Powers were unanimous in the denazification of Germany, which included the liquidation of all Nazi organizations. It is true that the Tribunal did not limit itself to this and brought charges against civil servants and members of organizations found criminal by the Tribunal. In the latter case, the Tribunal referred to Article 10(d) of its Statute, where the list of acts considered as a crime includes membership in "certain categories of criminal groups or organizations whose criminal nature will be recognized by the International Military Tribunal".¹⁴

Article 10(d) of the IMT Statute in fact provides a definite solution to the division of the guilt of the participants in a collective crime according to the principle of descent from the organization to its structural components, in this case from the State to institutions and then from them to individuals. But the principle of descent has not been interpreted as an attitude of strict transitivity or equal apportionment of common guilt among persons who were members of the criminal organization recognized by the Tribunal. Moreover, the principle of descent "according to apportionment of guilt" did not imply total liability of individuals. The involvement of a member of the accused organization in acts of a criminal nature, in the formation and promotion of the ideology of the organization could not be disregarded, which explains the absence of a universal formula for the apportionment of guilt from the organization to its members.¹⁵ The Tribunal adhered to the position of individualization of the degree of guilt up to the

¹⁴ Verdict of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Trials: 638).

<http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/np8/index.html>

¹⁵ It was with this in mind that on March 5, 1946, law number 104 was issued in the American zone. According to the law, persons over 18 years of age were required to fill out and submit to the judicial authorities a questionnaire containing 131 questions, on the basis of which they were assigned to one of five categories of Nazi involvement. The law provided for penalties of varying severity, ranging from imprisonment to prohibition from holding statutory office. The questionnaire identified the following categories of persons: (1) major perpetrators; (2) guilty (activists, militarists, profiteers); (3) minor perpetrators; (4) fellow travelers; and (5) innocent. A similar process was set in motion in the Soviet zone of occupation with an emphasis on the class reorganization of society. The purification of Germany from Nazism was considered complete in 1948.

recognition of innocence of its individual members. The transmission of guilt and responsibility for a criminal act along the line of ascent from individuals and intermediate stages to the highest organs of the organization was not strictly transitive. A crime committed by a member not commissioned by the organization or not arising from its objectives was understood as an act committed outside the responsibility of the organization.

The non-transitivity of guilt in the relationship between the organization and its members, both top-down and bottom-up, points to an ontological distinction between the subjectivities of the organization and its individual members, which could not but find a certain manifestation. While declaring that "only by punishing individuals¹⁶ who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be respected", the IMT verdict nevertheless devotes a special section to "Accused Organizations", which lists the organizations to be punished: "...the Gestapo, the SD, the SS, the SA, the Imperial Cabinet, the General Staff and the High Command of the German Armed Forces".¹⁷ But the Tribunal did not limit itself to punishing individual organizations. The victorious countries, as noted above, were unanimous that the verdict should not bypass the Third Reich and negotiated the course of denazification of Germany. So, not only the individual organizations of the German state structures, but the Third Reich itself did not escape punishment. Germany was temporarily deprived of state sovereignty and divided into four occupation zones. The deprivation of Germany's sovereignty and its division into occupation zones, which eventually led to the formation of two German states, were undoubtedly acts of punishment of Nazi Germany as a real (not abstract!) entity. The very presence of the occupation troops in the status of victors (but not liberators!) determined the meaning of this presence as an act of punishment of the German state. It is equally obvious that, in their totality, these acts against the defeated Third Reich were the punishment of Germany as a nation-state, which determined the further history of the German nation both during the existence of two German states with different socio-political systems and after their unification.

The difficult road to the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind

Although in fact the Third Reich was punished, the very concept of punishing the institution of the state remained legally undeveloped. But the Nuremberg spirit that swept the post-war political world strongly pointed to this flaw in the international legal system. It is not by chance that on October 23, 1946, only three weeks after the closing of the Nuremberg Trials, the UNGA addressed the issue of early incorporation of the applicable principles of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal into the body of

¹⁶ This attitude was most unequivocally manifested in Allied Control Council Directive No. 38 of October 12, 1946, "Arrest and Punishment of War Criminals, Nazis and Militarists, Internment, Control and Supervision of Potentially Dangerous Germans." <https://memorial.krsk.ru/DOKUMENT/USSR/19461012.htm/>

¹⁷ Nuremberg Trials: 639.

international law. It was a question of elevating the "Nuremberg principles" to the rank of general principles of customary law. The letter from US President Harry Truman to Francis Biddle, the US judge at the Nuremberg Trials, regarding his report to the UNGA was particularly pathos. In it, Truman made clear the ultimate purpose of placing the issue on the UNGA agenda, which, in his view, was that "the United Nations will reaffirm the principles of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal in the context of a general codification of crimes against the peace and security of mankind." It was in this "Nuremberg atmosphere" at the initiative of the United States that the UNGA adopted resolution 95(I) on December 11, 1946 under the title "Reaffirmation of the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal".¹⁸ After the Nuremberg Trials, it seemed that the UN energetically undertook the task at hand. By resolution of December 11, 1946, the Sixth Committee of the UN was established, whose functions included the theoretical elaboration of topics relating to the progressive development of international law. Further, on November 21, 1947, in order to implement this function of the Committee, the UNGA, by Resolution 177 (II), established the ILC with the task of drafting a Declaration of Rights and Duties of States (Code on Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind). On December 6, 1949, the UNGA, "in view of the emergence of new developments in the field of international law", on the basis of the draft Declaration of the Rights and Duties of States received from the ILC, decided "to transmit to the Member States of the Organization for consideration the draft Declaration and all documentation relating thereto ... and to request them to communicate their comments and observations not later than July 1, 1950".¹⁹ The ILC carried out this assignment, but the draft was not approved by the GA. By its resolution 488(V) of December 12, 1950, it again invited Member Governments to submit their comments on the draft Code to the ILC, and the latter to take them into account in finalizing the text. In 1954, the Commission submitted an updated version of the Code to the UNGA, but even this version was not adopted, since resolution 897(IX) of December 4, 1954,²⁰ found that it did not overcome the problems associated with the phenomenon of aggression,²¹ a concept which was still to be clarified by the Ad Hoc Committee established for this purpose by GA resolution 2330(XXII) of December 18, 1967. It was not until 1978, after the definition of aggression had been defined on December 14, 1974 (resolution 3314 (XXIX)), that the GA returned to the issue of the

¹⁸ https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_95-I/ga_95-I_ph_r.pdf

¹⁹ [https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=ru/A/RES/375\(IV\)](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=ru/A/RES/375(IV)) КМП

²⁰ [https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/897\(IX\)](https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/897(IX))

²¹ Resolution 897 (IX) states: "... Bearing in mind that, by its resolution 895 (IX) of 4 December 1954, the General Assembly decided to entrust an ad hoc committee of nineteen Member States of the Organization with the task of drawing up and submitting to the General Assembly at its eleventh session a detailed report on the definition of aggression and a draft definition of aggression, decides to postpone further consideration of the said draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind until such time as the said ad hoc committee shall have the opportunity to consider the draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind...". [https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=ru/A/RES/896\(IX\)](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=ru/A/RES/896(IX))

draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind and, by resolution 36/106 of December 10, 1981, invited the ILC to return to work on its draft. The GA obliged the Sixth Committee, on the basis of and as proposals on the subject were received by the Committee, to continue its consideration of the existing draft Code with a view to producing a codified text. The ILC, within the framework of which discussions were held on theoretical issues for the progressive development of international law, periodically reported to the UNGA on its work, which finally adopted the Draft Code in 1996.²² The above chronology of the drafting of the Code shows how difficult the path of drafting was. The motivations behind the ILC members' arguments were probably not only purely theoretical. The political motives accompanying the discussions may not have been explicitly articulated. They are usually carefully concealed in the subtexts of near-scientific arguments in a way that sometimes remains elusive.

State responsibility for an international crime as a key question of international criminal law

Why, after Nuremberg, did the idea of reducing the punishment of the state to the punishment of natural persons become firmly established? G. Donnedieu de Vabre²³ was of the opinion that the reason for this was the deprivation of German sovereignty. The elimination of its entire state structure meant the abolition of its subjectivity. The topic was removed from the political and legal agenda after the completion of denazification and the formation of two German states that were not successors of the Third Reich. A kind of retreat from the closure of the topic of punishment of the Third Reich was the assumption by the FRG (and since 1990 by the united Germany) of the obligation to pay reparations for material damage caused by Nazi Germany to the victorious states and individuals.²⁴ It is true that its political subtext - to represent the entire German nation - cannot be overlooked.²⁵

Be that as it may, these processes according to Donnedieu de Vabre have overshadowed the vital task for global security of legally criminalizing a crime against humanity committed by a state as the main subject of international relations. But there is another explanation for why the issue of criminal responsibility of states has been pushed back on the ILC's agenda. Already in 1951, the Committee on International

²² Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996. <https://bit.ly/4azXnh0>

²³ Г. Donnedieu de Vabre (1880-1952) - famous jurist, chief judge at the Nuremberg trials from France, consultant in drafting the UN Convention "On the Prevention of Genocide".

²⁴ The reparations act emphasized compensation for victims of the Holocaust according to the Reparations Agreement between the FRG and Israel signed in 1952.

²⁵ The FRG, formed on the basis of the unification of the occupation zones of the United States, Great Britain and France, on the basis of the so-called doctrine of Foreign Ministry State Secretary Walter Hallstein in 1955-1970 claimed to "solely represent all Germans in the international arena". The doctrine failed in practice with the fact that the GDR was recognized by many countries and its admission to the UN in 1970. Chancellor Brant had to retreat from this doctrine in 1970 and also recognized the Oder-Neisse border.

Criminal Justice²⁶ in its report formulated the conclusion that the International Criminal Court is not competent to deal with the issues of responsibility of states for international crimes committed by them due to their political nature. Here is an excerpt from the report: "...the Committee considered first of all the question whether States could be subject to the jurisdiction of the court. Regardless of whether the rules of substantive international criminal law currently allow for the criminal responsibility of States as such, it was pointed out that the responsibility of States for acts constituting international crimes is essentially political in nature and that it is therefore not for the court to decide such questions ... it is important to reaffirm and affirm the newly established principle that natural persons may be recognized as defendants for criminal acts".²⁷ A majority of the Committee voted in favor of this concept of criminal responsibility of States. But such a categorical verdict of the Committee on International Justice proved unconvincing to the ILC. It could not ignore the obvious fact that any act of a state in the global arena, especially of a criminal nature, cannot be purely political and not contain a legal component. It is not by chance that the ILC, which returned to work on the Draft Code in 1983, asked the General Assembly to clarify the inclusion of States in the category of subjects of jurisdiction for crimes against humanity, bearing in mind the political nature of the issue,²⁸ and in 1984 decided to limit the development of the Draft Code to the criminal liability of natural persons. This was a postponement of the issue, not a removal of the topic from the ILC's agenda. The motives for this slowness in developing the topic were not the complexity of the problem. Underlying political circumstances, as pointed out by experts, were at work.²⁹ And it is understandable that in the 1996 "Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind", the Commission, in Article 4, fixed that the "responsibility of individuals for crimes against the peace and security of mankind ... does not in any way affect the responsibility of States under international law" provided for in the Code. It began drafting the Code again in 1998, after Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz (Italy) was replaced by James Crawford (Australia).

In 2001, the ILC completed the second reading of the draft article on the topic under development and submitted to the UNGA a report on its work under the title "On the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts". The conceptual differences of the new version of the Code from previous and doctrinal works on the topic (especially from the ideas of V. Pella) testify to the shift that the very political and,

²⁶ Unlike the Commission, which is composed of internationally recognized specialists in criminal law, the Sixth Committee is composed of representatives of States. It must be assumed that it was through the latter that political motives permeated the drafting process.

²⁷ Doc. UN A 2136, para. 87, p. 11.

²⁸ Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1983: 17.

²⁹ Igor Fisenko, in his article "State Responsibility for International Crimes", was the most outspoken in this regard: "The competence of international judicial bodies is based on the consent of the disputing parties, and States always have a negative attitude towards the possibility of bringing such an issue to the court of a third party not under their control". https://elib.bsu.by/bitstream/123456789/30449/1/1998_3_JILIR_fisenko_r.pdf

behind it, the methodological vision of the topic has undergone. The Special Rapporteur explains this fact as follows: "The 1996 draft considered the following two relevant aspects ... on State responsibility: on the one hand, certain obligations are qualified as obligations towards the international community and not only towards individual States; on the other hand, certain particularly serious breaches of such obligations should entail particularly severe sanctions. Despite the general willingness on the part of most States (emphasis added - A.M.) to accept these general principles, the idea of holding a State responsible for a "crime" has been and remains deeply controversial. In addition to objections from a significant number of States (emphasis added - A.M.), the provision on international crimes raises problems arising from the compatibility of the concept of crime with the legal framework of inter-State relations, as well as the need to ensure ... due process, which are correlates of criminal responsibility but were absent from the 1996 draft.³⁰ It is unlikely that ensuring the compatibility of "the concept of crime with the legal framework of interstate relations" was an insurmountable task for the ILC. Previously, in many more serious cases, the ILC had been able to achieve by consensus language acceptable to all its members, such as in the definition of "aggression". The insurmountable obstacle was surely the objections of "a significant number of States", which prudently objected to the application of the notion of "crime"³¹ as a possible qualification of the conduct of States, so as not to face an international court as having committed a criminally punishable international crime. The Commission nevertheless chose to avoid "the use of the problematic term 'crime'". It is left to speculate that the "significant states" included politically significant states. One can only guess that the "significant number of states" included politically significant states. Thus, the decisive point in the conceptual transformation of the vision of the problem was the Commission's rejection of the idea of characterizing an internationally criminal act of a State as a crime. Nevertheless, in order to avoid an apparent break with its previous statements, the Commission assigned the third chapter of the second part of the instrument to "serious breaches of obligations", where a serious breach is understood to mean a breach by a State of an international obligation that "arises from a peremptory norm of general international law".³² The responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts was thus categorized as a "secondary rule" of international law.

The Special Rapporteur himself, Arangio-Ruiz, was opposed to this transformation of the topic. In his report, the "primacy" among the subjects of criminal acts, in the spirit of V. Pella, was given to the State. Especially categorical were his provisions formulated in Article 16 of his report concerning the crime of aggression: "The rule of international law prohibiting aggression applies to the conduct of a State towards another State. Consequently, only a State can commit the crime of aggression in violation of a rule of international law prohibiting such conduct ... Thus, the violation

³⁰ James Crawford. Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. C. 7. <https://bit.ly/3v5MCCL>

³¹ Ibid, p. 8

³² Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001. Articles 40 and 41 <https://bit.ly/3Ru76Nb>

by a State of a rule of international law prohibiting aggression gives rise to the criminal responsibility of persons who played a decisive role in the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of the aggression. The words "State-sponsored aggression" make it clear that such a State-sponsored violation is a necessary condition for the criminal responsibility of a person for the crime of aggression to arise".³³ Arangio-Ruiz disagreed with the Commission on another important issue. He presented proposals for a mechanism to implement State responsibility for international crimes as a concretization of Article 19 of the Draft Code, which defines the concept of international crime.³⁴ Although it was clear that without the development of such a mechanism, the Code would lose its practical value, the Commission decided not to reflect the Special Rapporteur's proposals in the document. This was perhaps the breaking point in the reorientation made by the ILC in the vision of the topic and the methodology for its development. The concept of "crime" as a possible qualification of state behavior was ousted from the conceptual system of the topic. And even after this radical revision of the Code, some states opposed its convention, while others, as James Crawford notes, generally favored leaving the Code as "an ILC text approved ad referendum by the General Assembly".³⁵

The importance of a codified definition of the responsibility of the State for an international crime is predetermined by the place of the State in international relations, its status as the axial subject of these relations. The criminality of an individual as a party to acts against humanity is derived from the civilizational orientation of the State, which determines its behavior as a subject of criminal acts against other States and peoples. A single individual simply cannot physically commit such crimes. That is why logic rebels against the attitude that international justice should punish only individuals, bypassing the main author of an international criminal act - States. Until 2001, the texts of the Draft Code had been transformed in a creeping reorientation towards the removal of the charges against the State. The theoretical basis was an extract from the Nuremberg verdict that "crimes against international law are committed by human beings and not by abstract categories". The approach was first put into practice at the Tokyo International Military Tribunal and later at the ad hoc tribunals - the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Tribunal for Lebanon. However, a closer look reveals that the reference to this thesis in isolation from the factual verdicts against the Third Reich and a number of organizations under its control is a departure from the philosophy of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Its verdict was aimed not only at the liquidation of the Nazi organizations it had

³³ Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001: 16.

³⁴ These are articles 51-53 of the Special Rapporteur's Report. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996: 90-92. https://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/russian/ilc_1996_v2_p2.pdf

³⁵ We have no information about which states have been working hard in the ILC and the General Assembly to remove the characteristic of "crime" from the list of possible characteristics of state behavior. But logic suggests that they should be States that do not rule out the use of force and extremely brutal methods to realize some of their claims. They can also be states that need conflicts as instruments for managing international processes.

classified as offensive, but also of the state that had spawned them. The pathos of the thesis from the verdict, which appears in almost all documents and articles devoted to the topic, was not to absolve the state from responsibility for the crimes committed, but to parry, in the context of the trial, the defense lawyers' argument that the defendants were protected by the doctrine of state sovereignty. Circumvention of this fact opens the door to all kinds of manipulations. And the main thing in them is to ignore the sentences passed and enforced on the Third Reich and Nazi organizations. Thus, the task of elevating the Nuremberg principles to the rank of *jus cogens* was removed from the agenda.

A "soft departure" from the starting ideas, as Special Rapporteur James Crawford writes in the article we have already mentioned, had developed by the sixties, when "there was support for the idea that the ILC should refocus its attention on 'identifying the general rules governing the international responsibility of the State'." This eventually led to the ILC Report (A/56/589 and Sogg.1) removing the very possibility of a State being charged with and adequately sentenced for an international crime. Prior to the adoption of the Code in 1996, the lawfulness of attributing such conduct to a state was obvious to all ILC drafters. The Code left the question of attribution of criminal conduct to the state open. And that is understandable. It was obvious to any non-biased ILC jurist that the State was "the principal subject of international crimes".³⁶

To the vulnerability of the methodology for examining State responsibility for international crimes in the ILCs

The failure to apply the "problematic term 'crime'" to state behavior is only one flaw in the 2001 Code. It is clear, for example, that any international instrument on state responsibility for wrongful acts will be ineffective without taking into account the factor of force and its conventional legal understanding (preferably with the precision of codification).³⁷ Otherwise, one will have to deal only with the consequences of the "work" of this, as it is sometimes called, mole of history. Both the Code and UNGA Resolution 56/83 bypass the phenomenon of force, a factor that constructs the global world order. In classical international law, the place of force was defined by the principle of *jus ad bellum* - in the right of a sovereign state to go to war without justification. I.Kant's project of perpetual peace with the ideas of republicanism, abolition of armies and creation of a federation of states with a unified legal system was conceived to limit the place of uncontrolled force in international relations. But it remained a mere blueprint. The Briand-Kellogg Pact for the Prohibition of Aggressive War, adopted in 1928, also proved unworkable. The establishment of the UN after World War II, which

³⁶ Formulation by I. Fisenko from his article "Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts". *Belarussian Journal of International Law and International Relations* 1998, No. 3. C. 20. <https://bit.ly/3RplRAH>

³⁷ Both the Code and UNGA Resolution 56/83 are silent on this factor, although there is no doubt that the high quality lawyers involved in drafting these documents were aware of it.

included in its charter a prohibition on the use of force and threat of force, had the same goal³⁸. But the use of force and wars do not stop.

All this leads to the necessity of attributing a special place in international relations to subjects endowed with particularly great power, which allows them to influence world processes, determine their course, and be a subject in conflicts. Meanwhile, the reports developed by the ILC consider only the state as a subject of international relations and a possible bearer of power. In this, the ILC follows the logic laid down in the foundations of the UN as a state-centric organization. This approach may have been justified for the modern era. But its flawed nature is now obvious. The introduction of the concept of force into the conceptual system of international criminal issues will reveal the existence of a whole club of actors responsible for international criminal acts. The state turns out to be one of them in the list, in which, apart from it, non-state formations - international organizations, movements, clans and transnational financial and economic giants, etc. - can appear. This list is open to any entities endowed with power commensurate with the "substance of international relations", sufficient to cause disturbances in them and thus to be an actual subject of international relations, regardless of whether they are recognized as such.

The state-centricity of the "classical times" perceptions of the world order and the traditional international political structures corresponding to them (primarily the UN) conceal the significance of non-state actors in world processes, overshadowing the relevance of the legal understanding of their international criminal acts.

The existence of non-state entities endowed with sufficient material and other potential to be a party to international conflicts and a subject of international unlawful acts (including criminal ones) is an obvious fact, and the involvement in the subject of international criminal law of the concept of "bearer of internationally significant force" as a characteristic of potential subjects of international offenses is a matter of time. Paraphrasing the statement of the international lawyer Count L. A. Komarovsky, convinced in his time of the inevitability of the establishment of the International Court of Justice (see reference 6 of our article), we can say that in this case too, not only theoretical, but much more practical needs will force the international community to embark on the path of its realization. Only in this way will the idea of elevating the Nuremberg Principles to the rank of *jus cogens* before the UN be realized, taking into account the obvious fact that "material force must be overturned by material force",³⁹ and not by declarations and constructions "in order to induce ... a State to fulfill its obligations".⁴⁰

³⁸ It is noteworthy that the UN, which has taken on the mission of prohibiting the use or threat of force, has itself been structured "on the basis of force": it is the most powerful states that are permanent members of the Security Council, where they have veto power.

³⁹ Marx, Engels 1953: 422.

⁴⁰ UNGA Resolution 56/83. Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. Part III, Chapter II, Article 49.

Another methodological gap in the reports of the UN Sixth Committee on the topic under consideration is also evident. We are referring to the absence in them of the topic of the responsibility of a people (nation) as a non-abstract subject of possible relevance to international criminal acts. For common sense, there is no explanation as to why a people, being the source of statehood, endowed with the right of self-determination, electing the highest legislative and judicial authorities, independently deciding on the form of its State existence, should not be held responsible for internationally criminal offenses committed by the State established by it and the authorities elected by it. It appears that a people (nation) is endowed with virtually unlimited domestic rights, but is exempt from all responsibility both to the world community as a whole and to another people against whom the State it established has committed a criminal act.

A comprehensive analysis of the legal gaps in the documents submitted by the Sixth Committee of the UNGA is beyond the scope of this article. It is a special topic. We aimed to show those obvious flaws of these documents, which create the atmosphere of the global legal environment in which the states, set up for crimes against humanity feel cozy, like, for example, the Republic of Azerbaijan.

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PRIMARY SOURCES

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

A MEMORANDUM

ON THE RECOGNITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, SUBMITTED BY THE
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ARMENIA TO THE UNITED STATES



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**THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA A MEMORANDUM ON THE RECOGNITION OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA, SUBMITTED BY THE
SPECIAL MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE UNITED STATES**

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Keywords: G. Pasdermajian, H. Kajaznoui, Memorandum

On 9 October 1919, the special civilian mission of the Republic of Armenia arrived in New York.¹ The delegation under Kajaznoui was joined by a member of the Armenian delegation in Paris, Garegin Pasdermajian (Armen Garo), who was appointed the RA Plenipotentiary Representative to the United States. H. Kajaznoui was authorized to provide solutions both to economic and political problems. Upon arrival his mission went to Washington to present Armenia's problems to the American government. On 10 October 1919 H. Kajaznoui, as the Chairman of the mission and G. Pasdermajian as the diplomatic representative of the Republic, spoke at the hearings entitled "Maintenance of Peace in Armenia" in the Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate.²

The statements of the Armenian delegates, who spoke about relief and military assistance to Armenians, as well as about the recognition of the Republic, played considerable role in shaping the opinions of the members of the subcommittee. After testifying at the subcommittee, the representatives of the Republic of Armenia met with a number of high-ranking American officials, including Secretary of State R. Lansing. During the meeting with R. Lansing, in response to recognize the Republic of Armenia, presented by H. Kajaznoui, the American official advised them to submit an official memorandum.

Thus, the Memorandum entitled "The Republic of Armenia" was prepared under the guidance of Kajaznoui and submitted to the Secretary of State by G. Pasdermajian on 28 October 1919.³ Later on, it was presented to the Senate by its member H. C.

¹ NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 355, f. 210; fund 370, reg. 1, file 63, f. 2-2B.

² Maintenance of Peace in Armenia 1919: 109-114; Hovhannisian 1982: 383-385; Makhmuryan 2018: 258-259, 264; Ghambaryan 2019: 258-261; Ghambaryan 2020: 89-93; Ghambaryan 2022: 276-286:

³ NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 498, f. 20-60; fund 450, reg. 2, file 8; Also «Pahak», 1920, n. 1, 3, 6; Hovhannisian 1982: 388; Hovhannisian 2007: 286; Hovhannisian 2014: 464-465.

Lodge⁴. On 10 November 1919, the Memorandum was printed as a Senate Document № 151 of the 1st Session of the 66th Congress in a separate booklet.⁵

The document contained brief, but rich information about the Republic of Armenia. The representatives of the Armenian Republic tried to convey to the US Government that the young Republic of Armenia, having overcome the hardships of the last year and a half and despite the still existing serious difficulties of various kinds, was already an established state worthy of international recognition.

The requested memorandum did not play a special role in the political orientation of the United States towards Armenia, and only half a year later, in April 1920, the United States de facto recognized the Republic of Armenia.

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⁴ Hovhannisian 1982: 465. Hovhannisian 2007: 287; Hovhannisian 2014: 465.

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**A MEMORANDUM ON THE RECOGNITION
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA**

[Dated October 28, 1919.]

SUBMITTED BY THE SPECIAL MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
TO THE UNITED STATES.

I. THE FORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

The territory of the Armenian republic was formerly a part of one of the outlying Provinces of the Russian Empire, namely, Transcaucasia.

In the spring of 1917, after the outbreak of the Russian revolution, the then temporary government of Kerensky created in and for Transcaucasia a special administrative body, styled as the commissariat of Transcaucasia. But in November, 1917, when the Bolsheviks overthrew the Kerensky government and established the soviet rule in Russia, Transcaucasia declined to recognize the authority of the Bolsheviks and the commissariat of Transcaucasia on November 28, 1917, declared itself the supreme authority in Transcaucasia.

In February, 1918, the Seim, or the legislative assembly of Transcaucasia, convened in the city of Tiflis, accepted the resignation of the commissariat and in its place instituted a temporary government composed of several ministries.

Thus, in effect Transcaucasia separated herself from Russia, though there was no appropriate declaration and she was still considered as a part of the Empire. But the external and internal political conditions took such a course that they made it necessary to change the de facto to a de jure separation, and on April 22, 1918, the Seim declared the independence of Transcaucasia from Russia and her constitution as an independent state, under the name of the federal democratic republic of Transcaucasia.

The three principal peoples of Transcaucasia-Armenians, Georgians, and the Tartars of Azerbaijan, became parties to the federation, with their respective territories. The Seim and the government were composed of the representatives of the political parties among these three nationalities, almost in equal proportions.

This federal republic of Transcaucasia scarcely lasted five weeks. The cause of its instability was the fact that the political tendencies of the three constituent nations were different, even conflicting with each other.

The point at issue was the attitude of Transcaucasia to the war then still raging.

Since the beginning of the war the sympathy of the Tartars of Azerbaijan was wholly with their kin and coreligionists, the Turks. In the latter part of 1917, when the Russian armies abandoned the Caucasian front and the Turkish forces began their victorious advance on to the north, the Tartars, almost without disguise, went to the side of Turkey. They not alone were unwilling to continue the war against Turkey, but also did all in their power to help Turkey to conquer Transcaucasia.

The Georgians had for a long time been in communication with Germany. They were seeking the protection of Germany and were at all times ready to withdraw from

the war, provided the independence of Georgia was recognized and her external and internal situation made secure.

But the Armenians, on the other hand, elected to remain and did remain loyal to the cause of the Entente and associated powers, and continued to war against Turkey till the end, as more fully set forth hereinafter.

These internal conflicts, daily becoming more emphatic, made it impossible for Armenians, Georgians, and Tartars to work in harmony within the sphere of a single state.

On May 26, 1918, the Seim declared the termination of the federal republic of Transcaucasia and relinquished its authority. The same day Georgia declared her independence; and after two days, namely on May 28, 1918, Armenia and Azerbaijan likewise declared their own independence.

From that day began the existence of the republic of Armenia.

II. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC

The republic does not yet have a written constitution, that important task having been reserved to the future constitutional convention which is expected to assemble when the State of united and integral Armenia shall have been instituted and when the present republic of Armenia shall form a part of that united and integral Armenia.

Pending that event, the Armenian republic is based upon and is operating under a democratic-republican form of government.

The republic has a legislative branch, consisting of an elected parliament, and an executive branch, consisting of a cabinet.

The republic does not have a president. The powers of the president are now exercised in part by the parliament and in part by the cabinet.

Sovereignty resides in a parliament of one house. The parliament consists of deputies elected by the entire people. The right to vote and to hold office is common and equal to all the people. Every citizen of Armenia of full age has an equal right to participate in all elections without regard to sex, race, or religion. The method of voting is direct and secret, and the elections are based on the proportional principle.

The parliament now in session, composed of 80 members, was elected in June, 1919, and commenced its session in August of this year. The composition of the parliament will, in the future, be extended to give representation to the people of the new territories that are to be added to the present republic, in proportion to the number of the population.

The cabinet contains eight ministries: (1) Foreign affairs; (2) interior affairs, including public health; (3) public works; (4) posts and telegraphs; (5) army; (6) finance, including commerce and industry; (7) education; (8) supply and relief, the latter being of a temporary kind.

The prime minister is at the head of the government and the president of the council of ministers.

The prime minister is elected by parliament ministers and presents their ministry, to the approval by parliament to names, as well as of the parliament. He designates the the platform of his The approval given the platform so presented acts also as approval of the proposed ministers.

The government (the cabinet) is responsible to parliament. If parliament, by a majority vote, should pass a resolution of lack of confidence, the cabinet must submit its resignation to parliament, which then commits the formation of new government to some other person.

The present prime minister and president of the council of ministers is Dr. Alexander Khatissian, who formerly for many years was the mayor of Tiflis, the capital of Transcaucasia. In the preceding cabinet, which was headed by Prime Minister Oh. Kadjazuouni, Mr. Khatissian was vice premier and at the same time hold the ministry of the interior, and later that of foreign affairs. The other ministers are men of university education and prominent in the public and political life of Transcaucasia.

The language of the republic is Armenian, but citizens not acquainted with Armenian are permitted to use their mother tongues or the Russian language.

All religions enjoy entire freedom and equal rights under the republic.

III. JUDICIARY

The system of Russian jurisprudence and administration of justice is temporarily continued in force, except in so far as it is modified or repealed by acts of parliament or is in conflict with the spirit and order of a democratic-republican system of government.

During its life of 14 months the parliament of Armenia has enacted a number of special statutes, supplementing the body of Russian laws in force at the birth of the Armenian republic.

IV. THE ARMY

The army of Armenia is formed on the Russian system and is administered according to the regulations of the Russian Army. The body of officers have been educated in in the technical schools of Russia, and the greater part of the soldiers have served and have received their training in the Russian Army.

The Armenian troops, as well as the people of Armenia, were not affected by the Bolshevik movements in Russia. Discipline in the army is satisfactory, and the morale and the patriotism of Armenian soldiers is exemplary.

The army is composed of all branches of the service. The number of troops under arms in the month of July, 1919, was 18,000. The country needs and has the capacity of raising an army double that number, but the lack of physical equipment, arms, clothing, food, supplies, etc., makes the realization of that number of troops at present impossible. Even the physical equipment of the troops now under arms is inadequate, and is tolerable only because the Armenian is a hardy and sturdy soldier.

For political reasons, military service is not obligatory upon Mohammedans, as it was not also under the former Russian régime. There are no Mohammedans in the Armenian army.

The commander in chief of the Armenian army is Lieut. Gen. Nazerbegan, formerly one of the most brilliant officers of the Russian Army, well known by his deeds of military valor in the Russo- Japanese War and in the Caucasian front in the present war.

Maj. Gen. Araratian, the minister of war, was also one of the learned and experienced officers of the Russian Army, and is very popular with the Armenian army.

The general staff, and the commanders of the line, are disciplined officers who have had a complete military training, and many of whom have high military decorations from the Government of Russia.

V. FINANCES.

The sources of revenue of the republic are the direct and indirect taxes, and income from the properties and enterprises of the state and from monopolies.

Income taxes are now imposed at lower rates than would have been in normal times, and the rates are lower, particularly on incomes from agricultural pursuits. As the country is now in great need of manufactured articles, no duty is imposed on imported goods, excepting goods made at home, such as alcohol and tobacco, on which there is an internal excise tax.

The disbursements are ordinary and extraordinary. Ordinary disbursements include salaries of public officials, maintenance and operation of state properties and enterprises and the expenses of an army on a peace basis.

In addition to these ordinary disbursements, Armenia has been confronted with extraordinary disbursements, due to the existence of a state of war, and the ravages caused by the war. These extraordinary disbursements are for the relief of the sufferers of the war and for the reconstruction of the economic life of the people. Food, clothing and shelter must be provided for orphans and those unable to work, the deported and exiled people must be repatriated, ruined villages must be rebuilt, and seed and agricultural tools must be furnished to the despoiled farmers.

The average monthly gross income of the Armenian republic during the first five months of the present year was 1,950,000 francs; the average monthly ordinary disbursements in the same period also amounted to 1,950,000 francs, so that all ordinary disbursements were met by the regular revenues of the state.

On the other hand, in the same period of five months, the republic's extraordinary disbursements amounted to on an average of These 4,650,000 francs per month. These extraordinary disbursements were met by the use of Transcaucasian bonds of that amount. These bonds are issued and guaranteed by the three republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. This large use of bonds caused a depreciation of their rate of exchange, but there was no other available means for meeting those

extraordinary pressing disbursements. The people of Armenia have cheerfully paid all taxes without any compulsory measures. On June 1, 1919, 90 per cent of all taxes then due had been paid.

Taxes are imposed only by acts of parliament. No money can be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an act of appropriation by the parliament upon estimates submitted by the government.

There is a board of state control which exercises supervision over the legality of the acts and the disbursements of the government. This board is entirely independent of the government. It is under the presidency of the state comptroller, who is elected by parliament and is accountable only to parliament direct.

All revenues must pass to the state treasury and all disbursements must be made through the treasury.

VI. TERRITORY AND PHYSIOGRAPHY

The territory of the Armenian republic, within its present boundaries, consists of the following parts of Transcaucasia, using the names of the former Russian administrative divisions:

- (A) The province of Erivan, in its entirety.
- (B) The province of Kars, excepting the northern section of the district of Ardahan.
- (C) The southern part of the province entire district of of Borchalou. of Tiflis, comprising the Akhalkalaki and the southern section of the district
- (D) Those parts of the province of Elizabetopol (Gantzag), comprising the southern section of the districts of Cossak and Elizabetopol, the entire district of Zangezour, and the upland regions of the districts of Jivanshir, Shousha, and Kariakin (Jibril), known as the Armenian Karabagh.

The boundaries of the republic are not definitely delimited or settled. Certain outlying regions are involved in disputes with the two neighboring newly formed states, Georgia claiming certain regions lying within the former province of Tiflis, and Azerbaijan (Tartaristan in Transcaucasia) claiming certain regions in the former province of Elizabetopol.

The territory described above contains 67,000 square kilometers, or about 26,130 square miles.

Armenia, generally speaking, is a mountainous country. The extensive high plateau of Ararat in the center has an altitude of 3,500 feet, the highland of Akhalkalaki, Alexandropol, and Kars has an altitude of from 5,500 to 6,500 feet, intersected by valleys and snow-capped mountains (Mount Ararat, Aragats, and several other mountain chains). In the northern region Armenia contains the extensive lake of Sevan or Gokcheh. A majestic river, the Arax, flows easterly through the plateau of Ararat, and numerous rivulets and streams cover the land.

The climate of Armenia is continental; dry, with an abundance of sunshine; the summer is comparatively warm, the winter generally long and severe. But the climate is extremely healthful.

VII. POPULATION.

According to Russian official statistics, the number of people inhabiting the territory of the Armenian republic in 1917 was approximately 2,150,000, of whom 1,416,000, or 66 per cent, were Christians: 670,000, or 31 per cent, were Mohammedans, and 73,000, or a per cent, were people of unclassified religions.

This population was divided, according to race, as follows:

| | <i>Number</i> | <i>Per. cent</i> |
|---|---------------|------------------|
| <i>Armenian</i> | 1,293,000 | 60 |
| <i>Tartar, Turk, Turkoman, and Karakalpak</i> | 588,000 | 27 |
| <i>Russian and Greek</i> | 110,000 | 5 |
| <i>Kurd</i> | 82,000 | 4 |
| <i>Yezide and Gypsy</i> | 73,000 | 3 |
| <i>Georgian</i> | 13,000 | 1 |

Since 1917, as a result of war operation, a part of the Mohammedan population has emigrated from the Armenian republic, and, on the other hand, 300,000 Armenians from Turkish Armenia have immigrated into or sought refuge in the Armenian republic.

No reliable statistics can be formed concerning deaths and births and emigrants and immigrants during the last two years.

According to the same Russian statistics of 1917, the Armenian population remaining within the boundaries of the two newly formed Transcaucasian states of Georgia and Azerbaijan, numbers approximately 494,000. There are also nearly 200,000 native Armenians and about 70,000 refugee Armenians in the northern Caucasus, the eastern coast towns of the Black Sea. and in southern Russia. In Persian Armenia there are 140,000 Armenians and other native Christians.

We may say with confidence that the greater portion of the Armenian population now in foreign countries is awaiting the first favorable opportunity for returning to Armenia.

VIII. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.

The great majority of the people of Armenia (as much as 85 per cent of them) are engaged in agricultural pursuits. Large cities and large industrial establishments (with few exceptions) do not exist. Armenian mercantile and manufacturing houses of considerable magnitude have their central locations outside the limits of Armenia, at Tiflis, Baku, Rostov, Moscow, and Petrograd.

On the other hand, all the branches of agricultural industry, such as the cultivation of grain, cotton, garden produce, vines, and the breeding of cattle and other animals, the production of milk and milk products, are in a high state of development. There is also manufacturing on a small scale.

(a) *Agriculture.* - The variety of the climatic conditions in Armenia makes the farming industry of all kinds possible, from the cotton and rice of the Ararat Valley to the animals of the rich pasturages on the heights of snow-clad mountains.

The following figures, from official Russian reports, will indicate the broad lines of the agricultural industry and the relative extent of the different uses of the occupied and cultivated lands of Armenia:

Villages and buildings - 32,500 Hectares
Orchards and vineyards – 34,600
Farms – 1,363,000
Hay farms – 214,000
Pasture lands – 2,228,500
Forests – 113,900

It appears therefore that out of a total territory of 67,000 square kilometers, nearly 40,000 square kilometers, or 59 per cent, is used for agricultural industries. Included in the remaining 27,000 square kilometers are lakes, rivers, snow-covered mountains, rocks, and waste lands. These waste lands also can be utilized by irrigation projects, which are entirely feasible but have been heretofore obstructed by the Imperial Russian Government upon political grounds.

During the year 1911 (the last normal year before the war) 734,000 hectares out of 1,363,000 hectares devoted to farming were used for the cultivation of grain. The gross quantity of wheat and barley seed sowed, in the spring and in the autumn, was approximately 150,000 tons.

Besides, wheat and barley, the principal products of Armenia are rice, cotton, and grapes.

Before the war the annual production of the farms of Armenia was in rice, about 10,600 tons; in seeded cotton, about 8,100 tons; and in grapes, 69,000 tons.

The finest grades of wine and alcohol are manufactured out of grapes. The annual production of wine is about 315,000 hectoliters: of alcohol about 1,880,000 hectoliters.

(b) *Live-stock breeding.* - This is an important part of the economic life of Armenia, second only there were in to that of agriculture. Before the war there were in Armenia 106,700 horses, 42,800 mules and donkeys, 1,243,100 heads of cattle, and 1,859,000 sheep.

These figures indicate the extent of the agricultural and live-stock industry in Armenia before the war in normal times. In the course of the war the country was ruined to a great extent and industry was destroyed. Many villages have been ruined, orchards

destroyed, farms left without cultivation, and the animals driven off into Turkey, or starved or killed to feed the destitute population.

(c) *Mineral products products.* - The mountains of Armenia are rich in various kinds of minerals, but they are left without development, owing to the absence of capital and initiative. Thus far copper mines have been developed to a certain extent, the annual production amounting approximately to 6.500 tons of purified copper. Next in importance are the rock salts of an unlimited quantity in the Koulpi and Kagzyman Mountains, but whose development, owing to lack of the means of transportation, has been limited to an annual production of 18,000 to 20,000 tons.

The development of pyrites of iron was begun during the war, but was discontinued on account of the retirement of the Russian Army, During the year 1917 nearly 57,000 tons of pyrite of iron were produced.

Other mineral resources, of which there are 450 known locations, also thus far undeveloped.

(d) *Water power.* - Armenia, especially in its central district, is poorly supplied with lumber for building and heating purposes. There are coal mines in the region of Olti, but they remain undeveloped. Within the present limits of the republic no petroleum has yet been struck. Consequently Armenia is distressed for lack of fuel supply. On the other hand, its supply ply of water power is unlimited for purposes of industry. The streams of the rivers and rivulets thus far explored are capable of furnishing motive power to nine millions of horsepower, which is considerably more than necessary. This water power can be readily utilized to serve all parts of the country.

(e) *Highways.* - Armenia is poorly provided with means of communication. The railways are altogether about 564 kilometers in extent. Railway transportation has been inadequate, by reason of want of the required number of locomotives and cars, and by reason of the difficulties placed by the authorities of Azerbaijan in the way of the transportation of petroleum from Baku to Armenia.

The entire length of macadamized roads is 1,463 kilometers. Communication by means of these roads also is inadequate by reason of the present shortage of draft animals and of motor vehicles.

IX. THE LIFE OF THE REPUBLIC IN THE LAST 16 MONTHS

The Armenian republic war born, lived and continues to live under extremely difficult conditions.

The long war had devastated and ruined the country. For four years, continuously, the greater part of Armenia was the field of war operations, subject to all the evils that are inseparable from war, particularly when Turkey is one of the belligerents.

In the course of these years, constructive and productive labor in Armenia almost entirely ceased. Apart from other unfavorable circumstances, we may mention only the absence of laboring men. The whole of the Armenian young manhood for four years

was engaged in battles, and the adults left at home could do but little, as they, too, were in the midst of war conditions.

To comprehend the situation in the country two facts must be borne in mind.

First. The Armenians of Russia not only gave to the Russian Army nearly 160,000 soldiers under the draft laws, but also from the beginning of the war formed special Armenian volunteer contingents; and after November, 1917, with the breakdown of the Russian Army, the Armenians alone held the fighting front against Turkey. Thus for four years the youth of Armenia was constantly engaged in fighting.

Second. In Transcaucasia the war was being waged not only on the front against Turkey but also in the rear, in the interior, against the native Tartars. The Tartars of Transcaucasia, under Russian law, were exempt from conscription; consequently the Tartar youth, capable of bearing arms and well equipped with arms, remained in their homes, in the rear or in the midst of the Armenians, while the Armenian youth had gone to the war fronts. The Tartars, in order to impede the operations of the front, led by the secret emissaries of Turkey, kept the country in the rear in constant turmoil and apprehension, raided the Armenian villages, killed the people and looted their movables. So that the Armenians remaining at home, instead of devoting themselves to constructive labor, were obliged to defend themselves against these attacks and to carry on a small factional warfare with their Tartar countrymen. So that while the Russian Army, aided by Armenian volunteer troops, was conquering the vilayets of Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis, Caucasian-Armenia was being devastated in the rear by the Tartars.

In November, 1917, 1917, when the Russian forces, infected with Bolshevism, abandoned the Caucasian front and without order began to return to Russia, the Tartars openly made common cause with Turkey; the Georgians engaged in negotiations with Germany and assumed a neutral position toward the belligerents, and the Armenians alone actually held the ground against Turkey.

From November, 1917, to May, 1917, for six months continuously, the Armenian forces, hastily collected and organized in the midst of a state of confusion and anarchy, fought the Turkish armies in the front and the Tartars in the rear. Yielding before superior numbers, the Armenians retreated step by step, carrying on a rear-guard fight from Erzingian and Mamak Mamakhatoun, through Erzroum, on to the former Russo-Turkish frontier, at the same time protecting the Armenian civilian population who were fleeing to the north from the menace of Turkish massacres.

The victorious Turkish Army, strengthened by two divisions from the Syrian front, did not stop at the frontier, but rushed on to the Caucasus. The Armenian forces retreated and fortified themselves at Kars, when they received orders from the then Transcaucasian government, of which the Georgians had then seized the supreme power, to surrender Kars to the Turks and, in accordance with the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, to hold the line at Alexandropol.

With the retreating Armenian army moved the refugees from Turkish Armenia and from Kars, and overcrowded the district of Alexandropol. But Turkey, disregarding the terms of the treaty of Brest Litovsk, did not stop at the frontier therein, described, but pressed through Alexandropol in two directions; to the east, toward the plain of Ararat, and to the north, toward Bambak and Lori. The Armenian forces and the Armenian people, men and women, stubbornly resisted the advance of the Turks. In May, 1918, two severe battles were fought, at Karakilissa (Bambak) and Sardarabad (Ararat) in which the advance of the Turkish forces was decisively checked, and in consequence thereof the Turkish Government recognized the independence of Armenia within a much restricted territory.

Turkey was obliged to take that course by reason of the resistance organized by Armenians beyond the limits of Armenia; namely, in the city and Province of Baku. In the early part of 1918, there had been gathered at Baku about 10,000 Armenian officers and men. who, after the rise of Bolshevism, had left the western front of Russia and were returning to Armenia by way of Baku. But the Tartars having cut the railroad lines, the Armenian returning soldiers had been obliged to remain at Baku in a state of siege. In March, when Turkish forces had begun their advance from the south, the Tartars, instigated by the Turks, attempted to disarm the Armenian soldiers as well as the Russian garrison at Baku. The Armenians, in union with the Russians, rose and destroyed the Tartar forces and conquered the city of Baku, as well as the oil district. The armed Tartars, though many times the number of the Russo-Armenian forces, finding themselves unable to overcome them, were imploring the aid of the Turkish Army. The Turks, on the other hand, were anxious to occupy Baku and the oil district, and were urged on by Germany, who was then in great need of fuel supply. The stubborn and desperate resistance of the Armenians in Armenia had impeded the advance of the Turkish Army on Baku. Turkey was obliged to protect the rear of her army in order to reach Baku.

Unable to crush the resistance of Armenia, Turkey was obliged to agree to an armistice with and to recognize the independence of Armenia, so as to be able to concentrate all her forces at Baku. Baku resisted until the middle of September, 1918, when the Turkish Army of 24,000 men, under Khalil Pasha, aided by the Tartars, occupied the city of Baku and the oil fields.

When the Armenian government was established at Erivan (May, 1918), the following was the situation confronting it:

The Turkish Army had occupied the greater portion of Caucasian Armenia and had placed her quick-firing guns only within 7 kilometers from Erivan.

Azerbaijan (Tartaristan in Transcaucasia), relying on the presence of the Turkish Army, was pressing the eastern and northern frontiers of Armenia and was threatening to put the Armenian people to the sword.

Georgia had accepted German protection, had welcomed German troops, and by their aid, had occupied in northwestern Armenia two exclusively Armenian districts, Akhalkalak and Lori.

Armenia was left alone, surrounded by hostile armies, without any external aid or support.

The internal condition of the country was desperate. More than half of the people were refugees, without food, clothing, or shelter. The villages and farms had been ruined and farm labor had ceased. The peasants were obliged to consume their grain seed and to kill their yoke animals for food. Famine in all its horrors, with the accompanying contagious diseases, particularly typhus, began to scourge the people. Drugs were already scarce, and drug stores were empty.

Communication with the outside world was altogether cut, because the Turks held the only rail line. Importation of goods had ceased, because all ties had been cut with Russia, Persia, or Europe, and the bordering lands of Georgia and Azerbaijan had no surplus to export

There was scarcity of goods of all kinds. There was shortage of even petroleum for lamps and of paper for the use of the government offices.

The state mechanism of the Russian régime had altogether broken down, all administrative functions being demoralized. There was complete chaos and anarchy. It was necessary to start from the beginning and to erect a new national life on the ruins of the old one.

In December, 1918, in pursuance of the conditions of the armistice with the allied powers, the Turkish Army was compelled to evacuate Transcaucasia, including the territories of Russian Armenia. The Turks departed, but in their wake completed the destruction of the partly devastated country. They carried away with them everything they could carry (grain, fodder, cotton, leather, domestic animals, wagons, automobiles, telegraph and telephone instruments, tools and machines from the factories and workshops, even doors and window sashes from houses), and what they could not carry away they burned or demolished.

With the departure of the Turks the territory of the Armenian republic was greatly enlarged and the danger of external complications diminished. But now cares were piled upon the government because it was necessary to establish order and peace in the new territory, and to give relief to the people in that territory who had been looted and made destitute.

It was under such conditions that the republic lived the first year of her life.

The Armenian government, with the native enthusiasm and virility of the Armenian race, met those conditions.

During the flourishing stage of the Russian revolution the socialist watchwords of the revolution were very disturbing to the life of the newly formed states. The government of Armenia was not impressed by those watchwords, but from the beginning realized the actual and pressing demands of the people and maintained a

steady and realistic policy, namely, to save the people from extermination, to establish an elementary state organism, and to secure the foundations of the independence of Armenia. This was the conception of duty which the government brought before the parliament and received its approval.

In pursuance of that program the Armenian government in the course of one year (1) organized central and local police forces to protect life and property and the means of communication; (2) reorganized the judicial system and recommenced the regular sessions of the law courts; (3) reorganized the army, small in number, but great in morale and discipline; (4) reopened the schools; (5) as far as possible put in order the postal, telegraph, and telephone communications; (6) in a measure restored rail communications which had become almost impossible by the destruction wrought by the Turks, and by inadequacy of locomotives and cars; (7) put the finances in order, organized a system of taxation, and the machinery of collection; (8) reorganized and established medico-sanitary institutions to fight against epidemics; and (9) devoted its greatest energy and effort to the relief of the famished and incapacitated people and the reconstruction of the ruined economic life of the people, more than half of its budget being appropriated for that purpose.

The results of the labors of the government are far from being sufficient. There are still numerous crying needs awaiting attention. But considering the exceptional conditions surrounding the government, it is no exaggeration to say that these results were greater than could be asked or expected. The one-year life of the republic is convincing proof of its stability and of the capacity of the Armenian people for self-rule.

There were and still are in Armenia all the conditions which create anarchy and extremist mass movements. But Armenia lived free from both. A legal and regular governmental system is firmly established; the laws are obeyed; the state mechanism is working as efficiently as possible; life and property is better protected now than under the former Russian rule; the people quickly appreciated democratic institutions and are attached to the government. The soldiers, though tired out by the endless fighting and deprived of many necessities, are loyal and obedient and not a single instance of discontent or strike has occurred in Armenia. The people, though in distress, proved their intrepidity and patriotism to an unlimited degree. The idea of an independent Armenia has so far stirred their souls that they were ready to submit to any sacrifice or want in order to consolidate their independence. By an exemplary instinct they realize the great significance of the act being performed and are refraining from rendering the task of the government harder.

Only by this devotion and patriotism of the people can be explained the fact that the Armenian republic passed the first year of its life without internal turmoils and disturbances and the government was enabled to establish order and to engage in its constructive efforts.

In connection with the foregoing it is gratefully acknowledged that the Armenian republic has received a measure of economic aid from America, notably the supply of

flour being received since 1919, in pursuance of an arrangement with the Hoover Food Administration, also supplies of various kinds from the Near East Relief, which aid has materially contributed to the amelioration of the suffering brought on by the war and cruelty of the enemy.

X. THE PRESENT NEED FOR EXTERNAL AID

The land and people of Armenia have all the requirements for the maintenance of an autonomous state.

The land is rich in natural resources and the people are capable of attaining the highest type of civilization, are law abiding, industrious, enterprising, and saving. There is a sturdy and healthy peasantry firmly attached to the soil and accustomed to the labors of all kinds of farming. There is a host of artisans and mechanics, who in Transcaucasia and especially in Asiatic Turkey, have for centuries held in their hands almost all the arts and trades in the country. There is an extensive class of merchants and manufacturers of large and small proportions, furnishing proud of the capacity of the Armenians to develop and conduct industry and trade along the same broad lines as among highly civilized nations. There is a numerous intellectual class, thousands of specialists and professional men educated in the universities of Europe and America, competent to conduct the various affairs of the state. Finally, there are military men and officers of all ranks who have received their training and won their spurs in the service of the Russian Army and are competent to conduct an orderly and disciplined army.

The economic and financial future of the country is safe. The republic under the present most distressing conditions in a devastated and ruined territory has already met its ordinary expenses by ordinary revenues. The same thing was true before the war, under the Russian rule, when the imperial revenues from Armenia were considerably more than all imperial expenses within that territory. According to official statistics of the railroad administration, the gross value of all imports into Armenia was far below the gross value of all exports from her; that is, Armenia was producing more than she was consuming. In recent years, before the war, while Armenia was receiving part of her flour from southern Russia, on the other hand, she was exporting her surplus rice, cotton, silk, cheese, butter, dry fruits, wine and alcohol.

While Armenia has all the resources for a national life, at the present critical period of convalescence and rehabilitation after a terrible war, she is in need of friendly assistance from outside nations in the work of organizing and developing her possibilities.

These needs of Armenia are less than were those of other newly formed states in the past. To-day Armenia is already organized and prepared for national life to a greater extent than were Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, or Roumania during the first few years of their independence. The present needs of Armenia from outside are more moderate than were the needs of those states during the years of infancy.

The republic of Armenia is entitled to recognition and to temporary aid from the allied and associated powers, and above all, from the great democracy and Government of the United States of America, and respectfully asks:

1. That the United States recognize the government of the republic of Armenia.
2. That the rail line from Batum to the Armenian frontier be held, if possible, by a few thousand American troops or marines.
3. That the United States lend to the republic of Armenia, or enable it to procure a loan in the United States, for the following purposes:
 - (a) to purchase in the United States goods, munitions, and supplies for shipment to Armenia for the organization of an Armenian army of 30,000 men; and
 - (b) To purchase in the United States provisions and supplies for the relief of the civil population of Armenia until the crop of 1920.

The question of the unification of the present Armenian republic with Turkish Armenia is now before the peace conference at Paris. The whole Armenian nation is awaiting with hope and confidence for the decisive word of the United States of America, knowing well that the friendly voice of America will be the greatest guarantee the favorable solution of the Armenian question.

Respectfully submitted.

OH. KADJAZNOUNI

FOREIGN SOURCES AND AUTHORS ABOUT ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS

Transcaucasia and Ararat

Viscount James
Bryce Bryce

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TRANSCAUCASIA

AND

ARARAT

BEING NOTES OF A VACATION TOUR IN THE
AUTUMN OF 1876

BY

JAMES BRYCE

AUTHOR OF
'THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE'; 'THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH,' ETC.

WITH ENGRAVING AND COLOURED MAP

FOURTH EDITION REVISED

WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER ON THE RECENT
HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

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CHAPTER III TRANSCAUCASIA

In this chapter I shall attempt to give a sort of general sketch of the Russian territories lying to the south of the Caucasus, the richest, and, for the present at least, geographically the most important of all the Asiatic dominions of the Czar. It is, like the rest of this book, a record of first impressions only, but of impressions formed, as I venture to believe, without any pre-existing bias, and to a considerable extent tested by comparison with the conclusions which other travellers have reached. And even for first impressions there is this much to be said, that the risk of errors of observation and of hasty generalisation has some compensation in the freshness with which things present themselves to a new-comer. Occasionally he is struck by aspects of society or politics which are really true and important, but which one who has lived long in a country finds so familiar that they have ceased to stimulate his curiosity, and would perhaps be omitted from his descriptions. This may supply some justification for the apparent presumption of a traveller who admits that he had to see, and now has to write, more hastily than he could have wished. What I have got to say of particular parts of the country, such as Tiflis, the capital, and Armenia, is reserved for later chapters.

Transcaucasia is a convenient general name for the countries lying between the Black Sea, the Caspian, and the Caucasus, which make up the dominions of the Czar in Western Asia. It is not, however, an official Russian name, for although for some purposes they distinguish Ciscaucasia and Transcaucasia, the administrative district of lieutenancy of the empire which they call the Caucasus (Kavkaz) includes not only the regions south of the mountains, but also several governments lying to the north, in what the geographers call Europe. Nor does it denote any similarity or common character in these countries, the chief of which are Georgia, which lies along the upper course of the Kur, south of the Caucasus; Armenia, farther south, on the Araxes, between Georgia, Persia, and Turkey; Imeritia, west of Georgia; and Mingrelia, west of Imeritia, along the eastern coast of the Black Sea. However, it is a convenient name, and before speaking of each of these countries by itself, something may be said of the general physical features of Transcaucasia as a whole. It may be broadly described as consisting of two mountain regions and two plains. First, all along the north, there are the slopes of the Caucasus, which on this side (at least in its western half, for towards the east the main chain sinks quite abruptly into the levels of Kakhitia) sends off several lateral ranges descending far from the axis, and at last subsiding into a fertile and well-peopled hilly country. Secondly, on the south, over against the Caucasus, there is another mountain land, less elevated, but wider in extent, consisting of the chain which under various local names (some geographers have called it the Anti-Caucasus) runs from Lazistan at the south-east angle of the Black Sea away to the east and south-east till it meets the ranges of Persia. Towards the south, this chain ramifies all over Armenia, and here attains its greatest height in the volcanic summits of Ala Goz, 13,460 feet above the

sea, while northward its spurs form a hilly country stretching to Tiflis. These two mountain masses are connected by a ridge which, branching off from the Caucasus between Elbruz and Kazbek, the two best known of all the summits of that chain, divides the waters of the Kur from those of the Rion (Phasis), and is crossed by the great road and railway from Tiflis to the Black Sea near the town of Suram. Although of no great height—it is only about 3600 feet at Suram—this ridge has a most important influence (to be referred to presently) both on the climate and on the ethnology of the country. It is that which Strabo speaks of as inhabited by the Moschici¹, and is sometimes, therefore, called by modern geographers the Meschic ridge.

The two plains I have spoken of are of very unequal size. The eastern extends all along the Caspian, from the southern foot of the Caucasus to the Persian frontier, and runs up the valley of the Kur, gradually rising, to within a few miles of Tiflis. It is open, bare, and dry; is, in fact, what the Russians call steppe country, or the Americans prairie, through nearly its whole extent, and though the soil is fertile, much of it, especially towards the Caspian, is but thinly peopled or cultivated. The western plain, on the other hand, lying along the lower course of the Rion, between the Caucasus, the Anti-Caucasus, and the Black Sea, is moist and densely wooded, parts of it little better than a forest swamp, but the whole, where dry enough for tillage, extremely rich. It has all the appearance of having been, at no distant period, a bay of the Euxine, which may gradually have got filled up by the alluvium brought down by the Rion and other Caucasian streams. When this bay existed, and when the Caspian, which we know to have greatly shrunk, even in comparatively recent times, extended far up the valley of the Kur, and was joined to the Euxine at some point north of the Caucasus, the Caucasus itself formed an immense mountain peninsula, united to the highlands of Western Asia by an isthmus consisting of the Suram ridge already referred to and the elevated country east of it. And as at this time the Caspian was also, no doubt, connected with the Sea of Aral (which is only some 160 feet above the present level of the Caspian, and about 80 above the ocean), one may say that the Mediterranean then extended through this chain of inland seas, far into Central Asia, perhaps to the sites of Khiva, Tashkend, and Bokhara.

The climates of these two plains are strangely contrasted, and the ridge of Suram marks the boundary between them. On the Black Sea coast the winters are mild (mean winter temperature about 44 °F., mean annual temperature 58°), snow falls, perhaps, but hardly lies, all sorts of southern plants thrive in the open air, and the rainfall is so abundant that vegetation is everywhere, even up in the mountains, marvellously profuse. At Poti, the seaport at the mouth of the Rion which every traveller from the West is condemned to pass through, the most fever-smitten den in all Asia, one feels in a perpetual vapour bath, and soon becomes too enervated to take the most obvious precautions against the prevailing malady. Higher up, in the deep valleys of the Ingur

¹ Interpreters, from the time of Josephus downwards (who places them more towards Cappadocia), have sought to identify these Moschici or Meschi (as Procopius calls them, Goth. iv. 3) with the Mesech of the Bible (Gen. x. 2; Ps. cxx. 5).

and Kodor, rivers which descend from the great chain, the forests are positively tropical (though the vegetation itself is European) in the splendour of the trees and the rank luxuriance of the underwood. If there were a few roads and any enterprise, this country might drive a magnificent trade in wood and all sorts of natural productions.

This is the general character of the Black Sea coast. But when you cross the Meschic watershed at Suram, and enter the basin of the Kur, drawing towards the Caspian, everything changes. The streams are few, the grass is withered on the hillside, by degrees even the beechwoods begin to disappear; and as one gets farther and farther to the east, beyond Tiflis, there is in autumn hardly a trace of vegetation either on plain or hills, except along the courses of the shrunken rivers and on the northern slopes of the mountains that divide the basins of the Kur and Aras. In these regions the winter is very severe, and the summer heats are tremendous. At Lenkoran, on the Caspian, in latitude 38° N., the sea is often blocked with ice for two miles from the shore, and the average winter temperature is the same as that of Maestricht, in latitude 51°, or Reykjavik (in Iceland), in latitude 64°. The rainfall, which near Poti reaches 63 inches in the year, is at Baku only 137, and in some parts of the Aras valley only 5 inches. The explanation, of course, is that, while the moist westerly winds are arrested by the ridge at Suram, the eastern steppe lies open to the parching and bitter blasts which descend from Siberia and the frozen plains of Turkestan, while the scorching summers are not greatly moderated by the influence of a neighbouring sea.

In Armenia the same causes operate, with the addition that, as a good deal of the country stands at a great height above the sea-level, the winters are in those parts long and terrible. At Alexandropol, for instance, the great Russian fortress built over against Kars to watch it, and in which a large part of the Russian frontier army is always stationed, snow lies till the middle of April, spring lasts only about a fortnight, and during summer the country is parched like any desert².

A result of this remarkable dryness of the climate, away from the Black Sea and its influences, is that the landscapes of Eastern Transcaucasia are bare, brown, and generally dreary. If there was ever wood on the lower grounds, it has been long since cut away, and probably could hardly be made to grow if now replanted. There is a certain impressiveness in the wide views of bare brown open plains and stem red mountains which are so often before one in these countries, and, I fancy, in Persia also; the effects both of light and shade, and of colour, are broad, deep, solemn. These are the merits of Eastern landscapes generally, which an eye accustomed to the minuter prettiness of such a country as our own perhaps underrates. Admitting them, however, I must still remark that there is not much in Transcaucasia to attract the lover of natural beauty, except in two regions, the spurs of the Caucasus and the part of Armenia which lies round and commands a prospect of Mount Ararat. These are certainly considerable exceptions, for the scenery of each is quite unlike anything to be found in Europe. The luxuriant vegetation of the deep western valleys of the chain and the noble views of its

² The mean winter temperature of Alexandropol is 16° F.; its annual rainfall, 14.68 inches.

tremendous snowy summits, streaming with glaciers, present pictures surpassing even those of the Italian valleys of the Alps—pictures that one must go to the Himalaya to find a parallel for. Ararat, again, an isolated volcanic cone rising 17,000 feet above the sea and 14,400 feet above the plain at its own base, is a phenomenon the like of which hardly exists in the world.

Whether beautiful or the reverse, however, the country is nearly everywhere rich, and might do wonders if it were filled by a larger, more energetic, and better-educated population. There are little over three millions of people in it now;³ it could easily support twenty. The steppe soil is generally extremely fertile, needing nothing but irrigation to produce heavy crops of grain. In some parts, especially along the Araxes, cotton is raised. The warm valleys of Mingrelia and Imeritia produce maize, an important article of export, rice, and other southern cereals; corn grows up to a height of 5000 or 7000 feet, and the tea shrub thrives on the hills. The olive is not common, and, though the vine will grow almost everywhere, the wine is generally inferior. Some of that which is made in Armenia is tolerable, but by far the best is that of Kakhitia, a delightfully pretty region lying immediately under the great wall of the Eastern Caucasus, north-east of Tiflis. Its wine is sound and wholesome, albeit a little acid. The natives are very proud of it, and incessantly vaunt its merits as a specific against fever and otherwise; they certainly all follow the prescription, and the Georgians in particular, a race of jovial toppers, are apt to carry their appreciation a little too far. If it would bear travelling, it would be a valuable article of export; and possibly, when better methods of making it than the present very primitive ones are introduced, and when it is put in casks instead of buffalo hides smeared with naphtha, it may rival the wines of the Don and the Crimea in the markets of Southern Russia. Of the wealth of the western forests in box, walnut, and woods of all sorts, suited for furniture as well as shipbuilding, it is needless to speak; of the minerals, it is rather difficult, for although every one believes that there is abundance in the mountains, and there is constant talk of getting up companies to work them, very little has been done to determine their precise amount or quality. Coal certainly exists in the west, among the mountains of Imeritia, north-east of Kutais, but the abundance of wood has made people remiss in availing themselves of it. Iron and copper have been discovered in many places; the best copper mines hitherto opened lie in the northern declivity of the Karabagh Mountains, to the south-west of Elizavetpol, and are worked by Messrs. Siemens Brothers⁴.

Salt is abundant in Armenia, especially near Kulpi, on the Upper Aras; and the Mingrelians, who really have silver mines, appeal to the instance of the Golden Fleece as proof that the precious metals exist among them. There is no doubt that grains of gold are found in the detritus brought down by the Phasis and other streams, but

³ [The population is now (1896) nearly five millions, but a part of this increase is due to the addition of territory taken from Turkey in the war of 1877. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

⁴ [Manganese mines have been for some years past (1896) extensively worked on the west side of the Suram range, and the mineral has become an important export. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

whether it is true, as geographers and travellers have gone on repeating ever since Strabo set the story going, that the natives place fleeces in the current to catch the passing particles, I have not been able to ascertain. Sulphur has been got in Daghestan, and was used by Shamyl to make gunpowder when he could get none from Persia. Perhaps the most remarkable mineral product is naphtha or petroleum, which comes to the surface in many places, but most profusely near Baku, on the coast of the Caspian, in strong springs, some of which emit gas that is always burning, while others, lying close to or even below the sea, will sometimes discharge the spirit or gas over the water, so that, when a light is applied, and the weather is calm, the sea appears to take fire, and blue flames flicker for miles over the surface.⁵ Now and then, when a deep shaft has been sunk, the oil will shoot up into the air hundreds of feet high, like a geyser, and go on thus discharging for months. The place was greatly revered of old by the fire- worshippers, and after they were extirpated from Persia by the Mohammedans, who hate them bitterly, some few occasionally slunk here on pilgrimage. Now, under the more tolerant sway of the Czar, a solitary priest of fire is maintained by the Parsee community of Bombay, who inhabits a small temple built over one of the springs, and, like a vestal, tends the sacred flame by day and night.

If it is hard to give a general idea of a country so various in its physical aspects, it is even more so to describe its strangely mixed population. From the beginning of history, all sorts of tribes and races have lived in this isthmus between the Euxine and the Caspian, and though some of them may have now disappeared or been absorbed by others, new elements have pressed in from the north and east. Strabo, writing under Augustus, mentions four peoples as dwelling south of the Caucasus: the Colchians, along the Black Sea; the Iberians, farther to the east, beyond the cross ridge of Suram (which he calls an aytccov (elbow) of the Caucasus); the Albanians, still farther eastward, in the plains along the Caspian Sea; and the Armenians, to the south of all these, in the country we still call Armenia. To the north of the three former, the wooded valleys of the Caucasus were occupied by many wild tribes, more akin, says he, to the Sarma- tians, but speaking many different languages; one of the wildest are the Soanes, the name still borne by a rude and primitive race who inhabit the grandest part of the whole Caucasus, immediately to the south of Elbruz and Koshtantau, and of whom I have spoken in the preceding chapter. While these Soanes have been protected by their inaccessibility in the pathless recesses of the mountains, all trace of the names of Colchians, Iberians, and Albanians⁶ has long since passed away, and though Mingrelians now live where Jason found the Colchians, there is nothing to show

⁵ [Important oil springs have been discovered and are now (1896) being largely worked on the north side of the Caucasus also, at Grosny, 100 miles east of Vladikavkaz, and a little north of Novorossisk, near the Black Sea coast. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

⁶ Those who build ethnological theories on similarities of name may be asked to try to connect these Albanians with the Albanians of Epirus and the Scottish Alban, or these Iberians with the Iberians of Spain.

that any of the blood of Aeetes and Medea flows in their degenerate veins, though the names of the Greek hero and his formidable bride are used to-day as Christian names in the country. Russian ethnologists talk of a Karthalinian stock, to which Mingrelians, Imeritians, and Georgians, as well as some of the mountain tribes, are declared to belong. But, without discussing problems of ethnology for whose solution sufficient materials have not yet been collected, I will shortly describe the chief races that now occupy the country.

Beginning from the west, we find the Mingrelians along the Black Sea coast, from the Turkish border to Sukhum Kaleh. They are the ne'er-do-wells of the Caucasian family. All their neighbours, however backward a Western may think them, have a bad word and a kick for the still more backward Mingrelian. To believe them, he is lazy, sensual, treacherous, and stupid, a liar and a thief. The strain in which the Russians and Armenians talk of them reminded me of the description one gets from the Transylvanian Saxons and Magyars of the Wallachs or Roumans who live among them. You ask what kind of people the Wallachs are. "A dirty people," they answer, "a treacherous people, a lazy people, a superstitious people, a cruel people, a gluttonous people. Otherwise not such a bad kind of people." (*Sonst ist es keitt schlechtes Volk.*) Lazy the Mingrelian certainly is, but in other respects I doubt if he is worse than his neighbours; and he lives in so damp and warm a climate that violent exercise must be disagreeable. He is a well-made, good-looking fellow, but with a dull and perhaps rather sensual expression. And he is certainly backward in agriculture and trade, making very little of a singularly rich country. South of Mingrelia lies Guria, on the slopes and ridges of the Anti-Caucasus, a land where the people are more vigorous and upright, and where, as they have been less affected by conquest and immigration, the picturesque old costumes have best maintained themselves. West of the Mingrelians, in the hilly regions of the Upper Rion and its tributaries, live the Imeritians, a race speaking the Georgian language, who may generally be distinguished by their bushy hair. My personal knowledge of them is confined to three waiters at three several inns, rather a narrow basis for induction, but quite as wide as many travellers have had for some very sweeping conclusions. They have a better name than the Mingrelians, both for industry and honesty, and these three waiters were pleasant, civil fellows, though not particularly bright.

Still farther east, and occupying the centre of Transcaucasia, are the Georgians, called by the Russians Grusinians or Grusians, who may be considered the principal and, till the arrival of the Muscovite, the dominant race of the country. They call themselves Karthli, deducing their origin from a patriarch Karthlos (who was brother of Haik, the patriarch of the Armenian nation, and of Legis, the ancestor of the Lesghians), a grandson, or, as others hold, great-grandson of Gomer, son of Japhet. According to their own legends, they worshipped the sun and the moon and the five planets, and swore by the grave of Karthlos until converted to Christianity by St. Nina, in the fourth century of our era. For several centuries their kingdom extended almost to the Black

Sea in one direction and the Caspian in another, and maintained itself with some credit against the hostility of Turks and Persians, though often wasted by Persian armies, and for long periods obliged to admit the suzerainty of the Shah. Its heroic age was the time of Queen Tamara, who flourished in the twelfth century, and is still honoured by pictures all over the country, in which she appears as a beautiful Amazon, not unlike the fancy portraits of Joan of Arc. To her is ascribed the foundation of every ancient church or monastery, just as all the strongholds are said to have been built by the robber Kir Oghlu,⁷ and as in Scotland there is hardly an old mansion but shows Wallace's sword and Queen Mary's apartment. Somewhat later the kingdom became divided into three, Kakhetia, Kartli, or Georgia proper, on the Upper Kur, and Imeritia; and in the period of weakness that followed it began to look for help to Russia. As early as 1492, a king of Kakhetia invoked the Czar Ivan III., and in 1638 the king of Imeritia swore fealty to Alexis Mihailovitch. The famous treaty of Kainardji in 1774 (about which we have had so many lively discussions) placed Georgia, Imeritia, and Mingrelia under the protection of Russia. However, *the coup de grâce* was given by the invasion of the Persians, under Aga Mohammed Khan, in 1795, which reduced Georgia to such wretchedness that the reigning king George made over his dominions to Alexander I. in 1799, and the country was finally occupied by Russian troops in 1802.⁸ One sees traces of a sort of feudal period in the numerous castles; most of them mere square towers, such as we see on the coast of Scotland and the north of Ireland, which lie scattered all over Georgia and Imeritia; and the organisation of society was till quite lately feudal, the peasantry villeins under the native kings, and reduced under the Russians to serfdom, while the upper class consisted of landowning nobles and their immediate dependants. It is a joke among the Russians that every Georgian is a noble; and as the only title of nobility is Prince, the effect to an English ear of hearing all sorts of obscure people, country postmasters, droshky drivers, sometimes even servants, described as being Prince So-and-so, is at first grotesque. The number of noble families is, however, really not very large. I have heard it put as low as thirty, but as the title goes to all the children, each of the families has a vast number of titled members. This at least may be said for the numerous nobility, that, although it has been charged with vanity and frivolity, it does not despise all honest occupations. And some of the Georgian noble houses have pedigrees, apparently authentic pedigrees, older than any to be found in Europe.

Every one has heard of the Georgian beauties, who in the estimation of Turkish importers rivalled or surpassed those of Circassia itself. Among them a great many

⁷ Stories of Kir (or Kara = Black) Oghlu are told all about the country. One, localised in Armenia, represents him as meeting a party of travellers, and among them one with pistols (then lately invented) stuck in his belt. He asks what those things are, and, when their use is explained to him, exclaims, "Farewell, Kir Oghlu, your occupation is gone," rides off into the mountains, and is never more seen.

⁸ Russia, however, did not acquire Imeritia till 1810, the Mingrelian coast till 1829 (by the Treaty of Adrianople), the Caspian coast south of the mouth of the Kur till 1813, and the valley of the Middle Araxes till 1828. She had already obtained from Persia, between 1797 and 1802, Daghestan and Shirvan as far as the Kur mouth.

handsome and even some beautiful faces may certainly be seen, regular and finely chiselled features, a clear complexion, large and liquid eyes, an erect carriage, in which there is a good deal of dignity as well as of voluptuousness. To a taste, however, formed upon Western models, mere beauty of features and figure, without expression, is not very interesting; and these beautiful faces frequently want expression. Nor have they always that vivacity which, in the parallel case of the women of Andalusia, partly redeems the deficiency of intelligence. Admirable as pieces of Nature's handiwork, they are not equally charming. A Turk may think them perfection, but it may be doubted whether any one who had seen the ladies of Cork or Baltimore would take much pleasure in their society. However, this is a point on which people will disagree to the end of time; and those who hold that it is enough to look at a beauty without feeling inclined to talk to her need not go beyond Georgia to find all they can wish. It must be remembered, however, that this loveliness is rather fleeting. Towards middle life the complexion is apt to become sallow, and the nose and chin rather too prominent, while the vacuity of look remains. One is told that they are, as indeed the whole nation is, almost uneducated, with nothing but petty personal interests to fill their thoughts or animate their lives.⁹

The men are sufficiently good-looking and pleasing in manner, with, perhaps, a shade of effeminacy in their countenances, at least in those of the lowland. They do not strike one as a strong race, either physically or otherwise, though they have produced some remarkable men, and having obtained civilisation and Christianity in the fourth century of our era, have ever since maintained their religion and national existence with great tenacity against both Turks and Persians. So early as the sixth century, Procopius compliments the Iberians (who are doubtless the ancestors of our Georgians) on their resolute adherence to Christian rites in spite of the attacks of the Persian fire-worshippers,¹⁰ who, it may be remarked in passing, seem to have been the first to set the example of religious persecution. The Muslims say that the Christianity of the Georgians is owing to their fondness for wine and for pork, both which good things, as everybody knows, the Prophet has forbidden to true believers. They belong to the Orthodox Eastern Church, and are now in full communion with the Church of Russia, of which indeed they may be said to have become a branch, though they have strong grounds for demanding to be recognised as autocephalous, and their liturgy differs a little in some points from the Russian. During the earlier middle ages I suspect that they were more influenced by Armenia than by Constantinople, though they had separated from the Armenian Church in the end of the sixth century, when the latter finally anathematised the Council of Chalcedon. The Georgian Church claims the distinction of

⁹ [Since the above was written a new spirit has worked upon Georgian society, and I am told that the women are now better educated and far more interested in intellectual pursuits and in public affairs than they were in 1876. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

¹⁰ Kobad, the reigning king of Persia, whose supremacy the Iberians then owned, had tried to force them over to his faith, and began by ordering them to desist from burying their dead, and to adopt the Persian practice of exposing the dead body to the birds and beasts. They refused, and sought help from the Romans (Procop. Pers. 1. 12).

never having, at any time, lapsed into any heresy. Their ecclesiastical alphabet—for they have two—resembles the Armenian. Of their number it is difficult to form an estimate; it can hardly exceed 500,000 souls, and may be considerably less.¹¹

Scattered through Upper Georgia, and to be found among the peasantry as well as in the towns, there is a considerable Armenian population, who probably settled here when their national kingdom was destroyed by the Seljukian conquerors, Alp Arslan and Malek Shah, in the eleventh century. Farther south, in Armenia proper, they constitute the bulk of the population in the country districts, Kurds being mixed with them in the mountains, Tatars in the plains, and Persians in the towns. As I shall have to recur to them in a later chapter, it is enough to remark here that they are the most vigorous and intelligent of the Transcaucasian races, with a gift for trade which has enabled them to get most of the larger business of the country into their hands. Their total number in these countries is estimated at 550,000.¹² Between them and the Georgians there is little cordiality, especially as their wealthy men are apt to be creditors, and the Georgians apt to be debtors.

Going down the Kur from Tiflis towards the Caspian, one finds the Georgians give place to a people whom the Russians call Tatars, and who are unquestionably a branch of the great Turkic family. When or how they settled here, no one can precisely tell, but it seems likely the earliest immigration was from the north, along the Caspian coast. There is no doubt that the Emperor Heraclius, in his long war with Persia in the middle of the seventh century, called in to his aid the Khazars, a Scythian tribe, from the Caspian steppe north of Derbend. Probably these Khazars were the first Turks who settled on this side the mountains; but many others must have come in afterwards from the south-east at the time of the great Seljukian conquests in the eleventh century. The Albanians of Strabo's time seem to have disappeared as a nation. Veritable Turks these fellows certainly are, quite unlike the mongrel race who go by the name of the Turks in Europe, and much more resembling, in face, figure, and character, the pure undiluted Turkman of Khiva and the steppes of the Jaxartes. Being in some districts a settled and industrious race, they are, however, less wild-looking than the Turkmans, and remind one more of the grave and respectable Tatar of Kazan or the Crimea. Their villages, often mere burrows in the dry soil, are scattered all over the steppe eastward to the Caspian, and southward as far as the Persian frontier. Many are agricultural, many more live by their sheep and cattle, which in summer are driven up towards the Armenian mountains and in winter return to the steppe; and some of them, settled in the larger towns, practise various handicrafts, and among others weave rich carpets and other woollen fabrics which pass in the markets of Europe under the name of Persian.¹³

¹¹ The total number of the Grusinian race, including Imeritians and Mingrelians, is estimated by a recent Russian statistician of authority at 850,000. [A more recent estimate (Caucasian Calendar of 1896), based on the census of 1886, gives the total number of persons of Georgian stock in the governments of Tiflis and Kutais at 1,247,963. —Note to Fourth Edition.]

¹² [It is now (1896) much larger, probably nearly 800,000. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

¹³ [Some of the wealthiest among the well-owners and refiners of mineral oil at Baku are Tatars. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

The Tatars are also the general carriers of the country. On the few roads, or oftener upon the open steppe, one sees their endless trains of carts, and more rarely their strings of camels, fetching goods from Shamakha, or Baku, or Tavriz, to Tiflis, thence to be despatched over the Dariel into Southern Russia, or by railway to Poti and Western Europe. The last of their occupations, the one in which they most excel, and which they have almost to themselves, is brigandage. To what extent it prevails, I cannot attempt to say, for, as every traveller knows, there is no subject, not even court scandal, on which one hears such an immense number of stories, some of them obviously exaggerated, many of them honestly related, most of them absolutely impossible to test if we had believed a quarter part of what the quidnuncs of Tiflis told us, we should have thought the country seriously disturbed, and travelling, especially by night, full of peril. If we had gone by our own experience, we should have pronounced the steppes of the Kur a great deal safer than Blackheath Common. Stories were always being brought into the city, and even appearing in the papers, of robberies, sometimes of murders; committed on the roads to Elizavetpol and Erivan; and along the latter road, we found the folk at the post stations with imaginations ready to see a Tatar behind every bush. Even the Russian officials at Tiflis, who of course desired to make little of anything that reflects on the vigilance of the Government, advised us to be careful where we halted, and how we displayed any valuables. I cannot help believing, therefore, that robberies do sometimes occur, and no doubt it is the Tatars, or at least bands led by a Tatar chief, who perpetrate them. But the substantial danger is not really more than sufficient to give a little piquancy to travelling, and make you fondle your pistols with the air of a man who feels himself prepared for an emergency. In a dull country, far removed from the interests and movements of the Western world, the pleasure of life is sensibly increased when people have got the exploits of robbers to talk about. It is a subject level with the meanest imagination; the idle Georgian noble and the ignorant peasant enjoy it as heartily as Walter Scott himself.

Some of the tales related about these robbers remind one of the legends of Robin Hood and other high-minded outlaws, who relieved the rich in order to relieve the poor. It is told, for instance, of Dali Agha, whom one heard talked of as the most famous of these brigand chiefs, that, being in love with the daughter of a man of substance, her father refused to give her to him except for a large sum of money. Dali was poor, but brave and sanguine; he demanded two years' time to collect it, and when the father promised to wait for so long, he took to the road to collect the sum by robbery; and though the faithless father had married the girl to another suitor before the appointed time, he liked the profession so well that he has not quitted it.¹⁴ He is at the head of a large band, and directs them to use all possible courtesy towards their victims, who are never killed except in case of necessity. Out of his plunder he gives freely to the poor,

¹⁴ A similar tale was told of the robber Arsen many years ago; so I daresay it is a stock incident, applied to every famous robber in turn, and may (who knows?) be a form of the Sun and Dawn myth.

and is so much beloved that no one will betray him; once, while Cossacks were scouring the country after him, he was living quietly in Erivan under the governor's nose. A physician in Government employment was travelling towards Elizavetpol to inspect the hospitals of his district, when he saw two suspicious persons on horseback a little way off, and drove faster on. As he turned the corner of a hill, three more appeared, and then a band, whose leader rode forward and wished him good evening. "Good evening," replied the doctor, who recognised the bandit. "I perceive you are in want of money; well, I haven't got much, only some hundred roubles; here they are in my trunk." "I see you are a good man," says Dali; "on what business are you travelling?" The doctor explains that he is going to visit a hospital, and needs some little money to reach it, so begs Dali to let him have a couple of roubles, which will pay for the post-horses thither. "You shall have fifty," Dali answered, and, taking them from his followers, who had opened the trunk, "here they are for you. And on your way back, stop at this place; my men will meet you and bring you to me; you shall be my guest for the night."

Another time, some of the band seized a poor priest who was travelling home with twenty-five roubles, which he had scraped together as a dowry for his daughter. Fearing for his life, he gives them the money, and is led to Dali, whom he finds in a thick wood, seated on a carpet-spread divan. Dali, seeing him to be a priest, receives him with respect—there is a good feeling between Mohammedans and Christians in some parts of these countries—makes him sit down, offers him coffee, sweetmeats, and a pipe, and hears the story of the dowry for the daughter's marriage. He apologises for the conduct of his men, and, pointing to the bales of precious stuffs that lie around, bids the captive take out of them the worth of twenty-five roubles. The priest does so, and, finding that the robbers are not watching him, he pockets a good deal more, thinking, I suppose, that he was spoiling the Egyptians, and makes off with his booty. However, he is pursued and caught by some of the band, who had not understood that he was to be favourably treated. Brought back before Dali, he is in terror lest they should discover how much he has taken, and flings himself down to beg for his life. Dali interrupts him, repeats that he is sorry anything was taken from so poor a man. "It was an unfortunate mistake, but mistakes will sometimes occur, and you must pardon it. Here, however, are twenty-five roubles; it is my gift to your daughter for her marriage portion; give them to her from Dali Agha and go in peace."

Whatever truth there is in such stories as these, they show the way in which the country people regard the robbers, and explain why brigandage still holds its ground against the efforts of the Government.¹⁵ Some people give another reason, and say that the inferior officials do not care to put it down, but take a share of the spoils, and sometimes, when they have caught a notable robber, release him for a good round ransom which his friends will always pay. This I believe to be a calumny, though of course such a thing may have occurred once and again; the chief difficulty in the way of

¹⁵ [I am informed that brigandage exists to-day (1896); and that robber bands are sometimes bold enough to attack the factories of European settlers, when these lie in solitary places. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

putting down brigandage is the vicinity of the Persian and Turkish dominions, into which marauders can easily escape, and whence the bands are constantly recruited by all sorts of adventurous spirits, who have lived under a government so bad that lawlessness seems justified. Take them all in all, these brigands, if they are not, as one of my informants said, "fine fellows who mean no harm," are evidently much better fellows than the members of their profession in Sicily or Greece, and deserve to be ranked with Dick Turpin or Claude Duval. Very different are the Turkman robbers who infest the road from the Caspian to Teheran, or those still fiercer tribes, described by Vámbéry, in the deserts of Khorassan and Bokhara, who carry off into cruel slavery all whom they do not kill on the spot.¹⁶

Besides these four nations, and the Armenians who live scattered among them, there are plenty of Persians in Transcaucasia, especially towards the south-west angle of the Caspian, and on the Aras, beyond Erivan, a region which Russia acquired from Persia only in 1828. They are singularly unlike the Tatars, whose enemies they have been ever since the mythic times of Sohrab and Rostum, and have an even deeper cause of hatred than this old one of race, for while some of the Tatars, like the Osmanli Turks and the Turkmans, are Sunni Mohammedans, the Persians are Shiah, who reject and abominate the three first Khalifs and honour Ali almost as much as the Prophet himself. Here, however, they live peaceably enough together. The Tatar is mostly tall and robust, with a round face, rather prominent cheek-bones, a short nose, and small eyes. The Persian is slim, lithe, stealthy, and cat-like in his movements; his face is long, of a clear yellowish tint, his eyes dark and rather large, nose aquiline, eyebrows delicately arched. The Tatar is inclined to be open; he is faithful to his word, and more (inclined to force than to fraud; the Persian has the name of being the greatest liar in the East. "In Iran no man believes another" has become in these countries almost a proverb. With these moral disadvantages, the Persians are no doubt in many ways a superior race, industrious and polished even in the dregs of their civilisation, after centuries of tyranny and misgovernment. In their time they produced great men, rulers such as Kai Khosru (the just Nushirvan) and Shah Abbas the Great; poets like Firdusi and Omar Khayyam; metaphysicians whose names are hardly known in the West. Their carpets and silks and metal work are still full of exquisite taste and finish. But modern Persia, from all that one can hear, is more execrably misgoverned than Turkey itself. The duty of the governor of a province or town is simply to squeeze as much money as he can out of the inhabitants; his methods are the bastinado, impalement, crucifixion, burying up to the neck in the ground, and similar tortures.

Besides these aboriginal races, Georgians, Mingrelians, Caucasian mountaineers, and Armenians, and the incomers of old standing, such as Tatars and Persians¹⁷, there

¹⁶ [These Turkman tribes have, since the above was written, been subdued by Russia. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

¹⁷ A recent Russian statistical estimate gives the number of Turks and Persians in Transcaucasia at 790,000, that of the Steppe - Tatars at 90,000.

is what may be called a top-dressing of recent immigrants from Europe, mostly Russians and Germans. The Russians, with one exception, consist of the officials, who generally consider Russia as their home, almost as our Indian civilians consider England, and intend to return to it when their work is over. The exception is formed by the various sects of dissenters whom the Government, fearing their disturbing political and social influence, has banished, or at least transferred, to these remote seats. They are mostly industrious, well-disposed people, morally, if not intellectually, above the level of the rest of the peasantry, who live in large villages, exactly like those of Central Russia, and keep themselves quite apart from the surrounding native population.¹⁸ Still more distinct are the Germans, of whom there are several colonies, the largest, established in Tiflis, numbering some four or five thousand souls. They came hither from Wiirtemberg about sixty years ago, driven out by an obnoxious hymn-book. In respect of education and intelligence, they are of course far above any of the natives, while their Protestantism prevents them from intermarrying with, and therefore from sensibly affecting, their Russian neighbours. They have lost, if they ever possessed, the impulse of progress; their own farms are the best in the country, and their handicraftsmen in Tiflis superior to the Georgians or Persians; but they are content to go on in their old ways, not spreading out from the community, not teaching or in any way stimulating the rest of the population.

All these races live together, not merely within the limits of the same country, a country politically and physically one, but to a great extent actually on the same soil, mixed up with and crossing one another. In one part Georgians, in another Armenians, in a third Tatars, predominate; but there are districts where Armenians and Georgians, or Armenians, Georgians, and Tatars, or Tatars and Persians, or Persians, Tatars, and Armenians, are so equally represented in point of numbers that it is hard to say which element predominates. This phenomenon—so strange to one who knows only the homogeneous population of West European countries, or of a country like America, where all sorts of elements are day by day being flung into the melting-pot, and lose their identity almost at once— comes out most noticeably in the capital of Transcaucasia, the city of Tiflis. Here six nations dwell together in a town smaller than Brighton, and six languages are constantly, three or four more occasionally, to be heard in the streets. Varieties of dress, religion, manners, and physical aspect correspond to these diversities of race.

The traveller's or interpreter's *lingua franca* of Eastern and Southern Transcaucasia and the Caucasus generally is what the Russians call Tartar (or rather Tatar), but what we should call Turkish, as it differs from the Osmanli of Constantinople only in being somewhat rougher, and having adopted fewer foreign words. The official language, and that which in a civilised city like Tiflis is usually the general means of intercourse between persons of different nationalities, is Russian,

¹⁸ These dissenters, or some of them, are from time to time very harshly treated by the Russian Government.

which, in spite of its difficulty, is learnt and spoken by a great many Armenians and Persians, and by most of the German colonists. In Georgia itself and the region farther west, Imeritia and Mingrelia, Georgian carries one pretty well through, the dialects of these peoples apparently belonging to the same parent stock.

These peoples inhabit the more or less level country south of the Caucasus. Besides them, there is a multitude of mountain tribes of whom I have said something in the last preceding chapter, but who are far too numerous and too diverse in their character to be described at length. Probably nowhere else in the world can so great a variety of stocks, languages, and religions be found huddled together in so narrow an area as in the Caucasian chain between the Euxine and the Caspian. It is as if every nation that passed from north to south, or west to east, had left some specimens of its people here behind to found a kind of ethnological museum. Of some of these tribes, especially of those inhabiting Daghestan and the Eastern Caucasus generally, hardly anything is known, that is, scientifically known: I doubt if an enumeration of them exists in any book.

All these tribes and regions, both of the mountain and of the plain, have now accepted the rule of Russia. The country is quiet from sea to sea. Save for an occasional outbreak among the Suans when the tax-gatherer or land-surveyor makes his appearance, one may travel unharmed through mountain and plain with a small escort, or perhaps unescorted altogether. It is surprising enough when one remembers how unsafe places nearer home are, and how long it took to suppress private war and brigandage in civilised Europe. The Russian military organisation deserves part of the credit, but even more is to be attributed to the sort of simplicity of manners which many of these tribes retain, to the absence of travellers to be plundered, to the isolation in which they live, separated from the world and one another by prodigious mountain masses. Some of them are pagans to this day, and others who, like the Suans, call themselves Christians, have preserved nothing of it but the internal arrangements of a church and one or two ceremonies whose meaning has been long since forgotten. Often they mix it with paganism, much in the fashion of the Tcheremiss of whom Mr. Wallace tells the story that he sacrificed a foal to the Virgin Mary. Much remains to be done in investigating the customs and beliefs, as well as the languages, of these people, and it is surprising to find that so few of those assiduous Germans who explore every corner of human knowledge should have been at work here.

That Russian influence, bringing science and civilisation in its train, should not have penetrated the hidden nooks of these mountains, may well be understood. One is less prepared to find how little it has changed the accessible regions of Georgia and Mingrelia, where, although the capital is a little Paris in its way, the country parts remain much what they were a century ago. The reason, however, soon discloses itself to a traveller, that Russian government is before all things military. The first object thought of is the movement of troops, the organisation of the army, the planting of fortresses and barracks. This was natural and necessary while the war in the Caucasus lasted, but

since 1864, when the Tcherkesses of the west submitted, the same system seems to have been maintained. Such roads as have been made, and they are few, were made almost wholly for military purposes, and a sort of military atmosphere still pervades all Transcaucasia. While the Dariel military road cost £4,000,000, and Daghestan is traversed by two or three beautiful lines of road with iron bridges over the torrents, many fertile parts of European Russia are almost without any means of internal communication.¹⁹ An enormous army, something like 150,000 men, is kept in these provinces always on a war footing. Upon this force the Government has had to spend vast sums, and consequently there has been neither the money nor the thought and care that are needed to bestow upon the material development of the land and the intellectual development of the people. Nor is this a process for which the Russians have yet proved themselves to have a gift. They have a wonderfully elaborate system of government, but the machinery is so complicated that the force is spent in making it move at all, and hardly reaches the material to be acted upon. The effect, therefore, considered as a means of improvement, is small in proportion to the cost (poorly as the *employees* are paid) and to the number of officials at work. And the civil service loses that sense of initiative which is so precious in half-civilised countries. They go on working their bureaux among these Asiatics much as if they were in Novgorod or Riga, forgetting that what is wanted is not to maintain the existing state of things, but to improve it, to enlighten and stimulate these backward races.

For some time past the whole Caucasus (*i.e.* both Transcaucasia and the governments immediately north of the mountains) has formed a separate administrative division of the Russian empire, governed by a lieutenant who is directly responsible to the Czar.²⁰ The lieutenant was in 1876 the Grand Duke Michael, a brother of Alexander II., who succeeded in 1867 to Prince Bariatinski, the conqueror of Shamyl. Like all, or nearly all, of the Imperial family, he has been personally courteous and popular, and was said to discharge his official duties well. The higher offices, both military and civil, are of course filled by Russians, many of them, as everywhere in the empire, of German extraction, or else by Armenians. All subjects, however, are admissible to office; this has been long a tradition of Russian administration,²¹ and it is no doubt one reason of its success in conciliating the good-will of its subjects, wherever there has not been, as

¹⁹ [Railways have, however, been of late years greatly extended in Russia. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

²⁰ Transcaucasia and Daghestan consist of the following six governments, whose respective populations I append: — Tiflis, 650,000; Erivan, 436,000; Eliravetpol, 503,000; Baku, 486,000; Kutais, 650,000; Daghestan, 450,000. [These numbers have now (1896) all increased. The latest figures I have been able to obtain, dating from 1889, are as follows: — Tiflis, 819,264; Erivan, 677,491; Elizavetpol, 753,395; Baku, 744,930; Kutais, 955,000; Daghestan, 597,356. To these must now be added the government of Kars, including most of the territory ceded by the Turks in 1878-79 (the rest belongs to Kutais); population, 237,114. The Caucasus is now no longer a separate lieutenancy. — *Note to Fourth Edition.*]

²¹ [I am informed that it is now (1896) much less observed than it was in 1876, Russia having become jealous both of Georgians and of Armenians. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

in the dismal case of Poland, a vehement race and religious hatred to begin with between conquerors and conquered. The sort of good-nature and susceptibility to impressions which is so marked a feature in the Russian character makes them get on far better with strange races than either we or the Dutch or the Spaniards have ever been able to do. It is not occasional acts of cruelty, it is not even a permanently repressive system, that makes conquerors hated nearly so much as coldness, hauteur, contempt, an incapacity to appreciate or sympathise with a different set of customs and ideas. Doubtless the English govern India far better than the Russians do their Asiatic dominions. That is to say, we do more to promote the welfare of the people and administer a pure justice, and we hold ourselves far more impartial in religious matters. For though Russia does not interfere with Islam, and has had the prudence to respect the Armenian Church, she is hostile to both Roman Catholic and Protestant missions, and does her best to advance her own Church in every way. Nevertheless there does not seem to be either in the Caucasian countries or in the south and east of European Russia, where so many strange races live beneath the sceptre of the Czar, so much bitterness of feeling among the subjects as there is towards ourselves, among certain sections of the better-educated class, in India, or to the French in Algiers now, and in the West Indies formerly. Perhaps this is partly because the Russians leave their subjects more to themselves, while we try to improve them; and the fact that in Georgia there is no distinction of faith or of colour between the two races has something to do with it. The Tatar Mohammedans, however, do not seem to have anything to complain of, either here or at Kazan on the Volga, where so many of them live, and one never hears that they are disaffected to the Czar, in spite of the long strife of the middle ages and the fanaticism of the Russian peasantry. So that, after all, there seems to be a good deal in the difference of manner with which we and they behave to inferior races. With us, every word and look betrays a sense of immeasurable superiority. Sometimes we are brusque, sometimes we are politely condescending, but we are always at bottom contemptuous, and contempt makes deeper wounds than violence. In India and China the fault naturally reaches its climax, but the whole continent of Europe can hardly be wrong in accusing us of a milder form of it; indeed, every Englishman who is honest with himself must admit that whenever he travels in a foreign country, he is conscious of some stirrings of this haughty insular spirit. Among the Romans there must have been plenty of this spirit in their era of conquest. The Spaniards have given much offence in the same way. The Americans, with all their self-complacency, are comparatively free from it. But the Russians have really very little of it. Perhaps they would be stronger if they had more; but at any rate its absence largely covers or atones for some of their defects as a conquering and governing power.

The upshot of this digression is that Transcaucasia is on the whole a fairly contented and peaceable part of the Czar's dominions, and that this is due partly to the apathy of the Russians, partly to their good-nature, partly to their being in religious matters in sympathy with the faith of so large a part of their subjects. In the autumn of

1876, when war with Turkey was daily expected, no one seemed to have any fear of an insurrection even among the Lesghians, though it was only some twenty years since they used to swoop down from the mountains and carry off landowners from their country-houses a few stages out of Tiflis. Since Shamil's surrender in 1859, there had been but one attempt at a rising in Daghestan, and that speedily ended by the head of the leader being sent by his own people to the Russians at Tiflis. In the summer of 1877, news came of a disturbance among the Mohammedan Tchetchens, who live to the north of the Caucasus, south-east of Vladikavkaz. It did not prove serious; and the idea which some people in Europe entertained of its spreading westward to the Black Sea, where the Turks had effected a landing, and of a general rising among the Caucasian tribes, showed how little Europe knew of these countries. The Circassians, whom the Turks were supposed to be endeavouring to excite, were too few to be formidable: most of them perished or emigrated in 1864; the Abkhasians, who are left along the coast about Sukhum, are fickle and inert;²² the Imeritians, Mingrelians, and Gurians towards Batum are Christians, a people not much inclined to fight for anybody, and certainly not against the Czar; among the remaining tribes there is no community in race, language, or religion which could enable them to co-operate were they ever so disaffected. The only thing that could have made an insurrection among any of them dangerous to Russian movements would have been a seizure of the Dariel military road, and of that there was no likelihood.²³ The same laws, the same mechanism of courts, the same educational system, omitting diversities of detail, obtain in these provinces as in European Russia. The great emancipation of the serfs, which here took place on the 1st of December 1866, was carried out much upon the same lines as elsewhere; the peasantry of Georgia and Mingrelia, where villenage, turned by the Russians into serfdom, prevailed from the middle ages downwards, are now all free, and the ancient, semi-feudal jurisdictions of the Mingrelian and Imeritian nobles have been replaced by the new-modelled Russian courts. Practically, indeed, education is still more backward than it is in Europe. There are comparatively few elementary schools; the upper schools are said to be poor, and are much hampered by difficulties of language, for the school-books in every subject are Russian, though Russian is a foreign tongue to the immense majority of the pupils.²⁴ There is no university nearer than Kharkof or Odessa; the necessity for one in Tiflis is admitted, but the money is not forthcoming, since considerable salaries would be needed to tempt learned men so far

²² [The latest figures give only 4100 Mohammedans in the district of Sukhum Kaleh, where the Abkhasians live. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

²³ [The Dariel road is now less important as a military route because Russia has both the Black Sea and the Caspian over which she can send troops and stores to Transcaucasia, and has a line of railway all the way from Batum on the former to Baku on the latter sea. She commands the seas, having no possible opponent on the Caspian, and nothing to fear from the (now rotting) fleet of Turkey on the Black Sea. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

²⁴ [In this respect things have not advanced much since 1876. The last figures I have seen give for the government of Kutais, for instance, only 28,000 children in schools of all kinds out of a total population of not much short of a million. And the schools are said to be very inferior. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

from home, and all the money that can be got is wanted for the army and railways. Of literature, one of course expects to find very little, and except in the capital there is no public to care for it. Agriculture is much what it may have been five centuries ago, witness the implements used. The plough is a ruder contrivance than that which Hesiod describes; no wonder that a large team is needed to drag it through the hard dry earth. Just outside the houses of Tiflis I have seen no less than sixteen oxen yoked to a single plough. The want of a market discourages improvements in tillage, as well as trade generally, for although there is a railway to the Black Sea, with steamers thence to Odessa and Constantinople, as well as one or two great roads through the country, such as that to Erivan, there are no roads of the second order to bring produce to the railway from places lying even a few miles away. The manufactures, as already remarked, are mostly of what we should call Persian goods, or of arms, which the Georgians chase most tastefully, and other articles in metal, silver flagons, belts, daggers, and so forth. Things needed for ordinary life, such as cutlery, crockery, glass, paper, cotton goods, are mostly brought from European Russia. What export trade there is—and it is not, considering the resources to be drawn upon, of any great consequence—is mostly in carpets and silks, made in the Tatar country towards the Caspian or among the Persians of Lenkoran, naphtha from Baku, and woods, especially box-wood and walnut roots, from Mingrelia and the south-west slopes of the Caucasus.²⁵ Nature has made the country rich, but the course of events has not brought to it that which a country needs to develop its riches, capital and enterprise.²⁶ Both must come from without, and at present Russia can spare neither. Her capital is all wanted at home; her peasants, except some sects of dissenters who have been deported hither by the Czars, have not crossed the mountains to colonise, nor are they the sort of colonists that change the face of a country as Americans do. They are uneducated, attached to their old ways, unreceptive of new ideas even in a new land.

If it is hard to convey an impression of the general character of Transcaucasia, the reason possibly is that it has not one general character, but two or three. It is like a mixed tissue, whose colour seems to vary according as the light falls this way or that upon it. There is no place in Europe except Constantinople, and probably few places in the world, where one feels in the middle, so to speak, of so many cross-currents, so

²⁵ [The supply of walnut and box is said to be now (1896) nearly exhausted, and such cargoes of these woods as are exported are the produce, not of Transcaucasian forests, but of those which clothe the mountains in Persia at the southern extremity of the Caspian. A good deal of oak timber is said to be now sent from Batum. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

²⁶ [Since 1876 plenty of foreign capital, mostly English, has come into the country, and its natural resources have been largely developed. The chief centre of this development has been the oil-field of Baku, where in the year 1895 more than 6,000,000 tons of crude oil were produced. In that year 1,040,000 tons, mostly of oil for burning, were exported from the ports of Batum and Novorossisk. The rest, including a vast quantity of what are called “residues,”—that which remains when the burning oil has been taken off, — went to the interior of European Russia, where these residues are largely used as fuel in manufacturing industries. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

many diverse associations of the past and possibilities for the future. Perhaps this puzzling, pleasing complexity, creating a desire to predict as well as to explain, and a sense of the difficulty of prediction, is the thing which makes the country so full of interest. It is Eastern—Eastern not only in the dry, bare glowing landscape (I speak chiefly of the Caspian basin), but in the look of the villages, the bazaars, the agriculture, the sense of immobility. Yet many Oriental features are wanting. It is Christian, to begin with. The ruined castles of the nobility, with peasants' dwellings clustering beneath them, have an air of Western feudalism. In the large towns, and along the great roads, one feels the influence of Russia, and the influence of Russia, superficially at least, suggests the influence of France. The streets are filled with men in uniform; the hotels, where the town is big enough to have more than a wretched *duchan*, or public-house, are kept by Frenchmen. You have intelligence and polish in the towns, and in the country the blankest ignorance and the most primitive rudeness. The telegraphic wire runs along a road on each side of which there lie regions almost unexplored, whose inhabitants worship unknown deities and speak unknown tongues. This contrast gives all the idea of a new country, like Western America or one of our colonies; yet here one feels at every step that the country is old, with a civilisation which, though it never blossomed, never quite withered up, a civilisation older than our own. Seeing the ancient churches and castles, most of which have some legend attached to them (though such legends are as seldom poetical as they are trustworthy), one has an odd sort of sense of being in a country which has had a history, but a history that never emerged from twilight, which hardly anybody knows, and which it is not easy to find the means of knowing. In Eastern Russia and Siberia you acquiesce in the fact that there never was any history; the past is a blank, and must remain so. In Asia Minor, on the other hand, you are within the circle of Greek and Roman civilisation; everybody, from Herodotus downwards, has something to tell of its cities and peoples. But Georgia, and the regions immediately round it, have been always the frontier land of light and darkness, a battlefield of hostile empires and religions; first of the Roman empire and the Persians, then of Christianity and fire-worship, then of Christianity and Islam, then of Persians and Turks, lastly of Russia against both the Sultan and the Shah. One finds traces in the buildings and the art of the people of all these influences—of the Greek traders who frequented the markets of the Euxine; of the Byzantine emperors, who held sometimes more, sometimes less of the country, Justinian having pushed forward his garrisons as far as the Upper Kur and Heraclius as far down as Tavrız; of the Genoese, who monopolised the Black Sea trade in the later days of Byzantine rule, and had their settlements all round its coasts; of the Persians and Armenians, who came as conquerors or immigrants. There is a wonderful harvest awaiting the archaeologist here, and the labourers are still few.

With this curious sense of a complex and almost unexplored past, the traveller has a still stranger feeling of perplexity as to the future. Transcaucasia is so rich by nature, so important by position, that nobody can doubt it has a considerable part to play in

history. What will that part be? Are commerce and culture likely to advance? Can Russia maintain her hold on these peoples? Will they themselves be melted down into one nation, and if so, what is the element, out of the many now contending, that will ultimately prevail?

So far, little or no assimilation among the various races of the country has taken place. In the towns they get somewhat more mixed together as trade grows and communications are opened up. But they are not fused, and with one insignificant exception they do not seem on the way to become fused. For this there are several obvious causes. The chief races are in point of numbers pretty equally balanced, so that no one of them is able to absorb the other. Neither is any one sufficiently superior in intellect and force of character to take the lead and impress its type upon the whole mass. The Russians, as being the rulers and the most civilised, might be expected to be able to effect this, but it must be remembered that they are not very numerous, consisting only of the upper officials, of the soldiers, who are a transitory element in the population, and of some isolated settlements of dissenting peasants. Moreover, they are not thoroughly civilised themselves, and cannot impart what they have not got. Civilisation in Russia is like a coat of paint over unseasoned wood; the unsoundness of the material is not at once detected, but it may fail when tested. A further obstacle is to be found in the differences of language and manners between the various Transcaucasian peoples, differences greater than those that separate Frenchmen from Spaniards or even from Englishmen; differences which might of course yield to the influences of commerce and a common participation in the working of free institutions, but which prolong themselves from generation to generation under a bureaucratic despotism which treats the people merely as taxpayers to be kept in order, which does something for them, but nothing by or through them. General compulsory service in the army, which has not yet been introduced here,²⁷ might in time diminish this sense of separation; nothing else seems likely to do so.

Finally, and this is the chief cause of the mutual repulsion of the atoms, there is the religious difficulty. It is of course greatest between the Tatars, the Lesghians, Tchetchens, and other Caucasian peoples, and the Persians, all of whom are Mohammedans of the Sunni or Shiah persuasion, and the Christians. So far as one can see, there is not much active Mohammedan fanaticism in these countries; even among the Lesghians it has very much cooled down from the heat of ShamyI's days. No one in Tiflis seemed in 1876 to fear that the Czar might be embarrassed in any war with Turkey by the disaffection of his own Muslim subjects. The Persians hate all Turks worse than they hate Christians, and may even, to the extent of their very limited power,

²⁷ [General service in the Russian army was introduced about 1886, even for the Christian tribes of the mountains, the Muslims paying a tax instead, but does not seem to be strictly enforced in some districts. Recruits are usually kept isolated and sent to serve in distant parts of the empire, as Austria, fifty years ago, was wont to send her Magyar conscripts to Dalmatia and her Italians to Galicia. I am told that Georgians are seldom allowed to rise to high posts in the army till they are well advanced in life. — Note to Fourth Edition .]

side with Russia in the quarrel The Tatars are a simple folk of shepherds, carriers, highwaymen, with no sense of the “solidarity of the Turkish race,” and no desire to draw the sword against the infidel. But since religion is the main influence that governs the lives of these peoples, is indeed the only intellectual life they have, and makes itself felt in all their customs and sympathies, it erects a barrier hardly to be crossed between them and the Christians. The Armenian peasantry of the Araxes valley seem to live much in the same way as their Tatar neighbours; their villages are little better, nor are they less illiterate. But one never hears of intermarriages nor any sort of *rapprochement* between them. Among the Christians themselves, the separate existence and strongly national character of the Armenian Church keeps its children apart not only from Protestant Germans, but from those who own the Orthodox Eastern faith. And it is really only where such a religious repulsion does not exist, as, for instance, between Russians and Georgians, that any social amalgamation goes on.²⁸

An able traveller who visited these countries several years ago, and has written some interesting remarks upon them,²⁹ suggests the probability of their growing into a Transcaucasian state independent of Russia. Admitting that the army and the administration of the Caucasus have already a certain amount of distinctive character, the facts above stated seem to oppose themselves to such a prospect. To an observer in Tiflis now there seems hardly more likelihood of a Russian hero, however able or ambitious, making himself the sovereign of a kingdom of the Caucasus than there is of a Viceroy of India revolting from the English Queen.

There is no unity among these races, no common national feeling to appeal to, nothing on which a national kingdom could be based. Nothing, in fact, keeps them together but the Russian army and administration, and the loyalty of both these to the Czar is that which keeps Russia herself together, rising as it does almost to the dignity of a national worship. A very extraordinary concurrence of circumstances must be imagined to make the rebellion of a Russian general have any prospect of success, while a peaceable separation of these provinces, so valuable in a strategical point of view, is even less likely. Moreover, they are every day being brought nearer and nearer to the heart of the empire. Since the completion of the railway from Rostof on the Don to Vladikavkaz at the north foot of the Caucasus, the post which leaves Moscow on Sunday night can reach Tiflis on the Friday morning, having to traverse only 126 miles of road from the terminus to Tiflis itself. The project of a railway over the mountains to supersede even this piece of road travelling, and to enable troops to step into a railroad car on the Neva and step out of it on the Kur, is not likely to be carried out for many years to come, for its cost would be prodigious, and other military communications, that, for instance, from Orenburg to Tashkend, are more pressing.³⁰ But as Southern Russia

²⁸ [This process of amalgamation has stopped of late years, owing to the revival of national feeling among the Georgians. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

²⁹ Mr. Ashton Dilke, in the *Fortnightly Review*, some years ago.

³⁰ [Now that Russia has made her Transcaspian railway from the south-east coast of the Caspian to Samarcand, and is continuing it thence to Andijan and Tashkend, a line from Orenburg to Tashkend is less needed than it was in 1877. It

fills up by the movement of population which is continually going on from north to south, the Transcaucasians will seem less and less remote, and will be connected by more active relations of trade and social intercourse with the European side of the Caucasus. Already the opening of the railway to Poti on the Black Sea,³¹ whence steamers run regularly to the Crimea and Odessa, has made intercourse with the mother country easier and more frequent, and strengthens the unity of sentiment between Holy Russia and her children in these outlying provinces.

Improbable, however, as the separation of Transcaucasia seems, its Russianisation, in anything more than administration, seems almost as distant. It is not well governed, being, like so much else in the Empire, both over-administered and ill-administered. In material prosperity, in the diffusion of light, morality, refinement, it is advancing very slowly. Germans, or Frenchmen, or Americans, would probably have effected far more in seventy years of occupation than the Russians have done. But compare it with the condition of Georgia or Mingrelia under their own princes, or, still better, compare it with that of the neighbouring territories of the Sultan or the Shah, which are daily going back, where there is absolutely no security for life, honour, or property, and its fortunes appear happy indeed.

Supplementary Observations (Fourth Edition)

The account of Transcaucasia contained in the foregoing chapter is, as I am informed by trustworthy persons who have very recently travelled in the country, still true in all its main features; and I have, therefore, not altered the substance of the text, while correcting in footnotes those statements which need some modification or addition in order to make them apply to the present time. There are, however, five important changes which the last twenty years have brought with them, and which need to be specially noted.

- I. In 1878, by the Treaty of Berlin, in this point partly confirming and partly varying the Treaty of San Stefano, a considerable piece of territory adjoining Transcaucasia on the south-west was ceded to Russia by Turkey. This territory included the harbour of Batum, which has now become the principal port of Transcaucasia on the Euxine, with the fortresses of Kars and Ardahan. Its population was chiefly Armenian in the eastern, largely Mohammedan in the western half.
- II. Since 1877 there have been considerable emigrations of Mohammedans from different parts of the country into Turkey. The first to go were the Lazes, who dwelt in the mountains behind Batum. The Turks made no proper arrangements for their

seems probable that before long a line may be constructed across the Caucasus, perhaps by the Dariel, [perhaps farther west, so as to strike the Black Sea at Sukhum Kalek. A line is now in construction from Tiflis to Kars. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

³¹ [This railway now runs all the way to Batum on the Black Sea and to Baku on the Caspian. — Note to Fourth Edition.]

reception, and many perished of hunger or disease near Constantinople.³² Somewhat later many Muslims went from Daghestan, leaving whole districts empty; but of these some are said to have returned, finding themselves worse off under the Turks. In some places Russian peasants have been brought in by the Government to fill the vacant space, land being refused to the Armenians, whose number it was not desired to increase. These settlers, however, do not always prosper. Those planted along the Black Sea coast have suffered severely from fever; and those who survive are said to be apt to become Georgianised, thereby defeating the object of the Government which carried them so far south.

- III. In 1886 a railway was opened all the way from Tiflis to Baku, thus bringing the Black Sea into easy connection with the Caspian, and opening a new and important route for trade from Northern Persia and Central Asia, while at the same time stimulating the development of the great oil-field at Baku. The production and refining of mineral oils has now become the chief industry of Transcaucasia, and the traffic on the railway has immensely grown. Much European capital has come into the country, and much more would come in were the administration a better one.
- IV. The Armenian element in the population of Transcaucasia has largely increased, not only by the addition of the territory taken from the Turks in 1878, but by the growth of the Armenians in Tiflis and other towns. National sentiment among them has become far stronger and more general, chiefly owing to the sufferings of the unhappy members of their faith and race in Turkey, and to the movement for endeavouring to secure some sort of local autonomy for the Armenian provinces of the Sultan. Patriotic Committees have been formed in Tiflis; and it is supposed that from there some sort of propaganda has been carried on, though, so far as I know, no anti-Russian feeling has been shown, and no plans unfriendly to Russian authority formed. The movement has excited the suspicion and alarm of the Russian authorities. Even before it took definite shape, they had begun to look askance on everything Armenian, and in particular to discourage the use of the Armenian language. They have now adopted a strongly anti-Armenian policy, treating Armenian schools with marked disfavour—200 are said to have been shut—admitting few Armenians as officers in the army, and closing (so one is told) the path of promotion to Armenians in the public service of Transcaucasia.
- V. In 1876 national feeling among the Georgians seemed to be at a low ebb. It has since grown apace. The change began when, soon after the death of the Czar Alexander II., his successor changed the liberal policy of that excellent monarch, dismissed his chief minister, General Loris Melikoff (himself an Armenian), and authorised the methods of repression which have been since followed. This revival has shown itself in the increased use of the national dress and of the national

³² In 1880 I saw many of them dying patiently from fever and starvation near Ismid.

language, in a drawing away from Russians, as indicated by the diminution of intermarriage between the races, but most of all in the development of a literature, full of life and inspired by an ardent patriotism. Ancient Georgian writings are being republished, and many new writers have arisen. There are at present one daily and three weekly newspapers, as well as two monthly magazines, published in Georgian, — a remarkable fact, considering the smallness of the nation, and the extreme smallness of the educated class. (Among the peasantry, however, the national sentiment is, in its way, not less strong.) The women, who are keenly patriotic, have taken a prominent part in the movement. The Russian Government, which of course desires the complete Russification of the country, does its best to check this tendency, discourages the use of the Georgian language in schools and otherwise, and is endeavouring to assimilate the Georgian liturgy in all respects to the Russian, and to place Russian prelates over it. Disturbances have more than once occurred among the students at the theological seminary owing to this policy.

Although I gather that Russia is less popular to-day among the native inhabitants of Transcaucasia than she was in 1876, and that no real success has attended her efforts to Russianise them, there is no reason to think that her political hold on the country is substantially weaker. She has an overwhelming military force, and has greatly improved her lines of communication with Europe. There is no active disaffection against her government, and nothing less than a great political change affecting the whole Russian Empire seems likely to bring about the detachment of these Asiatic provinces. But they are not becoming, and there is no present prospect that they will become, any more truly Russian, socially and linguistically, than they were twenty years ago. The spirit of nationality, which seems to have waned in most parts of Europe, where indeed its work has been largely accomplished, has spread to these backward countries, and is a potent factor in their politics.

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Yerevan, 2023



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David Ananun (David Hovhannes Ter-Danielyan), is one of the prominent figures of the Armenian reality of the first 30 years of the 20th century. He was born in Mets Shen village of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1880. He spent his years of adolescence and youth in Baku, serving in oil companies. In 1905, he joined the Armenian Social-Democratic Labor Organization (the so-called “specifics”) and became one of its leaders and prominent ideologists.

The renowned public-political figure, historian-economist, philosopher-sociologist, publicist-editor, literary critic D. Ananun left a rich scientific, political and literary legacy scattered on the pages of the periodical press. If all his published researches, articles, editorials, reviews, translations are put together, they can make dozens of volumes. However, the masterpiece of his works is the three-volume study “Public Development of Russian-Armenians” (vol. 1, Baku, 1916; vol. 2, Etchmiadzin, 1922; vol. 3, Venice, 1926). Using a large number of materials and statistical data in his studies, D. Ananun analyzed the patterns of economic, political and cultural development of Eastern Armenians, put forward the idea of the need for national consolidation. On how to address the issues of the Armenian national liberation movement and the Armenian Question, D. Ananun was in polemics with the Bolsheviks and ARF Dashnaktsutyun. He rejected the demagoguery of ARF Dashnaktsutyun and the “ardent” internationalism of the Bolsheviks. He did not accept as well the role of class consciousness in history and gave priority to the consciousness of national identity. D. Ananun’s assessment on Russia’s progressive role in the social development of Armenian people in the 19th century retains its relevance.

In March 1918, D. Ananun took part in the defeat of the Musavat forces by the Baku Commune and the Armenian National Council. He was a special guardian-commissar who ensured the safety of the Muslims living or hiding in the Armenian part of the city.


Throughout his life activity, especially in 1918–1920, the situation in Nagorno Karabakh was of great concern to D. Ananun, who visited the region several times, shared his impressions and observations with the Armenian public through a series of articles. Among them, the article “Karabakh” stands out, in which he substantiates the necessity to reunite Karabakh with the “motherland” – Armenia.

At the beginning of July 1919, D. Ananun moved from Tiflis to Yerevan. He contributed to the establishment of the First Republic of Armenia through his literary, cultural and socio-political activities. He held a number of state positions, edited the bi-

weekly newspaper “Cooperation of Armenia”. He was in constant contact with the literary, cultural and public figures – Hovh. Tumanyan, Ash. Hovhannisyan, V. Teryan, Vrt. Papazyan, Leo, D. Demirchyan, Ye. Charents, St. Zoryan, P. Makintsyan, K. Mikaelyan and others.

After the establishment of the Soviet power in Armenia, D. Ananun took an active part in state building, particularly, in the cultural and educational sphere. He was a researcher at the Cultural and Historical Institute in Etchmiadzin, worked for the Institute’s “Banber” (“Herald”) periodical, and gave lectures on relevant topics. From 1923 to 1926 he was the Head of the Department of Revolution of the State Museum of Armenia. Thanks to his energetic efforts, he made a great contribution to the museum’s collection in the form of numerous documents, collections of newspapers, books, archival materials, items, and related funds. However, his political and ideological views, the fact that he belonged to “specifics” in the past, the ideas of “unification of Armenians” and national consolidation were sharply criticized, he was called a “nationalist” and a “harmful element”.

On July 28, 1927, D. Ananun was arrested as a “fierce enemy of the proletarian revolution and the Soviet power”, on April 27, 1928, he was sentenced to three years and exiled to the village of Ilyino, Tomsk region, Narim territory, then he was sent to a concentration camp in Ufa. After serving his sentence, he was forbidden to live in the central parts of the country, as well as in the Caucasus and he settled in Astrakhan. After some time, on August 16, 1939, he was again arrested and sentenced to 10 years of exile but, taking into account his age, he was sent to the camp in Astrakhan where he died in 1943. He was rehabilitated in 1989.




THE PRIMARY SOURCES OF THE THIRD MILLENIUM BC ABOUT THE ARMENIAN HIGHLANDS

by **Artak Movsisyan, Robert Ghazaryan, Ruslan Tsakanyan, Lianna Karapetyan**

Yerevan, YSU, 2023, p. 194

The book represents the scientific edition and historical examination of the Mesopotamian cuneiform texts of the third millennium BC which are one of the most important sources of the ancient history of the countries and settlements of the Armenian Highlands.




ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMENIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL OF GEORGIA, AUGUST 1918 - FEBRUARY 1921

Documents and materials

by **Benjamin Mayilyan**

Yerevan, Copy Print, 2023, 331 p.

The collection includes the documents and materials that elucidate the activities of the Armenian National Council of Georgia. It unveils the public, political, social-economic, legal, educational, cultural and other pressing issues and challenges faced by Armenians in Georgia.



ARARAT IN AMERICA: ARMENIAN AMERICAN CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY


by **Benjamin L. Alexander**

I.B. Tauris, 2023, 264 p., 16 bw ill.

How has the distinctive Armenian-American community expressed its identity as an ethnic minority while 'assimilating' to life in the United States? This book examines the role of community leaders and influencers, including clergy, youth organizers, and partisan newspaper editors, in fostering not only a sense of Armenian identity but specific ethnic-partisan leanings within the group's population. Against the

backdrop of key geopolitical events from the aftermath of the Armenian Genocide to the creation of an independent and then Soviet Armenia, it explores the rivalry between two major Armenian political parties, the Tashnags and the Ramgavars, and the relationship that existed between partisan leaders and their broader constituency. Rather than treating the partisan conflict as simply an impediment to Armenian unity, Benjamin Alexander examines the functional if accidental role that it played in keeping certain community institutions alive. He further analyses the two camps as representing two conflicting visions of how to be an ethnic group, drawing a comparison between the sociology-of-religion models of comfort religion and challenge religion. A detailed political and social

history, this book integrates the Armenian experience into the broader and more familiar narratives of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War in the USA.




THE GOSPEL OF PRINCE VASAK AND THE ICONOGRAPHIC TRADITIONS OF ARMENIAN ROYAL MANUSCRIPTS OF CILICIA

by **Emma Chookaszian**

Yerevan, 2023, 192 p.

This is the first monographic study of the second gospel of prince Vasak (Treasury of Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem, Ms. 2568/13), which was produced in the last quarter of the 13th century. The main focus of this monography is determining the age of prince Vasak's Gospel. The book offers a detailed analysis of both historical context and stylistic changes appearing in the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia at the end of the 13th century. It also gives a

comprehensive account of the manuscript itself and thoroughly examines the orientation and the aspirations of the artists and the commissioner of this manuscript.




ARMENIA THROUGH THE LENS OF TIME

Multidisciplinary Studies in Honour of Theo Maarten van Lint Series: Armenian Texts and Studies, Volume: 6

Editors: **Federico Alpi, Robin Meyer, Irene Tinti, and David Zakarian**, *Brill, 2023, 564 p.*

From pilgrimage sites in the far west of Europe to the Persian court; from mystic visions to a gruesome contemporary “dance”; from a mundane poem on wine to staggering religious art: thus far in space and time extends the world of the Armenians. A glimpse of the vast and still largely unexplored threads that connect it to the wider world is offered by the papers assembled

here in homage to one of the most versatile contemporary armenologists, Theo Maarten van Lint. This collection offers original insights through a multifaceted lens, showing how much Armenology can offer to Art History, History, Linguistics, Philology, Literature, and Religious Studies. Scholars will find new inspirations and connections, while the general reader will open a window to a world that is just as wide as it is often unseen.




AFTER THE OTTOMANS-GENOCIDE'S LONG SHADOW AND ARMENIAN RESILIENCE

Edited by **Hans-Lukas Kieser, Seyhan Bayraktar, and Khatchig Mouradian**, Afterword by **Raymond Kevorkian**, *I.B. Tauris, 2023, 304 p.*

This book deals with the lasting impact and the formative legacy of removal, dispossession and the politics of genocide in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire. For understanding contemporary Turkey and the neighboring region, it is important to revisit the massive transformation of the late-Ottoman world caused by persistent warfare between 1912 and 1922.

This fourth volume of a series focusing on the “Ottoman Cataclysm” looks at the century-long consequences and persistent implications of the Armenian genocide. It deals with the actions and words of the Armenians as they grappled with total destruction and tried to emerge from under it. Eleven scholars of history, anthropology, literature and political science explore the Ottoman Armenians not only as the major victims of the First World War and the post-war treaties, but also as agents striving for survival, writing history, transmitting the memory and searching for justice.



CAUCASIAN ALBANIA

An International Handbook

Edited by: **Jost Gippert and Jasmine Dum-Tragut**

De Gruyter Mouton, 2023, 735 p., ill. 27 col. ill. 88, tables 46

By consequence of the Karabakh War in 2020 and due to Azerbaijanian revisionism concerning the history, culture and cultural monuments of the region, the discussion on Caucasian "Albania", which is little known in the West in both academic and public circles, has been reignited. The handbook provides an overview of the current state of research on the Caucasian "Albanians" in an objective, scientifically

sound manner. The contributions are not necessarily intended to reveal new scientific findings but rather to summarise approved knowledge. The volume brings together internationally renowned scholars, researchers and practitioners from various fields of studies reporting on and reviewing the state of research concerning the Caucasian

"Albanians", their history and archaeology, their language and written monuments, their religion, church history and their art, including their relation to the Udi people of today. The companion is intended to neutrally introduce the readership to the subject of Caucasian Albania from various perspectives.

Unique handbook on the historical Albania of the Caucasus based on long-time research by international experts highly interdisciplinary and up-to-date



THE ARMENIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN 1991-2005

by **Karen Mkrtchyan**

Yerevan, Institute of History, NAS of Armenia, 2023, 257 p.

The book addresses the Armenian-Iranian political, economic, educational, scientific and cultural relationships in 1991-2005, as well as the role of the Armenian community which had a certain participation in that process.




REFLECTIONS OF 1918-1921 EVENTS IN THE VERBAL MEMORY OF SHIRAK PEOPLE

Collection of materials by **Karine Bazeyan**

Shirak Armenology Research Center, 2023, 283 p.

This work presents the oral and written histories preserved in the local population about the realities of 1918-1921 in the territory of Shirak province, which mainly refer to the description of the two Turkish invasions of 1918-1920 and their aftermath. The collection includes the memories and oral histories from more than 40 settlements of Shirak region about the realities of 1918-1921 in Alexandrapol province and their socio-economic and cultural consequences, which were juxtaposed with literature and archival materials. Based on the above-mentioned materials, a map representing the consequences of the Turkish invasions was compiled.




HISTORY OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES OF ARMENIA

Volume 3, Modern Times

Editor in Chief: **Ruben Safrastyan**

Yerevan, Zangak, 2023, 600p., 24 ill.

The third volume of the *History of Neighbouring Countries of Armenia* includes the history of Iran, the Arab countries, Georgia, the Ottoman Empire and the region of Eastern Caucasus from the end of 18th to the beginning of 20th centuries.



THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ARTSAKH-KARABAKH. FACTS AND FICTION

by **Stepan Dadayan**

Armav, 2023, 504 p.

The first edition of the book was published in 2017, under the title "Political history of Artsakh-Karabakh from Khamsa to autonomy, facts and fiction." Tragic events of autumn 2020 forced the author to supplement it with new facts and conclusions. Particular attention is paid in the work to criticism of anti-scientific, historically unsubstantiated thoughts of Azerbaijani historians about the political history of Artsakh-Karabakh, an integral part of historical Armenia.



THE ARMENIAN DIASPORA AND STATELESS POWER

Collective Identity in the Transnational 20th Century

Talar Chahinian (Anthology Editor), Sossie Kasbarian (Anthology Editor), Tsolin Nalbantian

(Anthology Editor), I.B. Tauris, 2023, 328 p.

From genocide, forced displacement, and emigration, to the gradual establishment of sedentary and rooted global communities, how has the Armenian diaspora formed and maintained a sense of collective identity? This book explores the richness and

magnitude of the Armenian experience through the 20th century to examine how Armenian diaspora elites and their institutions emerged in the post-genocide period and used “stateless power” to compose forms of social discipline. Historians, cultural theorists, literary critics, sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists explore how national and transnational institutions were built in far-flung sites from Istanbul, Aleppo, Beirut and Jerusalem to Paris, Los Angeles, and the American mid-west. Exploring literary and cultural production as well as the role of religious institutions, the book probes the history and experience of the Armenian diaspora through the long 20th century, from the role of the fin-de-siècle émigré Armenian press to the experience of Syrian-Armenian asylum seekers in the 21st century. It shows that a diaspora's statelessness can not only be evidence of its power, but also how this “stateless power” acts as an alternative and complement to the nation-state.

PERSONALIA

ANUSHAVAN ZAKARYAN
(On the occasion of the 70th birthday)



Doctor of Philological Sciences Anushavan H. Zakaryan, editor-in-chief of “Historical-Philological Journal”, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, celebrated his 70th birthday. The well-earned name of editor, publisher, journalist, pedagogue, researcher accompanies him from the very first steps in his work. His career is purely connected with the system of the National Academy of Sciences. Today, occupying the very important position of the editor-in-chief of this internationally renowned Armenian Studies journal, he simultaneously carries out effective activities in the field of scientific research.

A. Zakaryan was born on December 14, 1953, in the village of Paraka, Ordubad district (Goghtan province), Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, USSR, in the family of a doctor. The entire environment was intellectual and mainly philological, which left its mark on A. Zakaryan’s professional orientation.

From an early age he settled with his family in Yerevan, where he was admitted in 1961, in 1971 he graduated from N. Krupskaya (now Nikol Aghbalyan) 19th secondary school. Then he continued his studies at the Faculty of Philology of the Armenian State Pedagogical Institute named after Kh. Abovyan.

A. Zakaryan’s field of activity is wide and comprehensive: editorial-publishing work, state service, scientific research activity. It should be noted that the famous historian V. Mikayelyan, member of the Academy of Sciences has largely contributed to the development of professionalism of A. Zakaryan.

In 1977, he started working as an editor in the publishing house of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR (1977-1980). During that time he edited more than two dozen scientific studies and monographs. The editor’s work then becomes one of his main fields of work, which requires perfect knowledge of Armenian, scientific discipline of thought, as well as skill and patience in working with authors. In 1980, as a responsible secretary, he was invited to work at the “Bulletin of Social Sciences” (Lraber).

In 1989-1990 A. Zakaryan was also responsible secretary of the “Goyamart” weekly newspaper of the Socio-political organization “Hayastan”.

In 1993 A. Zakaryan was invited to work in the Staff of the RA Supreme Council as the head of the publishing department. In a short period of time, he did his best to organize the transcripts of the meetings of the sessions of the Supreme Council accumulated over the years and the current sessions, organize the work of publishing the Armenian and Russian bulletins of the Supreme Council on time.

From October 1995, A. Zakaryan headed various structural divisions of the newly formed National Assembly Staff. He was the deputy head of the protocol-publishing department, the head of the translation-publishing sub-department, the head of the office, as well as the deputy head of the secretariat.

A. Zakaryan's organizational abilities and activities were best demonstrated in the position of executive director of the newly created "Official Bulletin of the Republic of Armenia" of the RA Government Office (1998). Since then, he continued working in the Staff of the National Assembly. From 2000 to 2019, he was the head of the publishing department in the National Assembly and then in its various divisions. The Illustrated trilingual (Armenian, Russian, English) books of the "National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia" (second, third, fourth, fifth convocations) were made under his direct leadership.

With the National Academy of Sciences A. Zakaryan's ties were not interrupted during this time. In 1999, at the recommendation of the editor-in-chief of the "Historical-Philological Journal" V. Mikayelyan, he assumed the position of the responsible secretary of the journal, and then in 2003, the position of the deputy editor-in-chief. In 2018 A. Zakaryan was elected editor-in-chief of the periodical. In all these positions, he showed himself in the best ways, was a skilled organizer of work, conducted a knowledgeable editorial dialogue with the authors, not only accepted and edited materials for printing, but also ordered them, did not miss memorable dates and anniversaries. Thanks to A. Zakaryan and the harmonious and efficient work of the editors, the already 65-year-old journal has always been published on time and today occupies an undeniable leading position among Armenian journals published in the homeland and abroad.

From February 2022 A. Zakaryan also works as a senior researcher at the Department of Diaspora Armenian Art and International Relations of the Institute of Arts of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia.

Wherever he worked, scientific work was always in the center of his attention. Today, he is the author of 16 monographs and 7 collection of articles, more than 250 articles, publications and reviews. Undisputed research and analytical abilities, knowledge of sources, knowledge of press and archival materials provided the horizon of his scientific interests. First of all, all this covers a wide range of Armenian-Russian historical and cultural relations, issues of the Armenian reality of the first quarter of the 20th century, coverage of the less studied problems of the Armenian Question and the Armenian Genocide.

Armenian-Russian historical and cultural ties, the history of our spiritual life of the first decade of the 20th century, have been newly revealed by A. Zakaryan. Those works refer to the Armenian-Russian literary-cultural ties in a comprehensive way, the herald of which was his candidate thesis defended in 1985 – "Russian writers in Transcaucasia and the Armenian literary life", and in 2005 "Russian literary figures and the Armenian reality (1910s)" was the subject of his doctoral dissertation.

In A. Zakaryan's studies, literary critic, historian, culturalist, chronicler, social scientists are combined. Here are connections and references, impulses and relationships, so it is more convenient to give him the definition of an Armenologist, which more fully represents his scientific image. His research method is historical-comparative, historical-cultural, which are combined into a more comprehensive comparative method.

There are well-known or little-known names among Russian literary and public figures. The latter were unfamiliar not only to the general public but also to specialists. In this regard, A. Zakaryan's "Russian Writers in Transcaucasia and Armenian Literary Life (1914-1920)" (1984), "Russian Writers and Armenian Reality (1910s)" (1994), "The Tragedy of the Armenian People in the Assessment of Russian Writers" (2003) monographs is the first step in filling that gap. Relying on newly revealed rich facts, he presents the literary and social activities of little-known Russian literary critics, writers, poets who lived and created in Western Armenia and Transcaucasia during the period in question. Their various impartial testimonies, sympathetic attitude towards the tragedy of the Armenian people, which were reflected in their works, ties with the Armenian intelligentsia, practical help to Armenia and the Armenian people, have been focused on.

A. Zakaryan's next monograph entitled "Alexander Kulebyakin and Armenia" (2003) is dedicated to Major General A. Kulebyakin, commander of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps, who actively participated in the military operations of the Russian army in Western Armenia on the Caucasian front of the First World War. In the monograph, for the first time, the military commander's career after the departure of the Russian army from the Caucasus has been covered. Living in Tiflis, the "poet-general" actively participated in the social-political, literary-cultural life, particularly in solving important issues and problems affecting the Armenian society. He had friendly relations with many prominent figures of Armenian culture, literature, social-political, and military spheres.

A. Zakaryan is a well-informed researcher of the history of the Armenian press of the beginning of the 20th century. It was this that helped him to reflect on Alexander Shirvanzade's public speaking legacy of the 1910s and publish the work "From Shirvanzade's public speaking legacy (1914-1919)" in 2006. Those articles of the writer in the press are daily responses to the difficult historical times of the Armenian people, which address many and varied issues of national and political life with a great resonance today.

During the First World War and the years following it, 1916-1921, the famous Russian poet, writer, public speaker, translator and public figure S. Gorodetsky lived and worked in Western Armenia and Transcaucasia, to whom A. Zakaryan's monograph entitled "Sergei Gorodetsky in Western Armenia and Transcaucasia" (2010, Armenian and 2015, Russian) is devoted. According to A. Zakaryan, S. Gorodetsky is one of those figures familiar to Armenians with his literary-cultural, social-political and pro-Armenian activities. In this regard, he mentioned the remarkable article entitled

“Karabakh” that he published in the newspaper “Caucasian word” in 1919, where the author considered Karabakh as a native Armenian territory.

In 2012, he published a book in Armenian and Russian headed “Tiflis days of Ilya Ehrenburg”, where the famous Russian writer and public speaker I. Ehrenburg’s literary and public activity in Tiflis in September-October of 1920 brought into circulation a series of portraits dedicated to Russian poets Al. Blok, V. Brusov, K. Balmont and V. Mayakovsky.

Among A. Zakaryan’s studies, the monograph “The Western Armenian reality according to the assessment of the Russian publicist T. Olgenin” (2014) has a special place. Here, for the first time, the details of A. Berezovsky-Olginsky’s 1913 trip to the six provinces of Western Armenia (Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Tigranakert, Sebastia, Kharberd), the economic, political and social aspects of Western Armenians under the Turkish-Kurdish yoke are presented in detail.

Famous Russian poet, translator, literary critic, literary critic V. Brusov’s contribution to the study of Armenian poetry and propaganda of the works of Armenian and Russian literary experts was mainly evaluated in terms of the compilation and publication of the anthology “Poetry of Armenia”. Along with that, he carried out extensive activities in the direction of popularizing Armenian literature, culture, and history in the Russian and Armenian society. The 1916-1917 lectures delivered in Baku, Tiflis, Yerevan, Etchmiadzin were not the subject of a special study in terms of the circumstances and significance of contacts with Armenian literary and social life. The goal of filling this gap is pursued by the literary critic by publishing the monograph entitled “Armenia in V. Brusov’s Literary and Social Activity” (2016).

Dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the birth of the all-Armenian poet Hovhannes Tumanyan, A. Zakaryan published the book “Russian Writers and Hovhannes Tumanyan” (2019), where he brought together and carefully presented Russian writers who lived and worked in Tiflis – Balmont’s, Brusov’s, Gorodetsky’s, B. Lazarevsky’s and A. Kulebyakin’s creative relations, simple and direct human contacts with the Armenian poet.

In 2019 A. Zakaryan published a work titled “Russian Composer Thomas Hartman and Komitas” in one book in Armenian and Russian, where for the first time the merit of the Russian composer Thomas Hartman in valuing the life and work of the famous musicologist and composer Komitas is presented.

Russian art theoretician, translator Osip Mandelstam has a special place in the history of Soviet literature. His name is also strongly associated with Armenia and the Armenian people. In 1930, living in Armenia for six months and traveling around the country became fatal for him, because his subsequent short life remained connected with Armenia, Armenian culture, a connection that the Russian poet valued very dearly. The latter, however, mainly refers to the series of poems dedicated to Armenia and the prose work “Journey to Armenia”. Important historical realities, motives and prerequisites of his visit to Armenia, his approaches to the events related to the life of

the Armenian people were not detailed. The poet's visit to Shushi, the massacre of the Armenian population in 1920 and the city turned into a ruin by eyewitnesses, and the poem "The Chariot" written as a result of all these have a modern resonance. A. Zakaryan's work titled "Osip Mandelstam: The Poet and Armenia" published in Armenian in 2022 has come to fill this gap.

Recently, A. Zakaryan's new monograph "David Ananun: life and activity" (2023) was printed. In the work, the prolific life and activities of Ananun, one of the bright figures of the Armenian reality of the first thirty years of the 20th century, are presented with many factual and creative references.

The collections made by him occupy a special place in his research works. They are works in which not only the actual story has a place, but also the seemingly insignificant facts of the period. The latter create a dense and complete picture of time with memorable facts and become science. The book "The losses of the Armenian people in the years of the First World War" (Collection of documents and materials of the Investigative Commission of the Damages suffered by the Armenian people from the World War", 2005) has its unique place in that chain, with a foreword and annotations by A. Zakaryan. The published documents, as primary sources, have for us not only cognitive, but also historical, political, and, of course, practical-applicative significance.

The collection entitled "Historical Armenian Regiment" (2009) written by A. Zakaryan and dedicated to the military career of the Andranik regiment (1918-1919), the legendary hero of the Armenian national liberation movement, is also included in this series.

There are separate pages, dedicated to the grateful people of the field of Armenian Studies (G. Hovsepyan, St. Malkhasyants, S. Ter-Hakobyan, Ye. Otyan, P. Makintsyanyan, A. Chopanyan, M. Babayan, K. Mikayelyan, L. Lisitsyan, Komitas, Z. Yesayan, Irazek (H. Ter Hakobyan), D. Ananun and many others) together with correspondence, memoirs of archival materials. A. Zakaryan's publications reveal new aspects of their life and activities with introductory words and skillful scientific annotations.

Parallel to the scientific work since 1989 in different universities of the republic (Yerevan Veterinary Institute, "Galik" and "Gladzor" universities, Vanadzor Hovh. Tumanyan Pedagogical University) A. Zakaryan also has been engaged in lecturing and pedagogical activities.

A. Zakaryan is a member of Union of Journalists of USSR and Armenia since 1986. He has the rank of 1st class counselor of the RA State Service. From 2021 he is a full member of the Academy of Humanistic Problems.

Although burdened with state and scientific works, A. Zakaryan was at the roots of the establishment of "Nakhijevan" patriotic union, he was the vice-president of the union.

A. Zakaryan is an individual who stands above daily and household issues and interests. Open-mindedness, demandingness towards one's own person and those around him characterize this human-citizen. In this sense, he has earned respect and prestige in the scientific community and in the socio-political circles.

Even today, the Armenian scientist, who is 70 years old, is engaged in various projects, with the implementation of which the panorama of the Armenian historiographical and cultural life of the first quarter of the 20th century will become more complete. His merit deserves high appreciation, because he has his unique place in modern Armenian Studies.

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
DAVID GASPARYAN

Translated from Armenian by Gevorg Harutyunyan

ALEXANDER KESHISHYAN – 80

Alexander Keshishyan, the Syrian-Armenian famous ophthalmologist, intellectual, public figure, and big supporter of the centuries-long Armenian-Arab friendship is already 80-years old. By his patriotic selfless activity during his entire life A.Keshishyan contributed much to the strengthening of Armenian-Arab friendship. Rightfully, he could be regarded as the ambassador of Armenia in the Arab world.

A.Keshishyan was born in Aleppo in April 19, 1943 by Armenian father and Arab mother. He received his education in the Armenian Krtasirats school of Aleppo, then American Aleppo College, and Arab Raet al-Arabi schools. In 1964-1971 entered the Yerevan State Medical University (Armenia), the Department of Ophtalmology (supervisor Sergei Malayan). After graduating University in 1971-1974 he worked at the “Jebejian Ophtalmological Center”, the only such institution in the Middle East.



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Հայաստանի Հանրապետության
Նախագահի աշխատակազմի ղեկավար

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Membership

1976 - Founding member of the Syrian Ophtalmological Association.

1977 – Member of the French Ophtalmological Association.

2002 – Member of the Syrian Arab Writers' Association.

2002 – Member of the Syrian Archaeological Association.

2006 – Member of the Syrian Archaeological Association's governing body.

2007 – Editor-in-chief of the «Syrian Archaeological Al-Atiat Yearbook», published by the University of Aleppo in Arabic, English, French, and German. In the Yearbook were published studies of about 120 Arab and foreign archaeologists, professors, directors of museums.

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Leutenant-general Aram Garamanukyan

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In total he is the author of about 300 published in the Armenian and Arab newspapers and journals which deal with different aspects of Armenian studies, Armenian-Arab historical and cultural relations and related problems.

Awards

- 1) Syrian State Acknowledgment on the occasion of the festival “Aleppo as the Capital city of Islamic Culture” (2006).
- 2) Movses Khorenatsi order on the occasion of “500 years of Armenian printing” and “Yerevan as the capital city of books” (by the president Serzh Sargsyan, 2012).
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- 4) «Poster on the Occasion of Translator’s day 2000» from the associations of the Armenians of Aleppo (2000).
- 5) «Poster on the Occasion of Translator’s day 2000» from Armenian General Gymnastic Union (2000).
- 6) «Poster on the Occasion of Translator’s day 2000» from the Tekeyan Cultural Association (2000).
- 7) Award by the newspaper “Zartonq” (2006).
- 8) Poster of the Syrian Archaeological Association (2020).

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